

ETHICAL LOVE

ITS BASIS AND EXPRESSION

By E. WALES HIRST, M.A., B.Sc.

Author of "Self and Neighbour," Lecturer
in Christian Ethics at Manchester
University and in the United Meth-
odist and Hartley Colleges.

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After arguing that the roots of Ethical Love lie deeper than Sex or Parentalism, even in the fundamentally social nature of Life and the Universe, the author considers the aim of Love to be the creation of a World-Household, and reviews the sexual, economic, and political activities appropriate to such a world.


¶ For Biographical Note
see other Flap.

WHS

With best wishes,

E. W. Hunt.

ETHICAL LOVE



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TO
THE MEMORY OF
MY FATHER
AND OF
MY BROTHER "WILL"

“And the Buddha said: ‘I know that the king’s heart is full of love and that for his son’s sake he feels deep grief. But let the ties of love that bind him to the son whom he lost embrace with equal kindness all his fellow-beings, and he will receive in his place a greater one than Siddhartha, he will receive the Buddha, the teacher of truth, the preacher of righteousness, and the peace of Nirvana will enter his heart.’ ”

“Agreement as to justice and virtue is a closer relationship than blood.”

PHILO.

“Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother.”

JESUS CHRIST.

PREFACE

THIS book is an essay in Social Idealism. It is frankly Utopian in character. Its aim is not so much to afford guidance respecting "next steps" in social progress as to fix the location of the goal. Surely it is only by steadfast regard for the end in view that even the line of practicable social advance can be safely determined. The following pages are offered as yet another contribution to the study of what Ideal Humanity would be like. Our subject may be otherwise expressed as the Basis and Economy of a World-Household.

The general reader whose interests are primarily practical may be recommended to start with Part II, though it is hoped that even to such a one the more theoretical discussion of Part I will not be without appeal.

Though the author is alone responsible for the views that he expresses, he is especially indebted to the Vice-Chancellor of Liverpool University (Dr. H. J. W. Hetherington) for finding time in the midst of a busy life to read this book in typescript, and for offering some valued comments thereon. The writer also owes his thanks to two of his colleagues in particular: to Mr. Atkinson Lee, M.A., for helpful criticism, and to the Rev. G. G. Hornby, M.A., B.D., for his kindness in assisting with the proofs.

E. WALES HIRST.

May 1928.

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INTRODUCTION

THROUGHOUT history man's most troublesome problems have been practical rather than theoretical. His scientific achievements have been phenomenal; his failure in the art of social life has been tragic. How great, indeed, have been the triumphs of science through the centuries—eclipses calculated to a minute, stars measured and weighed and their orbits traced; the constituents of earth, air, and water discovered; the very nature of the atom revealed! Man has used knowledge to win dominion over land, sea, and air. And Nature has by this time largely become his servant.

Man's record, however, in the realm of Human Nature has not been so glorious. He has as yet succeeded only partially in living harmoniously with his neighbours. A certain family, tribal, and national life has, it is true, been achieved. But, in spite of this, man's social record has been marred by chronic hatred, strife, and bloodshed. The greatest war of all time was but yesterday, when the world's science had surpassed itself in brilliance of discovery.

The formation of a common purpose may to-day be more possible than in primitive times—witness the League of Nations. Still, though war is becoming less likely, it is not yet quite out of the question. What boots it, then, that man should subdue Nature if he cannot subdue himself? What avails all his knowledge if he turns it to an unsocial use? Unless he learns to live in peace, friendship, and brotherhood with his neighbours, his cleverness may destroy such civilization as already exists.

But it is not only War which tends to render nugatory man's attainments in science; other forms of strife do this in only lesser degree. Through man's inhumanity to man the help that science has given in the production and distribution of material forms of good has not proved the widespread blessing that might have been expected. Greed, Waste, Luxury, Indulgence, Idleness, have in different ways affected unfavourably both the production and the distribution of wealth. In spite, therefore, of the aid of machinery, and of discoveries in motive power, vastly increasing as they have done the facilities of manufacture and transport, a few are rich, a few more are moderately wealthy, but the vast majority are more or less poor. In our cities delectable areas border on miles of slums. Making all allowance for the alleged niggardliness of Nature, wherever the fault lies, one cannot say that the people as a whole reap the full benefit of science as applied to Industry. At one point or another the human factor keeps breaking down. As a result, material well-being is neither so great in the mass, nor so beneficially distributed, nor so well used, as it might and should be. And of course any stoppage of production, such as occurs in time of strikes and lock-outs, will, if long continued, involve an enormous loss of wealth.

There surely can be little doubt, then, that the ethical co-operation of all those engaged in the production of wealth would both augment its total amount and promote its favourable distribution. Wastage through inertia would be removed; wastage due to suspension of work through strife would end; wastage arising from under-production, however motivated, would cease; wastage caused by competitive conditions would be a thing of the past; and, finally, wastage incurred through unsocial consumption would be precluded.

Thus everything seems to depend ultimately on the way in which people live together—a truth emphasized by the homely aphorism that the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul. Accordingly we reverse the Marxian position and contend that the primary adjustment which Society needs to make is not to things or to material tendencies, but to other human beings or, more strictly speaking, to its own members.

Since the dawn of history there has, of course, always been some sort of social life, even though, as we have seen, it has not been so developed as to avoid conflict and bloodshed. And, indeed, social organization of some kind was always necessary to the continuance of life and to any standard of well-being. Roughly speaking, early groups were tribal, and inter-tribal history was a long record of strife. Then empires arose, but only to decay. They decayed for the very reason that they were reared on a basis of selfish power. Having conquered by the sword, by the sword they perished. That vast unitary organization of the Middle Ages to which they gave place—the Holy Roman Empire—likewise suffered disintegration through warring claims. Out of the quarrels of Pope, Emperor, and Peoples nations were born and States were made—only, however, to develop into rival “Powers” which also exercised more or less of a tyranny within their own borders. “It was not because of the ‘natural’ mortality of the State, but because of the defective basis of political authority, that the early empires fell, to impress mankind for ever with the sense of the transient character of pomp and power.”¹

No doubt through all the changes of history there has been a certain political progress which is in its way

¹ MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 60.

impressive. Without referring to various modifications of political types, we may say that in general the tendency in recent times has been to pass from the Authoritarian to the Democratic system of government. And of course the form of the social organization of a people is a matter of great moment. So important is it, indeed, that it can affect greatly their well-being. Clearly some forms of political control are better than others.

But the organization of a people, so long as it is nothing more than political in the technical sense, must always be defective in so far as it maintains itself by the help of force. A family is, of course, a natural unity, and its members are held together by the bond of consanguinity. Larger groups, again, preserve their coherence by means of the attraction of kinship. Where, however, the group is based mainly on the principle of neighbourhood or territory, its integrity has to be enforced; any recalcitrant section has to be subjected to control by the community under whose restraint it may be more or less docile.

The ideal social unity would seem to be a unity which is universal in its scope, and which has also the quality of perfect coherence. It must possess a coherence deeper than that of the kinship group and free from its exclusiveness: an intimacy, in fact, which is not mediated by sex, and which yet relates men to one another in a world-wide family.

On this view what we call Politics would be no other than the harmonious administration of the Great Household. The conception is akin to the Platonic view that citizenship is the outward expression of the goodness which animates the inner life of the citizens; for Plato, as it has been said, "imagines a State which should be the perfectly congruous home of the perfect

character." And there are at least two remarkable passages, one in the *Republic* and the other in the *Laws*, probably Plato's last work, which suggest a communism of a lofty description:—

"Is not that the best-ordered State which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul and forming one realm under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger?"¹

"The first and highest form of the State and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that 'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost—whether all this is possible or not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a State which will be truer or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a State is governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the State, and to cling to this, and to seek with all our might for one which is like this."²

Notwithstanding these noble sentiments, when we

¹ *Republic*, Bk. V, p. 344, tr. Jowett.

² *Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. V, Bk. V, pp. 121–2, tr. Jowett (Oxford, 1892).

examine the social system of the *Republic*, we find that it makes impossible a real spiritual fraternity. Drawing a mistaken analogy between virtue in the individual and virtue in the State, Plato applied his hierarchical view of the impulses of human nature to a hierarchical division of classes in the community. Just as the inner life of the individual should be a harmony of reason, spirit, and appetite, so the life of the community was to be a harmonious co-operation of the classes in the State which respectively embodied these different qualities. Corresponding to the highest principle of reason in the soul is the supreme class of guardians in the community whose function it is to apprehend Wisdom and mediate it to the rest of the people. The subordinate principle of "spirit" in the soul is represented by the soldier class who defend the community from foes without and within. The lowest impulse of the soul—that of appetite—characterizes the life of the workers or labourers whose vocation it is to serve the soldiers and guardians. The implication was that the love of harmony as between the impulses of the soul would express itself in the State by the pursuit of justice.

Plato's conception is no doubt a noble one in so far as it supposes all the classes of the community to be animated by a common devotion to the interests of the State as a whole. But, since the community was a small one, being modelled on the pattern of the Greek city-state, devotion thereto was necessarily limited in its range. That it was so limited seems to be implied by the existence of the soldier class, which suggests a relationship of conflict towards those who were without the State.

But even within the State the devotion of the several classes was ambiguous in its ethical quality. While

all classes serve the community, the devotion of the workers can never in its moral nature be equal to that of the guardians. The guardians, in virtue of their possessing a special native capacity, disciplined by appropriate education, can alone attain through their endowment of reason the knowledge of the ideal Good. The workers may attain only an inferior type of virtue, popular or civic virtue, founded, not on reason, but on "opinion," which practically meant the virtue of self-restraint. Now this is more than a distinction of functional service within the community. It means that not all can be equally good in the same sense, and this because for Plato the seat of virtue did not lie exclusively in the will. Only as goodness resides in the will can all men be good in the same sense. The morality of the *Republic*, therefore, after all allowances are made, is a caste morality and unfavourable to the creation of a brotherhood.

Further, we do not argue, as Plato did, from a so-called individual morality to a social, but rather *vice versa*. Instead of saying that justice in the community must be modelled on justice in the life of the individual, we hold that it is only by reference to the community that the individual can decide what it is "just" for him to do. In other words, it is only by regard for the interests of the community that the individual can determine the due regulation of his own impulses. Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, refers, however irrelevantly, to Friendship as the bond of social communities, and recognizes that neither external convention nor brute need can make the *polis* or cement society together where this high friendship is lacking. "If citizens be friends," he says, "they have no need of justice. . . . That principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of friendship." The

implications, however, of his discussion of friendship were not realized by Aristotle, whose idea of social organization was one in which a few were called to practise philosophic meditation while the many were destined to be content with a merely pedestrian type of virtue. As for slaves, of whom there were many in the city-state of his day, these were to Aristotle but "animated tools," and *qua* slaves were not the objects of either friendship or justice. Such a view, again, would make human brotherhood impossible.

In the present work we conceive Society in its perfect form as a vast association, not instituted for a specific purpose, whether of culture or of government, but as having its primary end within itself and its basis in the moral will. All other associations are to be regarded as ancillary to it. As this vast community would be bound together by love, it is comparable to a universal Family and a great Household.

Plato despaired of the establishment on the earth of a society even of the Just, as he conceived justice, and accordingly relegated such a community to a transcendental realm as its appropriate abode. "Perhaps," he said, "it is laid up in heaven as an ensample for him who desires to behold it, and, beholding, found a city in himself." That men should form a great Household may seem to many an even more hopeless ideal; and they will urge that our aim should be more modest and practicable. Among the Jews of the Pre-Christian era who expected the advent of a perfect society, some, like Plato, despaired of its location upon the earth, though others were less pessimistic.

Here, however, we may say that we do not regard our ideal as inherently impossible. It is in our view neither world-despairing nor world-approving, but, rightly understood, world-renewing. That this world

should be peopled by a community of brothers does not seem to us impossible in the very nature of things. Of course, apart from the question of immortality—a matter on which we cannot enter—the identity of such a community would be constantly changing by the alteration of its personnel through the events of death and birth.

The present work, however, is confessedly a study of an Ideal. The only criticism that is relevant, therefore, would seem to be regarding the truth of the Ideal. Its truth we seek to uphold in the chapters that follow. Though the Ideal may not be immediately realizable, and may be attainable at any time only with difficulty, yet it is imperative that we should know its direction. Unless we are aware of the location of the goal, we cannot be sure that any movement of ours will bring us towards it. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the goal will at least furnish guidance for the journey.

We may add, however, that the Ideal is so far from being impracticable in itself that it has actually been attained by some lives. Devotion to the common weal is not an unknown occurrence. In the first century of our era there were at Jerusalem a multitude of people who “were of one heart and of one soul.” And, indeed, in all ages there have been many who have merged their interests with those of their neighbours, and in religion, art, science, and politics have spent themselves in generous service. So recently as the Great War numbers of men gave up their lives as a sacrifice for humanity. What some have done others may do. The love of neighbours would seem to be in most men at least a potentiality.

In the first part of our book we try to prove that in human nature and in the nature of the Universe there is a foundation for Fraternity. Such a task will involve

us in biological and psychological investigations, or, as we would prefer to say, in a study which combines the viewpoints of these sciences, and which we may describe as psycho-biological in method. In this connection we shall consider Instinct in man from the genetic standpoint, and discuss the question of the basic impulses of human nature. Our conclusion that man is made for a life of community will be supplemented by a brief metaphysical argument to the effect that Reality is ultimately interpretable only as Love.

The second portion of the work is definitely ethical and practical. The fundamental impulses of human nature, when moralized, develop into communal affection. Society thus becomes a World-Household. Henceforth the individual member of such a community merges his interest in that of the whole Family. In matters, for instance, of sex, politics, and industry the moral welfare of the Great Household is paramount.

"The whole framework of society," said Sir James Seeley, "compared to what it might be, is as the hut of a savage to a Grecian Temple." Similarly great would be the transition from humanity in its "homeless" state to the life of a brotherhood in the Great Household.

PART I

THE FOUNDATION OF FRATERNITY

CHAPTER I

LIFE ACCORDING TO NATURE

IN the determination of conduct philosophers, ancient and modern, have sought guidance from "Nature." Nature, it was thought, supplied the norm for human activity, in the form both of a cosmic ideal apprehended by the reason, and of a specific tendency discernible in living things. The former approach to Nature was metaphysical, the latter biological and psychological. Both points of view are traceable in Plato, who, however, stresses "the ideal forms of justice, beauty, and temperance" as these are revealed to the philosopher, and are also embodied imperfectly in the life of man.¹ Aristotle, on the contrary, considers rather the actual process by which the divine ($\tau\acute{o}\ \theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$) is striven after in the life of animals and men. He looked upon Nature as "presenting a continuous series of graduated forms, each of which stands to that above it as matter to form, as means to end." Man is the crown of this development, and, like lower species of creatures, is destined to discover a "form" or $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ which is his true function. "Can we suppose," asks Aristotle, "that while a carpenter or a cobbler has a function and business of his own, man has no business and no function assigned him by Nature? Nay, surely, as his several members, eye and hand and foot, plainly have each his own function, so we must suppose that man also has some function over and above all these. What, then, is it? Life evidently he has in common even with

¹ *Republic*, Bk. VI, § 501, tr. Davies and Vaughan,

the Plants, but we want that which is peculiar to him." ¹

According to Aristotle, the life which is "natural" to man is not that out of which he develops, but that to which he moves, and which is his true *εἶδος*. And the material out of which this "natural" or ideal life is evolved is the instincts and passions common to him and the lower animals. Goodness in man is thus the blossoming, so to speak, of a long growth which has its roots in the humblest species of organic life.

That the good life is the "natural" life has been held by many since the days of Aristotle. To live in conformity with Nature was the ideal of the Stoics, who, however, conceived of Nature as Cosmic Reason which, filling the universe, dwelt in every soul of man.

Centuries later Cambridge Platonists deduced morality from "the nature of things."

By contrast with the metaphysical interpretation of Nature a psychological approach was made by Shaftesbury and Butler. They sought to discover man's true function by studying the "anatomy" of his mind. "Where," asks Shaftesbury, "can we fix our standard or how regulate ourselves but with regard to Nature, beyond which there is no measure or rule of things? . . . Let us doubt if we can everything about us . . . we cannot doubt of what passes within ourselves." Accordingly he finds that man's nature forms a constitution, that it is a "fabric," that there is order and symmetry in the soul, that parts and proportions obtain between the passions such as subsist between the organs of the body.

But not even Shaftesbury could solve the problem of conduct by psychological inquiry alone. Just as the metaphysician must take account of human nature, so

¹ *Nicom. Ethics*, Bk. I, ch. vii, §§ 11 and 12, tr. Peters.

must the psychologist supplement his investigations by metaphysical reflection. In the case of the soul of man it is not enough to lay bare its "parts"; it is necessary especially to decide what should be the "proportions" between the parts. In a physical organism function does actually correspond to structure: a whale, for example, does not walk, or a pig fly, or an eagle swim. But the correspondence of function to structure in man's case is not so inevitable. He is unable to choose the character of his instincts, but he appears to have some option with regard to their use: he can gratify one impulse and repress another. A man can stress the self-affections to the detriment of the social impulses, and *vice versa*. Indeed, he can organize one or the other into a dominant system or Sentiment. He may actually develop a Sentiment which Shaftesbury would have called "unnatural." So much so that when people say concerning an action that "it is only human nature" they are thinking only of what is normal in the life of man in the sense of what is usual or frequent. One of old said "in his haste" what others have sometimes said at their leisure: "All men are liars." But this affirmation was meant as a description of what is normal in human behaviour only in the sense of what is usual. And the very disappointment or disgust with which the judgment is made implies that other behaviour might have been expected, and, indeed, ought to have been in evidence. In the background of thought there is an idea of conduct that is normal, in the sense not of being frequent, but of being ideal.

But it may be said that Shaftesbury specifically indicated that it was neither the "private" nor the "public" affections which in themselves suit the constitution of man's nature, but rather the "balance" between them. This we believe to be a prophetic, if

somewhat dim, approach to the true solution of the moral problem. But that such "balance" was ethically right Shaftesbury's psychology did not and could not reveal. And it is significant that towards the end of the *Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit* he assigns a theological reason for approving and seeking a coincidence between private and public good.

In the present work we try, in accordance with tradition, to determine the natural life for man by invoking all the aid which psychology, supplemented by biology, can give. It is the basic presupposition of our inquiry that the life of man is solidary with that of sub-human creatures, and that morality is the flower in man of a growth which has its beginnings at least in primitive animate life. Thus will our study go beyond the largely introspectional standpoint of Shaftesbury.

But not even will psychology, however assisted by biology, alone disclose the human ideal of conduct. As Shaftesbury himself appeared to realize, and as his follower, Hutcheson, expressly stated, our ethical conclusions need supplementing by an inquiry of a more or less metaphysical kind. Our moral faculty, says Hutcheson in his *System of Moral Philosophy*, needs "corroborating" by the knowledge that a Governing Mind and a moral administration will bring about a perfect coincidence between public and private good. In other words, man's true nature and purpose cannot be determined apart from his "world," or in abstraction from the nature of things as a whole. The human ideal must at least be possible; but at the same time it must be really congruous with man's nature considered in all its relationships. This question of congruity will make it necessary for us to have some regard to the universe in which man is placed,

CHAPTER II

THE QUEST OF THE NATURAL LIFE

IN the previous chapter we indicated that our method of search for the life that is natural to man would be first of all psycho-biological. We must now give some reasons for this line of approach to the problem. Alexander Pope declared that the proper study of mankind is man, and certainly students of human nature have never been lacking.

The historian and the novelist both give us an account of human nature; the former tells us what men have actually done, and the latter in his descriptions of character must at least not be untrue to experience. The help we gain, however, from history and novels is ambiguous. We simply learn from them that the world is made up of all sorts, and we are left asking which is the right sort. Which are the really "natural" men—your Neros or your St. Pauls, your Casanovas or your Savonarolas? Or shall we find the really natural man somewhere between these extremes?

To empirical observation the testimony of human nature is ambiguous in the case of any individual on account of the fact that there is bad in the best and good in the worst. Those, indeed, who are regarded as the best are most keenly conscious of inconsistencies. Rare as it is to see the perfect physical form, it is rarer still to find the perfect soul, the soul that is at unity with itself. Lecky, in his *History of European Morals*, has given us many instances of ethical inconsistency in the lives of famous personalities, showing in particular

how often kindness and cruelty are strangely intermingled in the same individual. There is good also in the worst, as Robert Burns reminded us in his plea for a merciful judgment of those who succumb to temptation:—

What's done we partly may compute
But know not what's resisted.

And indeed any action implies not only the expression of some, but also the suppression of other tendencies; and the latter activity, which may remain secret, may possibly have the greater significance for our purpose. Now and again human behaviour displays inconsistencies which are quite bewildering. During the Great War, for instance, many a soldier, addicted to selfish vice on occasion, would perform deeds of heroic self-sacrifice, and even die, for his neighbour. It was recorded the other day that on one of our convict stations a prisoner dived into a lake to save his warder from drowning.

Amid all such ambiguities how can mere observation of what men do determine the ideal trend of human life?

Suppose, however, that we make our observation of human nature less external and more direct, can we by Introspection find out the normal tendency of the soul?

It was a well-known simile of Butler's that, just as by looking at a watch you could see that it was made to tell the time, so by looking at human nature you could find out what it was made for: "from his make, constitution, or nature, he (man) is, in the strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself." But the comparison holds good only up to a certain point. So far as merely having parts is concerned, a watch

and human nature are similar. Moreover, unless a certain proportion obtains between these parts, neither will a watch "go," nor a man live whether in a physical or a moral sense. But here the analogy ends. A watch has the proportions between its parts fixed for it, i.e. it is a machine; whereas the proportions between the "parts" of his nature have to be determined by the man himself, and in doing this some choice of alternative purposes is open to him. Whether the watch is broken or not makes no difference to its purpose, which is not disclosed from within, but imposed from without by its artificer, with whose purpose most people are acquainted (a watch, of course, being a familiar object); but a machine not in common use would not inherently reveal its purpose, whether it was broken or intact.

Does human nature reveal its purpose to mere introspection? Butler thinks that the original architectural plan is patent to all. He himself, however, seems rather uncertain of it—witness the inconsistency he shows in regard to the relative importance of the three "superior" principles—self-love, benevolence, and conscience. Other moralists who have adopted the observational method do not agree as to which impulse of our nature is to be regarded as the ideal; some stress the self-regarding impulse, some the other-regarding, while others emphasize both equally. Human nature, in other words, is by some pronounced essentially selfish; by others it is declared altruistic; by others, again, it is described as having a dual trend. We cannot, therefore, be altogether surprised at the statement of Möbius when he says, "The misapprehension of the human impulsive life is a veritable *testimonium paupertatis* for psychologists."¹

¹ Quoted in McDougall's *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 23.

The verdict of mere observation as to man's natural impulse is questioned further on the ground that the instinctive life is modified by thousands of years of social culture. Wittels, for instance, says: "Human beings have lived a social life for so many generations that the need to comply with social demands has become instinctive. . . . The 'cultural overtones' are now an integral constituent of the mind: through the practice and the heritage of millenia, they have acquired the force of a categorical imperative."¹ In this way social impulses are thought to have entered into the strata of the unconscious along with the sexual. Hence some sociologists have concluded that "the discernment of the instinctive element in man is not possible through observation, but only through logical inference."²

It is therefore not a matter of wonder that introspective psychology has come to be supplemented by auxiliary inquiries, in particular by a comparison of the human with the animal mind. This is in harmony with that principle of the continuity of all life which we assumed at the outset, and which, of course, is the implication of the doctrine of Evolution. By this comparison the psychologist broadens and deepens his view of human nature. He realizes that the basis of all the mind's activity is instinctive. Now it is by an inquiry into this instinctive basis that we are most likely to discover the mind's most characteristic trend. Of course very much depends upon what is meant by "instinctive"—whether it includes "any innately organized motor disposition" or is restricted to the mental or purposive aspect of an innate disposition.

¹ F. Wittels, *Sigmund Freud*, p. 198, tr. E. and C. Paul. (George Allen & Unwin, 1924.)

² Ellwood, *Psychology of Human Society*, p. 285. (Appleton, 1926.)

William James contented himself with a mere enumeration of the human instincts, based on "physiological analysis." Regarding them as the "functional correlates of structure," he found that there are as many native aptitudes as there are innate motor reactions, and these, of course, are fairly numerous.

Thorndike, also, appears to ascribe every distinguishable movement of mind or body to an independent instinct. McDougall distinguishes thirteen instincts.¹ Drever, in his *Instinct in Man*, classifies our innate tendencies into Appetites and Instincts, each of which has both general and specific forms, there being of the specific forms alone four pure and ten or eleven emotional varieties.

Now the purpose in all these classifications is primarily descriptive. When, however, we remember the evolutionary history of these instincts, we are sure that they are thus numerous only to latter-day observation. These various modes of reaction by the living organism have become gradually differentiated through the stress of need and in response to the stimulations of the environment. It is impossible to believe that such instincts, for instance, as those of Biting and Claspings, which William James distinguishes as separate, are not differentiations of such a kind. For this reason a merely descriptive Psychology is inadequate for our purpose. We need to gain a genetic point of view.

Whatever may be the final verdict on the work of Sigmund Freud, credit must always be accorded him for his attempt to reach a "metapsychology." No attempt can here be made at either an elaborate exposition or a criticism of the Psycho-analytic method. It may be sufficient to indicate the reasons why even this method seems scarcely adequate for our purpose.

¹ See his *Outline of Psychology*.

A characteristic doctrine of the Psycho-analytic school is that the real seat of mental activity is in the "Unconscious." The Unconscious is described as "a realm of the Ego which is unknown and cannot be spontaneously recalled by the subject, and which reveals its presence and activity only in a disguised form during dreams, or in fantasies or mania." In view of the enormous quantity of literature which has been devoted to the discussion of this conception, we shall confine ourselves to a short statement of the reasons why we do not look to this "Unconscious" in order to find the normal trend of human activity.

In the first place there is some doubt whether, if there be an "Unconscious," it can be made accessible. It is claimed by Psycho-analysts that if the thoughts of the subject are allowed to wander freely they will by their associations, symbolically interpreted, reveal the nature of the unconscious mind. Now it may not be difficult in this way to discover the existence of "complexes," i.e. morbid Sentiments, in pathological cases. But that is not to say that the key to the healthy mind can be found in the same way. Psycho-analysts are apt to arrive at general conclusions from instances that are special and abnormal.

Again, the Free Association method is too "free" in the sense that it tends to identify the casual with the causal relationship of ideas. Association of thoughts that are similar in however slight a respect is taken to imply identical causation. Moreover, there is still bolder assumption in treating free thoughts as "symptoms" or surrogates for repressed ideas. There seems, indeed, no limit to the ingenuity with which explanations are advanced for the most trivial details of mental experience. That these "explanations" are arbitrary and subjective is confirmed by the fact that "four

of the most eminent psycho-analysts—Freud, Jung, Rivers, and Adler—adopt quite different systems of interpretation, e.g., of dreams. Thus Freud interprets practically every dream as a symbolic realization of suppressed sexual desire. For Adler a dream is an expression of the instinct of self-preservation, of the will to power. Jung interprets some dreams on Freud's lines and some on Adler's. Rivers finds the purpose of a dream in the solution of a mental conflict.”¹ There is some justification, therefore, for the contention of Wohlgemuth that the method of Free Association tends to reveal the mind, not so much of the analysed as of the analyst, and this not only in the practice of hypnotic suggestion, but also in the scheme of ultimate interpretation.

There is always the danger, from which Psycho-analysts themselves are not exempt, of identifying that which is merely constant and persistent in the region of impulse with what is normal, not only in the sense of what is usual, but of what is ideal or representative. But one wonders whether some time in the far distant future that which is constant and persistent *then* might not be of another nature. Even now it is possible to find people—they may be few in number—in whom the specific sex-urge is comparatively weak—weak, that is to say, as compared with their sense of social sympathy and responsibility. If a few, however, can so orientate their affections, presumably many more, if not all, could do likewise. And should the world after the lapse of centuries become populated by such types, the Psycho-analysts of, say, A.D. 5000 might differ radically from their present-day representatives as to the root-tendency of human nature.

Our main objection to the method, however, is that,

¹ *Times Lit. Sup.*, February 14, 1924.

while Psycho-analysts claim to be thorough in their investigation of human nature, they are not thorough enough. Jung, for instance, thinks that the "general" unconscious (as distinguished from the "personal," which is acquired during personal life and is the repressed experience of the individual) contains the racial strata of thought and feeling, preserving what is ancient and prehistoric in the life of man. He thus gets no farther back than that which is primitive merely in time and quality. The primitive which we seek is rather the logically primitive, that which is first in the sense of being foundational—the basic principle of all life.

Freud appears to object to such thoroughness. "He would not go so far as to deny that the sexual impulse (which he regarded as basic—cf. his *Dynamics of Transference*) and the impulse to seek food might have had common roots far back in the history of the human race. But with mordant humour Freud wrote: 'This contention relates to things which are so remote from the problems of direct observation, and have so little content of real knowledge that we waste our time equally in affirming or in denying them. It may be said that such a primitive identity has no more bearing upon analytical interests than the primitive kinship of all the races of men has a bearing upon the legal proof of kinship demanded of one who would make good his claim to an inheritance.'"¹

This implied claim on the part of the Psycho-analyst to disclose "real knowledge" of human nature seems, in the light of what we have already said, to be rather arbitrary. Further, while primitive kinship and legal kinship may not be exactly the same, there is a connection. Were there no primitive, there could be no

¹ Wittels, *Sigmund Freud*, p. 199.

legal kinship. In other words, were man not a social creature, no social conventions could ever have emerged in the history of humanity. Law itself has its ultimate foundation in the social will of the citizens, which will is itself an expression of man's social nature.

The stage to which we must carry back our investigation depends, we suggest, upon whether we seek the actual or the ideal trend of human nature. Shall we be more likely to find the truth by studying man in the narrower setting of his pathological or even his general history, or in the wider range of his relationship to sub-human life? As far as time is concerned, it may seem a great distance to trace human potentialities back to the stage of the amœba. But if our object is to discover the fundamental features or functions of life, the time-stretch is irrelevant; we are concerned rather with the logic of the evolutionary process.

"It is natural, therefore, to test the validity of any new psychological theory by looking to see if it be biologically sound. Psycho-analysis has escaped the pitfalls—by treating objectively, but as purely mental, the most dynamic factors in mental life. But are its hypotheses biologically sound?"¹ We favour, therefore, the Psycho-biological approach to the study of human nature as our preliminary method of inquiry.

In a recent work Drever contrasts with the merely descriptive classification of the Instincts a classification framed on a biological basis, i.e. according to the biological ends which they subserve. McDougall, however, deprecates "the common practice of classing together, as expressions of one instinct, whatever modes of bodily activity subserve the same general biological function. . . . It results in classing together such dis-

¹ MacCurdy, *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*, p. 211. (Camb. Univ. Press, 1923.)

ting instincts as the pairing and the parental instincts, because they both subserve the perpetuation of the species; and the instincts of food-seeking, disgust, escape, and combat, because all these subserve the preservation of the individual. Even if such terms as 'social,' 'reproductive,' and 'self-preservative' are used as names for groups of instincts of allied function, they are, I think, to be deprecated; for they inevitably lead to cross-classifications and confusions, and bring no compensating advantages."¹

In reply to this criticism we would point out that according to McDougall's own definition² the organism is essentially involved in all instinctive activity. It is owing to certain organic instincts that the perception of an object of a certain class arouses a characteristic emotion; and it is by means of a specific motor mechanism of the body that through this emotional excitement the perception of the object results in a specific mode of behaviour. Confessedly instinct is a mind-body phenomenon. Surely, then, in a study of it, especially for the purpose we have in view, one may legitimately combine the psychological and biological standpoints and classify the instincts accordingly. "Mental processes unquestionably depend on the integrity of the nervous system, and somehow or other they have developed with the evolution of the central nervous system. Fundamentally some parallelism must exist. . . . Any system of psychology must rest at bottom on certain laws analogous to those of biology, or else the system is wrong or the biology wrong."³

As to the alleged faults of confusion incurred by this method, we submit that on our view cross-classification

¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, pp. 175-6.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

³ MacCurdy, *Problems in Dynamic Psychology*, p. 211. (Camb. Univ. Press, 1923.)

loses its meaning. If the so-called instincts of food-seeking, disgust, escape, and combat subserve the preservation of the individual, then, however "distinct" may seem to be their manifestation, the distinctness is superficial, not fundamental, and is dictated by the changes in the situations presented by the environment. In the revolt from nauseating food or offensive odours, in the flight from danger, in the avoidance of, or resistance to, the hostile person or thing—in all these different forms of behaviour we are doing what is really the same thing, viz. seeking to preserve our lives. Just as the same so-called Instinct may use different motor-mechanisms, so one and the same general Instinct or Sentiment may use specific methods of reaction which have hitherto been themselves distinguished as independent instincts, but which on the present view do not seem sufficiently distinct to justify the term.

The same Instinct may therefore use one or another method of reaction according to circumstances. And if, as we would suggest, the great Instincts themselves are not independent, but are differentiated out of some basic tendency of human nature, subsequent "confusion" in classification has little significance. Indeed, McDougall himself states: "The evolution of the animal world may properly be conceived as primarily and essentially the differentiation of instinctive tendencies from some primordial undifferentiated capacity to strive. . . . We may regard the instincts as so many differentiated channels through which the vital energy pours itself into or through the organism."¹

If the method which we have called Psychobiological be criticized further on the ground that the matter dealt with is neither specifically psychological, nor biological, but is rather of the nature of a study of

¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 113.

the "metaphysical implications of instinctive actions," we are not concerned to disagree. If our approach to the present subject of study be regarded as legitimate, it is to us at least a secondary consideration whether it is described as scientific or philosophical.

"The ever-rising tide of specialization has obscured the fact that there are not a few problems, especially in the fields of pure knowledge, which cannot be understood in the terms of one subject. The spectrum of knowledge has been arbitrarily divided up into compartments, whereas the colours really shade into each other quite imperceptibly. Such arbitrary cuttings and slicings have often mutilated the delicate fabric of reality, with the result that there are many questions at the present time most urgently needing the synthesis of two or more illuminations." ¹

¹ Joseph Needham in *Science, Religion and Reality*. (Sheldon Press, 1926.)

CHAPTER III

THE FUNDAMENTAL LIFE-TENDENCY

IN accordance with the psycho-biological method discussed in the previous chapter, we regard the life-process, whether physical or mental in its expression, as in effect one and the same in tendency. We claim to avoid any confusion between the biological and psychological points of view by the theory of parallel development, whether the life-tendency be thought to have a mental as well as physical aspect from the first in the most elementary forms of life, or gradually to attain this parallelism in the course of evolution. In the present chapter we shall discuss the nature of the fundamental life-impulse.

At the outset it must be borne in mind that life is always qualittied. Hence no mere abstraction will suffice as an expression of its real nature, such as *élan vital*, *libido*, the *horme*, the cosmic urge, or life-force. Such conceptions certainly suggest that life is dynamic in essence. However, we seek to know in addition the precise character of its energy.

But if it is unhelpful to be too abstract, it is misleading to seek for too concrete an account. No doubt a tendency is most noticed in certain of its highly differentiated expressions; but such specialized manifestations may disguise its real nature. What is fundamental is, we think, more reliably studied in its comparatively undifferentiated stages. Hence, while those who describe the *libido* as sexual aim at being thorough, they do not appear to be thorough enough, inasmuch

as they are studying the life-tendency at a comparatively late stage of its evolution rather than in its primitive expression.

What, then, is life in its fundamental characteristics? Happily there is, as to this, not much disagreement among biologists. Leaving out the very important but subsidiary processes of life called Development, Variation, and the Enregistration of qualities, we confine ourselves to the basic activities—and these by general consent are NUTRITION and REPRODUCTION. Aristotle long ago mentioned these as the two functions of the soul. A modern biologist thus describes their operation:—

“The cell is the smallest known unit of life. A unicellular organism does not increase indefinitely in bulk; when it exceeds that size which is normal for the adult of the species, it tends to divide into two. The nucleus divides first, then the cell-body, forming two daughter cells, each with its own nucleus. The daughter cells then separate, growing into adults similar to the original parent. It is the same with the cells of the higher organisms. Each multicellular animal or plant starts life as a single cell, which grows and divides repeatedly.”¹

It is to be noted at the outset that while growth by nutrition and reproduction are distinguishable, these phenomena are essentially connected in the life-process. Haeckel remarked in 1866 that reproduction is simply “discontinuous growth.” There is no nutrition which is not allied with reproduction, and no reproduction which is not dependent on nutrition. How closely interconnected these processes are, for instance, in the vegetable realm, may be described in the words of an old authority:—

“It is in the almost homogeneous fabrics of the cellular

¹ E. S. Goodrich, *Living Organisms*, p. 30. (Oxford, 1924.)

plants that we find the closest connection between the function of nutrition and that of reproduction; for every one of the vesicles which compose their fabric is endowed with the power of generating others similar to itself; and these may extend the parent structure or separate into new and distant organisms. Hence it is scarcely possible to draw a line in these cases between the nutrition of the individual and the reproduction of the species.”¹

Originally, therefore, there is no independent “food-seeking instinct,” however differentiated such a tendency may have become at a later stage. Nor should we speak of hunger and love as “the pivot of the drama of animal life” in such a way as to suggest that they are fundamentally separate. That they are not is borne out by the testimony of Fabre. Insects, he says, “unlike some human beings, eat only that they may work. When I watch her (viz. the labyrinth spider), I find out what this work is. For nearly another month I see her adding layer upon layer to the walls of her nest. These were at first semi-transparent; they become thick and opaque. This is why the spider eats, so that she may fill her silk-glands and make a thick wrapper for her nest.” Surely this is a striking illustration of the connection between nutrition and reproduction.

In confirmation of all this are the recent words of Professor J. A. Thomson: “Deep down in the abysses of evolutionary emergence, hunger and love may be hardly distinguishable; and on occasions all through the history of living creatures the egoistic and altruistic currents seem to merge and flow apart again.”²

When, therefore, we study life in its original expression, hunger and love are an inseparable unity.

¹ W. B. Carpenter, *Principles of Human Physiology*, § 281.

² J. A. Thomson, *Concerning Evolution*, p. 120, (Yale Press, 1925.)

If, then, growth and reproduction are essentially connected, how must we describe the fundamental trend of life? Bousfield calls it the impulse of vital continuity. This description seems too general. Some more definite account is necessary of the way in which this continuance of life is brought about. Life is not continued precisely as is, for instance, a molecule of iron. No single characteristic property of iron, as Professor A. N. Whitehead tells us, can be manifested at an instant—it must persist. Now the peculiarity of life is that it does not simply persist, but does so by self-propagation: one cell originates another cell out of itself. It is not, therefore, merely a case of the perpetuity or even increase of life, but rather a multiplication of subjects of life by those who already possess it. The fundamental impulse of life, then, is to live and make to live, to multiply subjects of life, which are not a mere aggregate of individuals, but an interconnected society. “Not only is every cell derived from a pre-existing cell, but every nucleus is formed from a pre-existing nucleus, just as all protoplasm is derived from pre-existing protoplasm. The continuity of protoplasm, of cells, and of nuclei is one of the most important facts established in modern biology.”¹ Every cell, therefore, is now a child cell, and in turn a parent cell; it is derived from other cells, and other cells, again, are derived from it. This means that there is something of each in all. The life-impulse, in a word, is communal, and the biological good of each is the good of all.

It follows from the above that it is incorrect to regard the fundamental impulse of life as a “self-tendency,”² or to speak, as Freud does, of the “ego-libido.” If

¹ Goodrich, *Living Organisms*. (Oxford, 1924.)

² Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious* (Introduction, pp. 4, 5), admits that there is a more fundamental instinct than sex, viz. self-preservation.

what we have said is correct, the *libido* does not sway the ego in any exclusive way: it does not lead to any expression of the self in which there are no social implicates. We have already seen that there is no nutrition which does not also aid reproduction. Any restriction, therefore, of the *libido* to the life of the ego appears to lack biological support and to be unscientific. "Co-operation and mutual help," says General J. C. Smuts, "are written large on the face of Nature. . . . Anticipating the language of later developments, we may say that in the cell there is implicit an ideal of harmonious co-operation, of unselfish mutual service, of loyalty and duty of each to all, such as in our later more highly evolved human associations we can only aspire to and strive for."¹

We must, however, be careful at this point. By saying that the life-tendency is communal we do not imply that insects and animals are, or could be, social in any ethical sense; nor do we mean that man cannot, and does not, direct the force of the *libido* back upon himself with a view to the enhancement of his interest as an individual. Such "short-circuiting," indeed, is only too common. To this matter we shall have to give some attention in a later chapter. What we would emphasize at this stage is that biologically there is no foundation for self-love in any of its forms, ordinary or pathological.

It may be as well to add that, just as there is no biological support for pure egoism, neither is there any for pure altruism. Writers have sometimes distinguished two aspects or manifestations of the life-impulse, viz. the struggle for one's own life and the struggle for the life of others.² But, as we have seen, there is no independent self-tendency; nor is there any independent

¹ Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, p. 83. (Macmillan, 1926.)

² Cf. Henry Drummond's *Ascent of Man*.

altruistic tendency. Indeed, a fundamental duality of impulses would be incompatible with that unitary control which is implied in the possession of life. How, indeed, could independent impulses ever come into harmonious relation? Exclusive concern with the life of others is just as "unnatural" as exclusive concern with the self-life. It seems ironical that moralists like Shaftesbury and Butler, who claimed to base the distinction of these two kinds of affection (which they called Private and Public, or otherwise Self-love and Benevolence) on "Nature," should have that claim repudiated by Nature herself, speaking through the mouth of the modern biologist. That Shaftesbury realized the insecurity of his position seems to be indicated by his recourse to the idea of a "balance" as an escape from the inevitable dualism. Nature, we repeat, regards neither the individual nor its neighbour exclusively, but integrates their interests in one and the same unitary tendency. For the reasons just adduced we think it unsound to classify impulses as Creative and Possessive.¹

Our conclusion, then, is that, as far as the evidence of Cytology is concerned, the fundamental life-tendency is neither purely egoistic nor purely altruistic; neither purely possessive nor creative; but both. Nature's principle is "live and share"; her aim appears to be to bring about community of life.

It does not follow, however, that in the same creature the nutritional and the reproductive aspects are manifested simultaneously in equal strength. On the contrary, a creature's activity may on occasion be more specifically the one or the other, as the case may be. It may be so much so that "hunger" and "love" may to the spectator seem disconnected. "It sometimes hap-

¹ As is done by Bertrand Russell in *Principles of Social Reconstruction*.

pens," says Professor J. A. Thomson, "as among some insects, that an entire section of the creature's life is preoccupied with satisfying hunger, while another section is largely given over to love; it sometimes happens that there is a hunger season and a love season; but in the total woven fabric there is always the self-regarding warp and the other-regarding woof." ¹

So far we have seen that life in its unitary tendency exhibits a nutritional and reproductive aspect. We have in the next place to point out that these aspects show themselves in specific ways, in the form of a particular response to definite stimulus. Instead of a general impulse of hunger or reproduction, there are determinate modes of reaction in different species of creature. So determinate is this instinctive reaction that in lower orders of life both attention and response to stimuli are precise and exact. So much so that should there be any variation in the stimulus the reaction may not occur, and should unusual conditions beset the response the instinct may fail to attain its end. McDougall points out ² that instincts have greater specificity in this sense in proportion as intelligence is absent. With the development of intelligence innate tendencies become more "general" in the sense that they are called forth by a greater variety of stimulation and are expressed in a greater variety of ways.

But, after all, these specific differentiations of the Life-tendency are only variations of its expression under different conditions and circumstances. Examination, we think, will show that however specific an instinct may be, whether on its receptive or executive side, it is always possible to trace its connection with the nutritional-reproductive process.

¹ *Concerning Evolution*, p. 121.

² *Outline of Psychology*, p. 114.

Of these differentiations of the Life-tendency some are more general and common than others, and are more nearly related to the basic impulse. Instances of such major differentiations are the Sex, Parental, and Herd instincts. We must now show the derivative nature of these instincts.

CHAPTER IV

DEEPER THAN SEX

OF the Major Differentiations of the Life-impulse, which, as we saw in the last chapter, is potentially communal in its nature, the Sex instinct is one of the chief. Indeed, some writers do not hesitate to say that life in its fundamental trend is essentially sexual.¹ There is a certain ambiguity in this term, as it is used respectively by Freud, Jung, and others. Suffice it to say that in the present discussion we indicate by the term the differentiation of organisms into male and female. In a word, we mean Hetero-sexuality.

We suggest, then, that Sex, so understood, is not a fundamental feature of the Life-force, and this on two grounds at least—its somewhat tardy appearance in the history of evolution and also its remarkable instability.

As regards the comparative lateness of the development of sex in Evolution, it is enough to mention that the primitive forms of life reproduce themselves by fission or budding. The amoeba, for instance, has no sex; it propagates a new life by dividing its substance. A hydra, again, can without help from another produce a new living hydra merely by budding-off. As we ascend in the evolutionary scale we find that the paramœcium can perform an elementary sexual act by exchanging some of its nuclear material with that of another paramœcium simply through the mouth.

¹ This is the view of at least some members of the Psycho-analytic School, e.g. Ferenczi, who held that an unconscious sexual element was the basis of every sympathetic emotion.

Even after fish and insects have become sexually differentiated, fertilization is not absolutely necessary to reproduction. "The ova of starfish, sea-urchin, worm, mollusc, fish, and even frog, can be made to divide without being fertilized. . . . The artificial stimuli effectively used are very varied—physical, chemical, and mechanical, an electric shock, a superabundance of carbonic acid gas, and even a pin-prick. . . . Green-flies, or Aphides, produce prolifically all through the summer without there being any mates in existence at the time. . . . The sexual union which leads to insemination, and which from observation of the higher animals long seemed to be the very essence of the process, is really of later acquirement." ¹ It is a remarkable fact that when the hive is short of drones, these are produced by the Queen-bee parthenogenetically, i.e. without fertilization. Indeed, so purely economical rather than essential does the possession of sex seem to be that in bees the work of reproduction, whether of drones or workers, is committed to one only of the bees, which is specially selected for the purpose, and specially nourished with royal jelly for her task.

In colonies of humbler forms of life, "in Protozoan colonies, Zoorthamnium and Volvox will serve as examples: each of these possesses two types of units, reproductive and vegetative. Many colonies of hydroid polyps show two kinds of individuals, nutritive and reproductive." ² Such facts indicate that sexuality is a mere question of division of labour. All these colonies of ants, bees, wasps, and termites are not social because they are sexual, but primarily social and secondarily sexual.

¹ Geddes and Thomson, *Sex*, pp. 39, 40, 41. (Home University Library.)

² Julian S. Huxley, *Journ. of Phil. Studies*, July 1926.

At first, then, organisms are not specialized as to sex. When, however, sex-development begins, bisexual characters are possessed by one and the same organism, which contains within itself both male and female cells. This makes possible the fertilization of the ova by the spermatozoa in the same individual. Instances of this occur in flukes and tapeworms.¹

“As we ascend higher in the scale we find that the male and female organs still persist in all animals, but that gradually one set of organs only is fully developed, the other remaining more or less rudimentary. . . . Individual beings in their development have become differentiated into male and female very gradually. But right up to, and including, human beings we still find that every individual has some of the organs of both sexes present.”²

Man's bisexuality shows itself in the earliest stages of foetal life. Whether the foetus develops as a male or a female depends upon which of the two tendencies becomes dominant, and this, again, depends apparently on the relative quantity of the male and female hormones produced, which, again, may be determined by certain chemical conditions.

Thus, in the history of Evolution, hetero-sexuality—the familiar specialization of different organisms into male and female—is a comparatively late phenomenon. It is developed out of that bisexuality which is the native possession of each organism. And yet, because the bisexuality remains, though it may be in a latent form, we must regard the hetero-sexuality as relative rather than absolute.

¹ “In many species of invertebrates both generative cells and accessory organs of both sexes, serving for the expulsion of the secretion of the gonads and for copulation, are normally present in the same individual.”—Lipschütz, *The Internal Secretions of the Sex Glands*, Eng. tr. p. 349 (Heffer, 1924).

² Bousfield, *Elements of Psycho-Analysis*. (Kegan Paul, 1920.)

Another proof that sex, i.e. hetero-sexuality, is not a fundamental characteristic of life is, we suggest, the instability of sex distinctions. This is what we might expect to follow from the bisexual nature of the individual. Indeed, in bisexuality the possibility of intersexuality appears to be latent. Intersexuality actually occurs when there arises, for instance, an abnormal interference in the sex glands. Thus, "when the ovaries of a hen are affected by a certain kind of tumour, the bird stops laying, her comb and wattles enlarge to the size of a cock's, her spurs grow, she begins to crow, her plumage changes and becomes cock-like, and finally she becomes indistinguishable from a male. One such bird had functioned for three years as a female and afterwards became the father of chickens. . . . The secretion of the altered ovary now apparently resembles that of a testis and stimulates centres of the brain which would otherwise have remained permanently dormant. . . . It is quite clear from these and other facts that in the higher vertebrates there are present in every individual of either sex the nervous connections which give the possibility of either male or female behaviour—which connections have to be activated by the secretion of one or other of the reproductive organs." ¹

Such intersexuality, it is thought, may arise through the removal by disease of the embargo, so to speak, which the ordinary development of the female cells places on the rudimentary male cells, which then are left free to develop.

Certain Plants have been shown to be hermaphroditic. Their sex is often in a state of unequal equilibrium, due possibly to environmental influence.

As regards human beings, "now and again Nature

¹ From a paper by Dr. Crew at the British Association.

makes an experiment on the human subject. Thus cases have been recorded in boys of tumour of the adrenal gland and early development of the secondary sexual characters, viz. growth of hair on the upper lip and chin, and also on the pubes, precocity of sexual desire, and change of the voice, which remains that of an adult. Recently a still more remarkable case has been recorded of a girl who began to grow a beard and whose bodily conditions resembled that of a male. Moreover, her mental attitude was that of a male rather than a female. Upon removal of the tumour of this gland the hair disappeared, the breasts developed, and the menstrual periods began. . . . She subsequently married and gave birth to a child. Thus a condition of virilism was converted into feminism by the removal of the male structure and its internal secretion.”¹

So unstable is sex that not a few animals are first male and then female in the course of their individual lives! The glutinous hag (a deep-sea fish) is one of those first-male-and-then-female animals (protandrous hermaphrodites).² In mammals rudiments of the genital organs of the opposite sex are to be found in every individual.³ All human beings have a degree of hermaphroditism.

By experiment it is possible to produce inter-sexual changes of a marked character. These changes are most obvious when there is direct transplantation of sex glands, when, for instance, the ovary is planted directly into the testicle.⁴

¹ Sir F. Mott in “The Biological Foundation of Human Character,” *Edinburgh Review*, July 1923.

² Professor J. A. Thomson in *Quarterly Review*, October 1923.

³ “Rudiments of the Mullerian duct, which develops in the female into the uterus and oviduct, are represented also in the male individual by the appendix testis and the utriculus prostaticus” (Lipschütz, *op. cit.*, p. 457).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 351.

Seeing, then, that sex is so unstable, that indeed it can be actually reversed, we cannot regard the fact of maleness or femaleness as a fundamental human quality.

In addition to the foregoing there is the evidence to be derived from the effects of Castration. Experiments in castration indicate that sex is intimately dependent upon glandular activity; and in particular Steinach has shown that between the testicle and maleness and between the ovary and femaleness there is a direct causal connection. After castration—i.e. after the removal of the testicle or the ovary, as the case may be—the man or woman tends to change into a more or less common type, to a juvenile form common to both sexes, and this without any special detriment to the constitution. Indeed, it is rather remarkable that, whereas the extirpation of other glands from the body produces a pathological condition, the removal of the sexual glands does not seem to have any such effect.¹ These facts, again, confirm us in our view that the hetero-sexual character of human life with which we are familiar is not, after all, as fundamental as is often supposed. Therefore we cannot regard the poet as strictly correct when he says:—

Nature, with endless being rife,
Parts each thing into "him" and "her,"
And in the arithmetic of life
The smallest unit is a pair.²

There is some controversy as to whether the soma out of which the sex glands develop should be regarded as asexual rather than bisexual. From our point of view, at any rate, the settlement of this controversy is not a vital matter, especially if "asexual" is taken to mean,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 104.

² Coventry Patmore.

as Lipschütz takes it to mean, "without definite sex," the soma being "equipotential" for either sex, and thus being in this sense bisexual. Sexual dimorphism must, of course, start somewhere; pure asexuality cannot produce sexuality.

The point we wish to make is that hetero-sexuality is not fundamental to life, but develops out of bisexuality, which is the possession of each individual life. Bisexuality itself is a rather tardy evolutionary development, for, as we have seen, in primitive forms of life reproduction appears to be sexless.

Why, then, should any kind of sexuality develop, and why in particular should bisexuality change to hetero-sexuality? Why, in other words, should individuals specialize in sex?

The usual solution of this difficult problem is that sex is on the part of Nature an economical device, so to speak, for strengthening the reproductive process. In particular, it is thought that it multiplies variation and makes possible extreme individuality. That the product is strengthened has been doubted by some. Freud tells us ¹ that an American named Woodruff declared after experiment that a "slipper-animalcule," though it divided to the 3,029th generation, suffered no loss of vitality, and that the last descendant showed no sign of degeneration. The general opinion is, however, contrary to this; and Freud himself agrees that reproduction by fission cannot be long continued without incurring weakness in the offspring. As a matter of fact, if protozoa mingle their material, they experience rejuvenation apart from any question of reproduction. And when germ-cells of different metabolism unite, the value of the union is shown by the increased strength of the product.

¹ *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, pp. 59, 60, 1922.

Sex, then, is, as it were, an invention of Nature for ensuring the enrichment of life, the life of the parents and that of the resultant offspring. By the developing of cells of different metabolism, male cells being more katabolic and female cells more anabolic, a certain division of labour is effected; and such cells by union at one and the same time complement each other and also enrich the vitality of the product.

In conclusion, then, sex is not the essential and inevitable expression of the *libido*, but its effectual auxiliary only. The trend of the *libido* is towards community of life and uses sex merely as an instrument.

CHAPTER V

THE DERIVATION OF PARENTALISM

CLOSELY connected with the subject of Sex is that of Parenthood. We hold, as in the case of Sex, that the Parental instinct is a derivative one; that it is, in fact, one of the major differentiations of a more general tendency of Life which in its nature is communal. In the present chapter our aim is to show the derivative character of the Parental impulse.

There is much sexual life in the sub-human world which has no connection with parentage. This is the case with the propagation of fish. The union of ova and spermatozoa is effected in the sea and outside the bodies of the parents. Under these circumstances there is neither nest nor home, though there are some instances, such as those of the stickleback and the henfish, where the father keeps guard over his pile of eggs. As a rule, however, there is no parental oversight of young fish. Obviously, in the absence of care, the fate of the offspring must be uncertain, since the hazards are so numerous. Even the seed, as it lies on or in the water, will be exposed to many enemies.

As Evolution proceeded, the connection of the male and female parents with one another and with the offspring became "tightened up," so to speak. In the higher forms of life the process of fertilization was made safer by insemination, and the protection of the offspring ensured either by gestation within the body of the mother, or by incubation, the parents subsequently exercising more or less oversight over the young.

Having regarded Sex as ancillary to the more funda-

mental Life-impulse, so do we regard the Parental function. We take both to be specializations of one and the same Life-trend, which from our human point of view we call social or communal. We differ, therefore, from those who find the basic movement of life to be sexual, and also from those who, like McDougall, attribute fundamental importance to the parental instinct. Both these instincts, we contend, are of the derivative order.

The Parental impulse is too specific to be fundamental. It arises in a particular set of circumstances: there must be offspring which are born immature, and which become mature only after a period of time. Where there are no young, or where the young are mature almost as soon as they are born, there is no occasion for parental solicitude. Further, when offspring that are helpless do attain to maturity their need for protection ceases, and *ipso facto* the function of the parents comes to an end. Thus, an attitude like the parental, which is contingent and transitory, can scarcely be regarded as fundamental. To speak of it as "the only truly altruistic element in Nature," as McDougall does, seems incorrect, firstly because of the reason just mentioned, viz. that care for others in the form of parental solicitude is derived from something more basic; secondly, because no fundamental trend of Nature is strictly speaking "altruistic" in the sense that it is solely concerned with others without any regard for self-maintenance.

There is, indeed, a sense in which Parentalism is a misnomer, the child being as old as its parents. In view of Weismann's doctrine of the continuity of the germ-plasm, Galton was surely right in speaking of the parent as the trustee of the germ-cell rather than the producer of the child. The parental task is relegated, therefore, merely to the passing on of the germ-cell

enriched by the mixture respectively of the paternal and maternal inheritance. Thus parentalism is an extension of the sex-function, and both are ancillary to a much deeper process by which the germ of life is continued from individual to individual and at the same time endowed with additional potentiality.

Parentalism and sex, though connected, become in the process of evolution characteristically differentiated in their reactions. Millions of years may be allowed for the differentiations to take place. The differences of reaction are due to the differences of function which become necessary, in the one case that of insemination, in the other that of gestation. Insemination requires two individuals, whose mutual attraction must be ensured. This attraction is mediated by either physical, æsthetic, mental or moral qualities according to the species of creature concerned. The process of gestation requires no such "mechanism of allurements." Insemination having taken place, gestation is occupied solely and directly with the development of the seed of the new life. Further, in the process of gestation there is no mutual enrichment as between the mother and the foetus, the latter being relatively passive in relation to the mother, who for the time being monopolizes the function of nourisher of life. On this account the sex and parental attitudes will always be dissimilar, the former being a mutual experience of active participants, the latter being a creative rather than a reciprocal experience. On this account pairing and mothering can never be quite identified. It is the co-operative aspect of sexual love which gives it its peculiar bliss:—

Doch unsre Liebe, heisst sie nicht Tristan
und Isolde? Dies süsse Wortlein: und.

(But our affection, is it not Tristan's
and Isolda's? That word of sweetness, "and".)†

† Richard Wagner, *Tristan and Isolda*, tr. Corder.

In parenthood, on the other hand, reciprocation on the part of the child is at least made possible, though for some time it cannot, in the nature of the case, be actual. Both sex and parenthood are social instruments, so to speak; the former makes sociality actual, the latter makes it possible. In the perfect human experience, the nature of which we hope to describe later, there would be a combination of that more creative aspect of love which we see in parenthood with that more co-operative attitude which we find revealed in mating.

And yet both sex and parentalism, in spite of their differences, seem to have something fundamental in common. Both appear to be at bottom expressions of the same life-impulse—the impulse to enrich. Freud remarks:—

“The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists (and this is what is commonly called love and what the poets sing of) in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this—(what in any case has a share in the same love)—on the one hand, self-love, and on the other love for parents and children, friendship and love of humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas. Our justification lies in the fact that psycho-analytic research has taught us that all these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities; in relations between the sexes these instincts force their way towards sexual union, but in other circumstances they are diverted from this aim, or are prevented from reaching it, though always preserving enough of their original nature to keep their identity recognizable (as in such features as the longing for proximity, and self-sacrifice).

“We are of opinion, then, that language has carried out an entirely justifiable piece of unification in

creating the word 'love' with its numerous uses, and that we cannot do better than take it as the basis of our scientific discussions and expositions as well. . . . In its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the 'Eros' of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psycho-analysis; . . . and when the Apostle Paul in his famous Epistle to the Corinthians prizes love above all else, he certainly understands it in the same 'wider' sense." ¹

"We are in general agreement with this important passage, and especially with its unitary standpoint. We do not believe that sex-love is the type of which all other loves are variations. But we think that whatever can be truly called love has one and the same basis, which, however, is neither sexual nor parental, but less specific and more basic, viz. the impulse toward social enrichment.

McDougall regards it as a common fallacy to assume that whatever things have the same name are similar in essence. Some degree of similarity, however, would seem to have provoked the use of a common term: the important question is as to the extent of the similarity. Psycho-biology suggests, we think, that underneath its differences of expression love has a common root.

In an Appendix to his *Outline of Abnormal Psychology* McDougall acknowledges that apparently "there is some degree of innate connection between the sexual and protective instincts." He mentions that both impel to close bodily contact in embraces; that the love of the sexes tends to be accompanied by a paternal or maternal attitude, as the case may be, towards the partner. But he thinks that the relation between the two instincts is not reciprocal, "that while the excitement of the sex instinct tends naturally to lead on to the excitement of

¹ Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 38-9.

the protective, that of the protective has no such natural tendency to awaken the sex impulse." This seems, indeed, to be the case. But, we submit, the fact just mentioned does not necessarily disprove that the two instincts, whose innate connection is acknowledged, have a common origin. We have already allowed that evolution in the course of countless ages has differentiated the special instincts with their characteristic reactions. In both the sexual and parental relations there is a merging of mind as a common element. That in the one case there is an impulse to the merging of bodies, which is lacking in the other or parental attitude, seems accounted for by a perception of the difference in the respective situations. The protection that goes with parenthood is accompanied by the recognition of the fact that the object of the care is a child, who is the evidence that a merging of bodies has already taken place, making any further process of such a kind superfluous, the child being one flesh with its parents. Whereas the impulse to protect seems appropriate under all inter-personal relations, the impulse for bodily union does not. Hence the sex attitude seems more highly specialized in its reaction than the parental with which it is so closely akin, and whose derivation from a common root it shares. This "intimate connection" between sex and parentalism and their derivation from a common root receive confirmation from experience, whether we consider the testimony of literature, especially poetry, or of actual life. The language which lovers and parents use has a striking resemblance; the ideas expressed are those of protection and identification. The poetry which portrays the protective aspect of love can be applied indifferently to the relationship between the sexes or to that between parent and child.

Take but the well-known lines of Burns as illustration:—

O wert thou in the cauld blast . . .
I'd shelter thee, I'd shelter thee.

An exquisite example of the same attitude is to be found at the end of Ibsen's *Peer Gynt*. Though Peer deserts his faithful Solveig and wanders far through the world, yet, when as an old and worn man he returns to Norway, he finds her still waiting for him. She is now lame and nearly blind. Peer Gynt throws himself down on the threshold of her hut. She comforts him. Dramatically Peer cries:—

Mother and wife! You stainless woman!
Oh, hide me, hide me in your love!

Whereupon Solveig softly sings a cradle-song!

Sleep, my boy, my dearest boy!
I will rock you to sleep and guard you.

That this is true to real life is borne out by such a case as that of George Romney, the famous eighteenth-century painter. During his years of success in London and in Italy he hardly saw at all the wife whom he married when he was twenty-two. Bewitched by Lady Hamilton, of whom he painted some forty pictures, he neglected his wife. When, however, he was old and worn and poor, he sought his wife once more. She did not spurn him. Without reproaching him she welcomed him, cared for him, nursed him until he died.

Sometimes this impulse to protect becomes pathological, as in an instance reported in the daily Press of a woman who in December 1922 tried to kill her lover and then committed suicide. She left behind a note of explanation, which ran as follows:—

"I cannot bear the thought of another woman taking my Roy away, so I am going to take him with me."

The similarity of the language used by parents and lovers respectively shows itself in the use by both of diminutive expressions, such as "dearie," "baby," "darling," etc. How often, too, after a marriage of years, with affections disciplined and chastened by time, does the mutual attitude of a Darby and a Joan, who have become, as it were, boy and girl to each other respectively, resemble the parental relation!

When the desire to protect becomes intensified, it develops into a yearning even for possession or identification. This attitude is common both to the sex and the parental relation. In the case of parent and child the language of possession is not only characteristic, but has literal truth behind it, inasmuch as the child in the early stages of its growth formed one life with its mother and both shared a common nourishment. In the sex relation, too, the lovers tend to appropriate each other and to apply to each other the possessive pronouns "mine" and "thine." Occasionally the language may take the form of hyperbole, as when one of the parties desiring to express a degree of utter devotion says: "I love you so much that I could eat you." There may be more significance in such language than might at first appear. Freud ¹ reminds us that the primitive form of the expression of the *libido* was oral, in which the object longed for is assimilated by eating. (We have already seen that in the lowest forms of life—e.g. in the paramœcium—there is an exchange of seminal matter through the mouth.) The idea suggested by the eating process is that of identification. To "eat" one's beloved is, therefore, so far as it is a figure of

¹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 61.

speech, an expression signifying an utter union of interest as between two lives.

There is an interesting moment in Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde* when the lovers in their ecstasy attain such an utter identification of personality as to suggest confusion of individuality. Isolde calls Tristan by her own name, and Tristan replies by giving his own name to Isolde, whereupon there supervenes a further stage of transport during which Isolde cries, "No more Isolde," and Tristan adds, "No more Tristan." All this may be interpreted as the effort of lovers to transcend duality of existence by the closest possible union of soul.

In passing we would suggest that the explanation of the phenomena of incest may lie partly in the fact that the sex and parental attitudes have so much in common, and partly in the failure of the incestuous person to accommodate himself to the differential features which evolution has introduced into the sex and parental reactions.

Finally, we would call attention to the tremendous strength of the Life-force, as this is revealed often in the power of Sex and Parental love. Just as an electric current, when interrupted, manifests its awful power, so thwarted or disappointed love has by its tragedies since the world began testified to its power over and within the spirit of man. We have it on ancient authority that love is strong as death. That many waters cannot quench love is illustrated by Leander's hopeless defiance of the stormy Hellespont that he might gain the presence of Hero, and his death in the wild waters. Take this, again, as a description of the agony of separation:—

"Last night he came—Good God, what a scene! He held me in his arms—sobs stopt his voice—he trembled—changed hot and cold alternately—then

broke from me—walked about the room and lifted up his eyes to heaven in a speechless way. . . . I endeavoured to console him, promised never to be the wife of any other—pressed his hand to my heart, my lips to his forehead. He was insensible—stupified—tears—heartrending tears were all the answer he could make. He looked up to me with a countenance in which distress, love and gratitude were strongly painted. The scene was too much for me—I fell back in my chair and gave vent to a torrent of tears. I had not been in bed the night before, nor broke my fast for twenty-four hours.”¹

That the strength of Parental love is just as fierce as Sexual affection is a matter of common observation. One or two illustrations from life will suffice. Some years ago a Professor and his wife in New York committed suicide on the death of their only child. A child fell out of the window of an express train during its journey between Manchester and Crewe, and the mother immediately jumped after her child, both being killed. Truly Love is as strong as death.

¹ From *The Love-letters of Mary Hays* (1779–1780). (Methuen.)

CHAPTER VI

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HERD INSTINCT

IN any list of the chief instincts of human nature an important place is generally given to the Herd or Gregarious instinct. This, indeed, is by many regarded as the social instinct *par excellence*. It is the instinct which impels insects to form colonies, animals to live and move in packs, men to mass in crowds or form themselves into social groups.

Some writers have distinguished different varieties in the herd instinct according to the function subserved. Trotter, for instance, regards sheep, deer, oxen, and horses as forming protective groups; wolves as forming aggressive groups; and bees and ants as grouping themselves for social purposes. Rivers, again, distinguished between groups with and without a leader respectively.

Such distinctions, though useful for some purposes, do not seem fundamental. Wolves do not join packs for the purpose of hunting prey; their aggressive habits are not a cause, but a consequence, of their herding together. Their gregarious nature must be presupposed, and the aggressiveness must be regarded as a subsequent development. Nor is the division of groups into those which are led and those which are leaderless fundamental. For here, again, the existence of grouping is presupposed, and leadership is a characteristic which is clearly evolved.

The tendency of animals to herd seems deeply rooted

in their nature; how strong the tendency is may be inferred from the discomfiture of an animal when it becomes separated from its companions, especially at any time of danger. Galton thus describes the effort of the Demara ox to rejoin the herd:—

“If he be separated from it by stratagem or force, he exhibits every sign of mental agony; he strives with all his might to get back again, and when he succeeds he plunges into its middle to bathe his whole body with the comfort of closest companionship.”

McDougall gives the following illustration from Kohler’s *Psychology of the Chimpanzees*:—

“It happens often enough that, if the cage of the isolated animal can be reached, one or other of the group will quickly spring to it and embrace the complaining one through the bars. But the latter must actually cry and howl in order that this friendliness shall be shown him; as soon as he becomes quiet the rest of the group remain unconcerned.”¹

“. . . The hanging together of the group of chimpanzees must be regarded as the expression of a very real force, sometimes of astonishing strength. One sees this clearly at every attempt to isolate an animal from a group well accustomed to be together. If this has not happened before or not for some considerable time, the separated individual becomes wholly absorbed in the striving to unite itself with the group.” . . . Large animals “cry, howl, rage, throw themselves against the walls of the confining chamber and, if there appears even a most improbable route by which the others may be reached, will forthwith launch themselves upon it at the risk of life in order to return to the bosom of the group.”²

“Even the dry plateaus of Asia and America,” says

¹ *Outline of Psychology*, p. 136 n.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 155.

Kropotkin, "had their herds of llamas, of wild camels; and whole tribes of black bears lived together in the mountains of Thibet. . . . Even when they seemed fully absorbed in grazing, and apparently took no notice of the others, they closely watched one another's movements, always ready to join in some common action." ¹

It may be objected that not all animals are gregarious. As to this I cannot do better than quote Kropotkin's view:—

"It appears extremely probable that even those few animals that now lead a solitary existence, such as the tigers, the smaller species of the cat tribe, the bears, the martens, the foxes, the hedgehogs, and a few others, were not always solitary creatures. For some of them (foxes, bears) I found positive evidence that they remained social until their extermination by man began, and others even now lead a social life in populated regions, so that we have reason to believe that nearly all once lived in societies. But even if there always existed a few unsociable species, we can positively assert that they were the exception to the general rule." ²

Hence we may conclude that in the solitary species the gregarious tendency has been either suppressed or undeveloped.

What, then, is the significance of this widely prevalent grouping tendency? In what sense is it a social tendency? And how is it related to the fundamental life-impulse of which the sex and parental instincts seem derivatives? This tendency of animals and men to live and move in masses is so manifest, so characteristic, and so inveterate, that it testifies to something more or less deep in the nature of life itself.

¹ Kropotkin, *Ethics*, p. 53.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 52.

This grouping tendency is not to be explained away as by those who would account for it by Natural Selection. Herbert Spencer contended that animals and men learnt to live in groups because Nature favoured such a mode of existence.

“Simple association as of deer profits the individual and species only by that more efficient safeguarding which results from the superiority of a multitude of eyes, ears and noses over the eyes, ears and noses of a single individual. Through the alarms more quickly given, all benefit by the senses of the most acute.”¹

We do not, however, see that Natural Selection affords an explanation of these associations. No doubt the tendency to massing was useful for survival. As Darwin pointed out, those creatures whose habits were solitary would, in the presence of enemies, be at a disadvantage, whereas those that were social would by union with their fellows vastly increase their strength in dealing with the foe. Thus, it is added, the solitary species would tend to be eliminated by Nature, and the gregarious would be more likely to survive. Natural Selection, however, cannot cause gregariousness for the simple reason that it must have existed before it could have been “selected.”

The same kind of error is made by those who, like Tarde, try to account for gregariousness by the principle of Imitation. No doubt imitation plays a great part in unifying the habits and practices of the herd, though there is probably more involved in the case than mere imitation. Each member of the herd seems predisposed to accommodate its behaviour to the general type, and such a predisposition makes for the safety both of the individual animal and the herd. But so far is Imitation from accounting for gregariousness that it presupposes

¹ H. Spencer, *Principles of Ethics*, § 253.

it. Obviously, unless animals associated, there could be no opportunity for imitation; the association is a condition necessarily precedent to the imitation. Creatures are not social because they are suggestible, but suggestible because they are social. The function, therefore, of imitation is simply instrumental.

Darwin,¹ and Sutherland later, regarded social impulses as extensions of the parental and filial affections, since the "social instinct seems to be developed by the young remaining long with their parents, and this extension may be attributed in part to habit, but chiefly to natural selection."

But if what we have already said is correct, the parental instinct is derivative and secondary, and the social tendency seems to be deeper and more original. Moreover, animals mass, whether they have young or not, and whether they are male or female.

In support of our thesis that the tendency to herd represents a fundamental social impulse of all life, of which sex and parentalism are derivatives, we must now adduce the evidence of biology.

At the outset it is interesting to remember that Aristotle found that the various forms of *φιλία* are more or less obvious phases of the gregarious instinct:—*πολιτικὴ φιλία* may be traced back to *συγγενικὴ φιλία* ("kinsmen's friendship"), which is the natural affection binding together parents and offspring and kinsmen generally; while *συγγενικὴ φιλία* itself touches the First Principle of Nature. According to Aristotle, Nature's fundamental trend is the endeavour after *τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ θεῖον*, which he recognized as *φυσικώτατον* in all creatures.²

What, however, is the testimony of modern Biology? It is to the effect that life in its most primitive as in its

¹ *Descent of Man*, p. 186.

² J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, Vol. II, pp. 262-3.

most evolved forms is "colonial." Among the Protozoa there are single-celled units "joined together either organically or by the dead matter of their skeletons or cases." Higher forms of life are multi-cellular, and reveal this colonial feature in a clearer and more intimate way. "Those animals and plants," says Sir Ray Lankester, "which are built up of many cells of many varieties . . . may be considered as composite organisms—cell-states or communities in which the individual cells, all derived from one original mother-cell, are the citizens, living in groups and habitations (tissues), having their different occupations and capacities, carrying on distinct operations and working together for the common good, the 'life', as we call it, of the individual plant or animal which they constitute. . . . It must not be forgotten that the separate cells are all derived by binary division from the original germ-cell, that they have not come into juxtaposition from distinct sources, but often are held together by threads of their living material, which remain after the process of division of one cell into two."

Thus, in the multi-cellular organism the cells, begotten as they are from a common stock, remain connected among themselves, and co-ordinate their activity; they complement each other and serve the organism as a whole.

A higher stage of "colonial" life is reached by the attainment of union not merely within the organism, but between organisms themselves. In such "colonies" of individuals "there is no direct physical connection, dead or alive, subsisting between the members; but the connection is by way of the brain and sense organs, through the bonds of instinct." ¹

¹ Professor Julian Huxley, *The Biological Basis of Individuality, Journal of Philosophical Studies*, July 1926.

“It is the rule rather than the exception for creatures to be subject to it (i.e. the social impulse). . . . The social mammals submit to it throughout their days, only leaving the herd or pack under exceptional circumstances, as when the female is about to bear young; while the birds show more variety, some being more sociable at the breeding season, as the sea-birds, and others, at that period, becoming solitary and deserting their fellows, though they rejoin the flock in the autumn.” ¹

Sub-human creatures present more than one variety of societary life. There is, for instance, the flocking of birds and the herding together of mammals with comparatively little division of labour. There may, however, be much co-operation, as when birds combine to attack a hawk or an owl, or when beavers join in digging a canal. The societary form is more complex in the case of ants and bees; for such creatures exist in communities in which much division of labour is accompanied by hierarchical control.

“Many an ant-hill is strictly speaking a huge family, consisting of the children and grandchildren of one queen. But in other instances the ant-hill includes several families, just as a herd of wild cattle or antelopes may include several family groups. . . . In an ant-hill there is division of labour—the development of different castes, the reproductive queens and drones, and the productive (usually non-productive) workers.” ²

In such communities “the members are quick to recognize one another, probably by smell, and are ready and willing to help one another.”

Now we submit that this feature of mutual helpfulness can be traced in greater or less degree in all forms

¹ Frances Pitt, *Animal Mind*, p. 297. (Allen & Unwin, 1927.)

² Professor J. A. Thomson, *Ways of Living : Nature and Man*, p. 167.

of associational life in insects, birds, and animals. For this reason we do not, as does McDougall, distinguish rigidly the herd from the protective instinct. Mutual advantage does, of course, accrue as a matter of fact from close association, especially in time of danger. In virtue of this advantage each member of the herd is thus at one and the same time a giver and a receiver of intenser life. How far these benefits are given and taken with any degree of conscious purpose is a difficult question. That the herding habit is not entirely blind and involuntary seems to be clear from the distress that is felt by an animal when it is cut off from its neighbours and its desperate efforts to rejoin them. In the case of chimpanzees the desire to overcome separation when one of the company is isolated is extraordinarily fierce and persistent.

It often happens that blind animals are fed by their companions. Darwin gives us examples of such sympathy, in particular the case observed by Captain Stansbury of an old and blind pelican which was nourished by other pelicans on fish brought a distance of thirty miles. "Monkeys search for and kill each other's parasites, and when they have passed through prickly undergrowth, each will oblige his neighbour by pulling the thorns out of his coat in places that the latter cannot reach." Crabs, too, as Kropotkin tells us, will help a comrade that happens to be in a tight corner.

That the so-called herd instinct is more than a mere tendency to mass seems further to be confirmed by the phenomena of signalling. It is well known that animals warn one another of the presence of danger, and advise one another of the approach of the quarry. There is the fear cry, the hunting yap, the stamping of the ground as by rabbits,

"Sentinels are posted by many birds and also by a few species of mammals. We may instance wild-ducks and geese, cranes, parrots, flamingoes, sea-gulls, bustards, rooks, crows, storks, prairie-dogs and prairie-hens, zebras, wild-horses, beavers, otters, and wal-ruses."¹ These sentinels will sometimes sacrifice their lives for those whom they are guarding. "A herd of about thirty elephants," says a writer, "under the influence of a still alarm and sign signals, once vanished from the bush in front of me so quickly and so silently that it seemed uncanny. One single note of command from a gibbon troop-leader is sufficient to set the whole company in instant motion."²

Some writers do not hesitate to speak of the prevalence of Telepathy in the animal world. McDougall, however, uses the simile of the key and the lock to illustrate the way in which an animal's sounds and movements are understood by its neighbours. But such a simile, which is so appropriate, is, we suggest, a confirmation of the view that the association of animals is a much more intimate process than a mere tendency to mass. We maintain that in the association there is a protective bond. Freud, indeed, finds existent in it a "libidinal tie," and thinks that panic ensues when this tie is broken, since the danger which seemed small when one is a member of a group appears greater when it has to be faced in isolation.³ The contrary view is that in the face of danger it is the panic which destroys the "libidinal tie" and reveals an innate individualism. Such egoism, however, is human rather than animal: animals even in panic keep together. Men at such times do occasionally act on the principle of "every

¹ Deshumbert, *An Ethical System based on the Laws of Nature*, p. 74. (Open Court Co.)

² Hornaday, *Minds and Manners of Wild Animals*, p. 229. (Scribner.)

³ Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 47.

man for himself," though such conduct is not invariable. But man can, as animals cannot, notoriously change his nature: he can on occasion snap "the libidinal tie." Nay, as we show later, he can do this, not merely occasionally, but regularly and, so to speak, on principle. In a word, he can become an egoist. In a sudden emergency, like a fire in a theatre, whether he thinks first of himself or of others depends not so much on what is really basic in his nature as on what is strongest at the time.

But to return to the point, the members of a herd are imitative and responsive to suggestion in virtue of the tie that binds them, and not *vice versa*. As a result of this responsiveness they are able to take harmonious action. But this harmony of action rests upon the deeper harmony—in fact, upon the fundamental union which pervades the group. The mutual understanding which seems to exist between the members of a herd is, accordingly, very significant. Many illustrations of this subtle unanimity of action might be given; it may suffice to mention the simultaneous wheeling of birds in the air.

This responsiveness to suggestion on the part of members of the group is by some writers regarded as sexual in origin. Of course everything depends upon what sex-activity is taken to include. Used in the broad signification in which Freud understands it,¹ there is no difficulty in speaking, as he does, of suggestion as being "love-desire for harmony." MacCurdy, however, says:—

"Sex is more fundamental than the herd instinct, since sex subserves the maintenance of the whole species, while herd instincts cement and maintain only a group within the species."²

¹ *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, p. 39.

² MacCurdy, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 353.

In this view there appears to be a confusion of the fundamental with the extensive. What is fundamental depends rather on the nature than on the mere range of a function. We have already seen reason to think that the sex function, whatever its range, is derivative. And if we are right, this antithesis between sex and the herd instincts begs a question: may they not be manifestations of one and the same life-tendency?

We do not think with MacCurdy that group-suggestion is the utilization of an earlier sex-mechanism. It does not follow that because suggestion and response accompany the sex relation they owe their existence to it. Both the sex reaction and the key-lock apparatus of suggestion associated with it are, in fact, too specialized in character to be fundamental and original. Moreover, group-suggestion is quite indifferent to sex distinctions. In bees, for instance, sex is a very specialized function within the colony of the hive which contains many bees who work in harmony, though they cannot couple. It seems much truer to regard sex-suggestion as derivative from group-suggestion than *vice versa*, even as we have regarded the protectiveness of the sex attitude as derived from a more original and more general tenderness of life for life.

It is unnecessary here to show the power of group-suggestion in the case of man. This has been done in particular by Trotter,¹ who has pointed out how prone man is to copy the fashions, opinions, and beliefs of the group to which he belongs. Conventional morality, indeed, is as to its content a system of taboos or signals, i.e. warnings what to do and what to avoid. The so-called private conscience is to a great extent public in origin; it is the view of the community as to what is best for the life and well-being of the group.

¹ *The Instinct of the Herd in Peace and War.*

There is, therefore, in human groups something like the same key-lock relationship as obtains in the animal herd. Man, too, has his taboos or signals. In his case, too, they have a protective function, viz. to safeguard the life of the tribe. All research, indeed, goes to show that it was out of a Tribal Sentiment that Morality was born. It was not merely that the content of morality was tribal in its inception and in its reference. The matter was much deeper than this. The very rationale of early morality was its cohesive nature and power. The one essential ethical principle was, indeed, "Thou shalt stand by thy kin." A corollary of this principle was often a communism in property, as in Melanesia.

No doubt kinship throughout the ages has been understood in too physical a sense. Groups tend to be formed by man on an exclusive basis. Mankind has not yet realized kinship in its full scope as comprehending a world-wide brotherhood that transcends race and clime.

The conclusion, then, to which we come is that this so-called herd-instinct, whose presence we have traced in animals and man, is a manifestation of one and the same life-impulse, from which the instincts of sex and parenthood are derived, and of which the essential nature is protective. It is this fundamental social impulse of life which is the basis of ethics.

CHAPTER VII

MINOR DIFFERENTIATIONS OF THE LIFE-IMPULSE

HAVING adopted a genetic view of the Instincts, and having devoted the previous chapters to an attempt to explore the fundamental trend and impulse of life and mind, we must now say something about the relation which we believe to exist between this basic instinct and other instincts which, because we regard them as derivative, we call "differentiations." Of these we distinguish between major and minor. In the former category are the Sex, Parental, and Herd instincts, of which we have just treated. So far, however, little or no reference has been made to the way in which further instincts emerge. These, we now hope to show, fulfil an auxiliary function in relation to the instincts already named, or in more specific ways subserve the Life-impulse, and may therefore be described as "minor." Of such minor instincts we take as examples Curiosity, Acquisition, Flight, Self-Display, etc.

Descriptive Psychology in its classification of Instincts is apt to create the impression that they possess a structural independence which is native and original. There is no need to suppose this. The process of Evolution is sufficient to account for the differentiation of unitary impulse or trend into various modes of reaction according to the necessities of the situation presented by the environment. Given the dynamic of a master interest along with a capacity to perceive and

react on objects, a creature would gradually develop ways of response by means of appropriate motor-mechanisms. That the Sexual, Parental, and Gregarious tendencies have a common root, that they are all forms of a fundamental life-impulse which is essentially social, will, we trust, have already appeared. We have been led to take the view that both the sexual and the parental instincts are too highly specialized to be primitive, and have seen in the gregarious tendency an expression of the social trend of all life, which is at once simpler and broader in range. Nevertheless they have all as their common characteristic the tendency to enrich and protect life in both the individual and its neighbours. They all function with different motor-mechanisms; but that fact must not blind us to the essential similarity of their attitude. The sex function is relatively more creative, the gregarious and parental attitudes are more conservative; though the desire to beget a fresh life and the desire to cherish a life that already exists, whether that of the mate or of the offspring, are alike social in their ultimate nature.

In the course of evolution, however, there have emerged, not only the aforesaid major differentiations of the life-impulse, but instincts that are still more specialized. To present observation these appear to possess, as we have said, a structural independence as well as a functional dissimilarity. We suggest, on the contrary, that they have a common origin. Thus sucking, smelling, wandering, chewing, hunting, may on first consideration seem distinct and unrelated; the genetic standpoint reveals their intimate connection with that process of life-enrichment which we call Nutrition. The same process would originate such an instinct as that of repulsion. In the search for food the senses of smell, taste, and touch would develop a fine

power of discrimination. A knowledge of what was bad for food would have been gained, of which the olfactory sense would have learned to give warning. Anything which offended the nose or palate would be rejected as literally disgusting. Noxious odours and disagreeable tastes would be avoided in the interests of the creature's well-being. Thus would an instinct of repulsion be generated. Expressions of the same instinct are the refusal to touch anything slimy and the revolt against anything unclean or dirty, the latter of which develops in some people a veritable mysophobia and causes a perpetual washing of the hands.

Associated with the self-preservative aspect of the life-impulse is the instinct to avoid and escape from danger. Unless some such tendency had been developed, life would not have maintained itself. This danger-instinct, as we might expect, is common to all creatures. In some animals it takes the form of fear of the strange or unfamiliar and expresses itself in a variety of ways, —in flight, in immobility, in timidity. In man it shows itself as carefulness, prudence, and practical wisdom.

It is not difficult to see how the instinct of Construction, for instance, would subserve the life-impulse, whether in its self-preserving or other-regarding aspects, though especially in the latter. In order to safeguard offspring sub-human creatures build nests, make dens and lairs, hollow out underground galleries. Indeed, the facility shown in constructing the appropriate form of shelter is truly remarkable. The close alliance of this instinct of construction with the social purpose of life will be manifest from the following illustration:—

“Wasps come in pairs to a muddy pool. One of them picks up a little pellet of mud, and the other fills his mouth with water. When they reach their nest, the one

sets down his little bit of mud, and the other throws over it his tiny drop of water, and then they puddle it, and fly away for more."

All such architectural activity is auxiliary to the satisfaction of a deeper instinct, i.e. the parental. In man this constructive ability assumes various and wonderful forms, not merely in the building of houses, or the weaving of garments, or the growing of food; it creates works of art, it devises methods of government, it elaborates systems of thought. And in these varied human activities the social purpose is more or less patent.

It might be thought that in the instinct of Acquisition we have an instance which contradicts our doctrine of the social origin of instincts, for the impulse to get seems at first sight exclusively self-regarding. Its connection, however, with the social character of the life-trend discloses itself on closer investigation. There is in sub-human life no pursuit of property for property's sake; that is a human development, due to sophistication. Even when among the lower creatures there is hoarding, that hoarding is merely the prudent postponement of use. And the object of acquisitive desire in the sub-human world is food—food for the creature itself and its young—also materials for the nest. According to Mr. Eliot Howard, the acquisition of property by birds is due to the influence of a social instinct.

"Birds, when the breeding season draws near, leave the common feeding-ground and stake out a territory as the special feeding-ground for their future mate and offspring. Their subsequent singing in a tree is a signal to the female that he is ready, having secured a territory, and also it is a warning to other birds to keep away." ¹

¹ *Territory in Bird Life*. (Murray, 1920.)

There may be some dispute as to the exact significance of this singing, but it appears to be well established that birds are keen to secure a breeding-ground, and that it is this keenness which prompts them to fight, as it also explains their migratory search for larger and more favourable districts.

Another minor differentiation of the fundamental life-impulse is the innate tendency to Curiosity which is common to sub-human creatures and to man. Nearly all animals are attracted by a strange object. If it is too strange, it may scare rather than attract. But if the object is moderately unfamiliar, animals will be drawn towards it. Fish in particular are very curious; they approach anything solid which is hanging in the water and scrutinize it. Perhaps, however, it is to monkeys that the palm for curiosity must be awarded. In spite of their dread of snakes, their curiosity is so great that they cannot help lifting up the lid of the box in which the snakes are kept.¹

Now this instinct of curiosity in sub-human creatures is no mere desire for information in the abstract. It seems to be a desire to find whether an object is dangerous or profitable for the purposes of life. In man the desire to know, which had its original connection with the life-impulse, tends to run off into abstract inquiries of which the relation to the values of life is often obliterated by the mere theorist and pedant.

The alliance of the instinct of Self-display with the social purpose of life is disguised by the conduct of man whose parade of himself is often mere egoism. Nevertheless, when we observe the ways of insects, birds, and animals we see clearly that in their case there can be no possibility of egoism as such. It is true that in the presence of smaller dogs a larger will

¹ Cf. Darwin's experiment at the London Zoo.

manifest what seems to us a sense of superiority. Darwin tells us that a peacock also is so desirous of being noticed that he will sometimes descend to the level of showing his finery off before poultry and even pigs. But usually display in the sub-human world is for another reason. When moths and butterflies, birds of paradise, pheasants or pigeons disport themselves in rich colours, the purpose for the most part is sexual. Display, in a word, signifies allurements. "So the stallion arches his thick neck, waves aloft his tail, steps high and prances proudly. The bull bellows; the lion roars, the cat caterwauls." ¹ "The glow-worm attracts its mate by flashes of light, the death-watch by tapping in the wainscot, the snipe by drumming, the cricket by serenading with an instrument played by its own wings." In short, the apparatus of allurements includes sounds of all kinds, colours and special plumes, and various antics designed to impress.

Thus in the lower creatures the instinct of Self-display functions in the service of the Sex attraction, and if the latter is, as we have contended, itself a derivative rather than a fundamental impulse of life, much more subordinate thereto is this tendency to self-display.²

Man, having the same sex instinct, feels also the same impulse to attract the opposite sex. But the nature of the allurements in his case depends upon the precise character and motive of his sex-reaction. Of this we hope to speak later.

The foregoing illustrations may suffice to explain the way in which we conceive the genesis of the instincts. We submit that, given a fundamental life-impulse

¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 159.

² This argument seems unaffected even though self-display be regarded, as it is by some, as a joint-product with the Sex instinct of a sense of Vitality.

which is essentially social, along with the capacity to appreciate and respond to the environment, impulse will differentiate itself in these modes of activity which we have called minor instincts.

NOTE.—For further illustrations of methods of allurement see a report of a public lecture on Animal Courtship given by Professor Julian Huxley at the British Association at Oxford in August 1926.

CHAPTER VIII

IS NATURE "UNSOCIAL"?

As a result of our investigation of the phenomena of Instinct we concluded that the Life-trend is essentially social in the sense explained. There are, however, certain facts concerning the behaviour of creatures which at first sight, at least, appear to contradict our conclusion. Nature, it is often said, is not social, but cruel. She is doing every day, said J. S. Mill, what a citizen would be hanged for doing; she is committing cruelty, rapine, and murder as part of her settled policy. Huxley, too, regarded Nature as acting on "the gladiatorial theory of existence." What philosophers and scientists have averred poets have echoed. Tennyson described Nature as "red in tooth and claw." Sir Edwin Arnold, in his *Light of Asia*, quotes Gautama, the Buddha, as observing with dismay the cruelty of animals one to another:—

Then mark'd he, too,
How lizard fed on ant, and snake on him; . . .
Each slew a slayer and in turn was slain,
Life living upon death. So the fair show
Veiled one vast, savage, grim conspiracy
Of mutual murder, from the worm to man,
Who himself kills his fellow.

To the problem created by this alleged warfare we must obviously give some attention in defence of our thesis.

It may be best to consider first those breaches of sociality which occur within a particular group, and afterwards the warfare which exists between species.

(I). WARFARE WITHIN THE GROUP.

At the outset we must carefully distinguish real from apparent fighting. There is a good deal of struggle between animals which is merely "fighting-play," as it has been called.¹ This obtains especially among birds, and particularly sparrows and wrens. The exact significance of this "fighting-play" is uncertain. It is agreed that it is by way of a rehearsal for the more serious use at a later date of the creature's powers. What is this use? The later and serious contests appear to be for either food or the female. That birds fight for food is only too obvious. That other species struggle for the possession of the female is also evident, especially in deer and buffaloes. One buffalo bull will kill another. Bovet thinks that it is in order to strive for a female rather than for food that the young are being unconsciously rehearsed when they contend with each other. Animals fight, however, both for food and for mate. Does this imply that no such social instinct as we have declared to be basic in life really exists?

Clearly the struggle presupposes sociality in so far as it takes place within the group. Just as clear is it that the fighting is not for fighting's sake; it is for food or mate, which means that it is an obstinate attempt to gratify either the nutritive or the reproductive aspect of the life-impulse. Where the instinctive is in danger of being thwarted, struggle is only natural. Such violent effort, indeed, is evidence of the force which is behind instinct, and is provoked by the presence of any obstacle. But these hindrances are not inevitable or constant in the order of Nature. Indeed, in the animal world the prevailing disposition is to live and let live. Kropotkin, indeed, says:—

¹ Pierre Bovet, *The Fighting Instinct*, p. 43. (George Allen & Unwin.)

“Among the carnivorous beasts there is one general rule: they never kill one another. Some of them are very sociable, such as the dog tribe, jackals, hyænas. . . . Lions and leopards . . . join together for hunting like the dog tribe.”¹

To the point also is Shaftesbury’s repudiation of the Hobbesian psychology:—

“To say in disparagement of man ‘that he is to man a wolf’ appears somewhat absurd when one considers that wolves are to wolves very kind and loving creatures. The sexes strictly join in the care and nurture of the young, and this union is continued still between them. They howl to one another to bring company, whether to hunt or invade their prey, or assemble on the discovery of a good carcase. Even the swinish kinds want not common affection, and run in herds to the assistance of their distressed fellows.”²

Now if our view is correct, the instincts of nutrition and sex, so far from being inconsistent with the fundamental social trend of Nature, are really aspects or parts of it. The two instincts can—they often do—function harmoniously. On the other hand, their harmony or mutual adjustment cannot, on the plane of sub-human life, be assured. What integration exists is, of course, automatic, so to speak; in a conscious and voluntary sense it would be quite impossible. Indeed, no sub-human creature can, strictly speaking, be social. Neither can it be anti-social. It can act only in line with that instinctive trend which happens to be strongest at the moment, and it is unable to attain anything like purposive organization. Indeed, it may succour itself to the detriment of others, or others to the detriment of itself, in a way which is quite blind. To call this maladjustment is simply to adopt an anthro-

¹ Kropotkin, *Ethics*, p. 52. ² Shaftesbury, *The Moralists*, pp. 83-4.

pomorphic point of view. Insects and animals are far below the stage at which conscious co-ordination is possible.

Nor should we be surprised to find that there are even cases of slaughter in the lower orders of life, such as the slaughter of one sex by the other, or of offspring by the parent. At the close of the pairing season female golden beetles will devour the male specimens. A scorpion after pairing will allow itself to be devoured by its female partner. The female mantis under similar circumstances will proceed quietly to consume her spouse. Here the disharmony between instincts seems flagrant. Apparently the parental, and especially the maternal, instinct becomes dominant in such cases; for the male, after fertilizing the female, is sacrificed as nutrition for the mother who guards the eggs. When in the beehive the drones are slain by the workers, this may be semi-purposive; it may be done because food is short, or to avoid the feeble progeny that might ensue on the fertilization of the young queen by old bees. The killing of the young by one of the parents is a not uncommon occurrence. Male rabbits and male rats will devour all or some of the young brood. Hence a female rabbit before giving birth to her brood will withdraw from proximity to her mate in order to safeguard her young. In the case of sticklebacks the position is reversed: the male protects the eggs against the predatory female. How far this cannibalism is due to the fear of man, or to jealousy of the other parent, it is, of course, impossible to say.¹ That the well-being of a particular species is sometimes attained only by the sacrifice of some of its members appears to be the fact.

¹ Miss Frances Pitt in *Animal Mind*, p. 103 (George Allen & Unwin, 1927), thinks that slaughter of young by the mother arises out of fear and anxiety—out of a desire to keep her babies—and takes place after she has been frightened or worried.

But, as evolution advances, sacrifice within the species seems to become less common. In higher species what sacrifice there is becomes more and more compatible with the continued life and activity of all the members of the species. Even when, in a contest for the female, animals test their strength the combatants do not fight to the death. Nor in the struggle for food do the parents or members of the flock normally feed on one another.

(II). WARFARE BETWEEN SPECIES.

This presents a somewhat different problem. The Herd instinct groups together members of the same species, but between species of a higher and a lower order respectively there is a more or less chronic strife. What else, it may be asked, is the significance of such parts of the anatomy of creatures as claws, talons, teeth, stings, and poisons? In respect of these things Nature's aim at first sight seems to be selfish and destructive. There are, for instance, carnivorous plants, fish, and animals. Among plants there is the Venus fly-trap. A whale in the course of its career will swallow countless thousands of smaller fish. A notorious "criminal" of the water is the sword-fish. Weasels prey on moles, rabbits, small birds and poultry. Owls devour rats and mice. Eagles will carry off lambs. Lions and tigers will kill for food horses, sheep, and oxen.

(1) In regard to all such facts as the foregoing we may observe that teeth, claws, stings, and poisons are used by the creatures that possess them, not, it would seem, for mere slaughter as an end in itself, but partly for the purpose of self-defence, and partly for the procuring of food.

In so far as these weapons are used in self-defence there is no necessary breach of the social principle. Clearly in the so-called instinct of self-preservation there

can be in sub-human life no reference to self as an ideal construction; such a "self" is possible only to a rational being and makes a somewhat late appearance in evolutionary history. The "self" which an animal tries to protect is its life, and so different is this from an egoistic aim that at the moment of danger the reaction is a reflex movement which precludes any idea of the interests of an exclusive self. Sometimes, indeed, the presence of danger leads an animal to merge its interest in the interests of others, as when a solitary wanderer quickly rejoins the flock, or when a lioness defends her cubs, or a hen her chickens! After all, what is a creature's life, the instinct for the preservation of which is so strong? Its life, as we have seen, has its reproductive as well as its nutritive aspect. All that the instinct of self-preservation provides for is life-continuity without any prejudgment of the way in which life so continued shall be used, certainly without any rigid separation of individual from social tendencies. And as a matter of fact the interest of an animal is never a merely exclusive one. Any animal is either a potential or an actual parent of offspring. It is not without significance that the "sting of the worker-bee is a transformed ovipositor or egg-laying organ, and therefore absent from the drones or males."¹

Again, so far as these "weapons" are used for the procuring of food there is no breach of the social principle. Even where the methods adopted seem most "criminal" the domestic impulse is in operation, as may be now briefly illustrated.

"The Crab-spider, while the bee is gathering honey, lurks under cover of the flowers, comes out of her hiding-place, steals up close and nabs her in the nape of the neck. The bite in the neck is paralysing, because

¹ Professor J. A. Thomson, *Concerning Evolution*, p. 71. (Yale Univ. Press, 1925.)

the nerve centres are affected. The poor thing's legs stiffen; and all is over in a second. The murderous spider now sucks the victim's blood at her ease, and when she has done scornfully flings the drained corpse aside. We shall see the cruel vampire become a model of devotion where her family is concerned." ¹

"The *Ammophila*, a solitary wasp, preys upon caterpillars. She stings them precisely at the most convenient place—the principal nerve-ganglia—and thus paralyses without killing her victim; she then drags it to her nest and deposits her egg upon it, leaving it as a supply of fresh (because living) meat for the grub which will hatch from the egg." ²

These illustrations may suffice to show that in sub-human nature killing is not done for its own sake. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence that in Nature life does certainly live upon death. A higher species flourishes at the expense of a lower. However we understand sacrifice, it is a fact.

(2) But in the second place this sacrifice of life is purposive. Nature appears bent, not on the mere production of life, but on a certain kind of life. Reverence for life has by some been proposed as the supreme moral and spiritual principle.³ But it is clear that Nature herself yields no support for such a principle. Apparently there is on the part of Nature no respect for life as such. Nature, indeed, is very lavish—in fact, too fertile. Darwin remarked that "there is no exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a rate that, if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of a single pair." Herrings, for instance, multiply at such a colossal rate that, if they were left alone, the sea would soon grow stiff with

¹ Fabre, *Insect Adventures*, p. 264. (Hodder & Stoughton.)

² McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 87. ³ E.g. by Schweitzer.

them. Putrefaction would set in. The poisonous air thus created would spread inland and destroy all life on shore. A single cod will lay 4,500,000 eggs. The common shield fern in a single season will produce 100,000,000 spores. During the first year the queen bee at the height of the season may lay from 2,000 to 3,500 eggs every twenty-four hours. The ovary of a newly born female baby possesses between 100,000 and 400,000 eggs, and when the time for bearing arrives the ovary still contains very many times more ova than can possibly be ever used. There is even more prodigality in the spermatozoa or male cells. It has been calculated that each time a male and a female pair 226,000,000 spermatozoa or male cells are transferred from male to female; and yet only one, or at the outside two or three, can possibly be used.¹

What is the meaning of this prodigious fecundity? The biologist replies that it is Nature's way of safeguarding the continuation of the species. Out of the many seeds that are destroyed some are fairly certain to bear fruit. Only two eggs of the $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions laid by the cod survive. When, however, we inquire into the agents of all this destruction, we find that a lower species has its ranks thinned by a higher. Insects provide food for birds, small fish for large, and so on. The whole process is, in fact, a cycle of sacrifice. It has been well expressed in *Jungle Days* as follows:—

This is the story of Opalina
Who lived in the Tad,
Who became the Frog,
Who was eaten by Fish,
Who nourished the Snake,
Who was caught by the Owl,

¹ For these facts I am indebted to an article in the *Quarterly Review* for January 1925 by Dr. A. E. Shipley, Master of Christ's College, Cambridge.

But fed the Vulture,
 Who was shot by Me
 Who wrote this Tale,
 Which the Editor took,
 And published it here,
 To be read by You,
 The last in the Chain
 Of Life in the tropical Jungle.¹

All this system of sacrifice by which a lower subserves a higher species indicates, as we say, that Nature is intent, not on the production of mere life, but of a certain quality of life. "The opossum was searching for food for itself and its young, and somewhere the great snake was coiled, watching with lidless, untiring eyes for its share in some life of lesser strength. It seemed somehow so cruel, this eternal alternation of life and death. If only the lower animals,—and then I remembered that perhaps at the very moment my Indian hunter was pulling trigger on an unsuspecting agouti or curassow or peccary for my next dinner; it came to me that the very emotions of compassion and sympathy which moved me were materialized and sustained by the strength derived from the sacrifice of many, many lives of these same lower animals."² This is but a picturesque way of saying that Nature uses the method of sacrifice for the evolution of a being who can appreciate the meaning of sacrifice, which in the case of man tends to become less and less a sacrifice of mere physical existence, and assumes the nobler and deeper form of the sacrificial will—the will, that is, which abjures the interest of an exclusive self and more and more merges its good in that of its neighbours.

Briefly, then, the process of Evolution may be interpreted as the development through many species of creatures of a certain quality of life which is finally

¹ W. Beebe, *Jungle Days*, ch. i, p. 3. (Putnam's Sons, 1925.)

² Beebe, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

attained only by man. That quality we may call sociality. In creatures that exist on the instinctive level, i.e. without self-conscious will, there can, in the nature of the case, be no sociality in the ethical sense, but only its preparation. We must expect to find, therefore, that in such creatures the nutritive and reproductive instincts, i.e. the instincts that are directed respectively to the protection of self and others, function without integration and so at times at each other's expense. Only man can merge his interest in that of his neighbour and attain a common good. Further, that sub-human creatures are potentially social is manifest in the phenomena of their domestic and herd life. Such sociality, however, as they attain is not only not achieved by conscious integration, but does not possess any universal or absolute quality; in other words, its scope is limited to the members of its own species, and its value is further limited by their sacrificial destiny. For example, a herd of sheep keep together, but the value of their gregariousness apparently counts for little, for if they are not preyed upon by other animals they eventually become food for man.

With the advent of man the power to co-ordinate the protection of self with that of others becomes possible, and this ethical sociality has a value of an absolute kind. Fraternity, for which the preparation in Nature is long and protracted, serves no mere economical purpose, but is an end in itself. Henceforth sacrifice for a higher species is out of the question. And indeed the very meaning of sacrifice undergoes transformation; more and more, as man advances in civilization, the sacrifice of blood is precluded by the growth of a sacrificial will. Gradually men cease to slay one another and delight to live and let live. At last the Good is pursued neither as the good of self nor the good of others, but as the good of each and all.

CHAPTER IX

MAN AND THE LIFE-TENDENCY

MAN, according to our view, is solidary with sub-human creatures and inherits their instincts. He is, however, endowed with an intelligence much greater than theirs. Not that either intelligence or appreciation of worth is peculiar to him. The principle of continuity alone leads us to postulate in the different grades of lower species some sense of desirable ends and of the way to their realization. Indeed, it may be a mistake, as Dr. C. S. Myers has pointed out, to sever instinct and intelligence. The experience of being baulked in the attainment of their goal appears to stimulate in lower forms of life experimental attempts to reach the end by some variation of method, as though intelligence began as a venture of faith in the service of an instinct. However this may be, in the case of man intelligence can do much more than vary the means to attain an end; it can modify the end of action itself. And so man, though a creature of instincts like the animals, is not their slave.

As a result of the activity of his intelligence man's instincts tend to lose both their inevitability and specificity: stimulus and reaction are no longer automatic, or precisely correspondent. In man's case, instincts need not be gratified as they occur, nor are they fixed, either on their receptive or executive sides. Indeed, man's intelligence leads him to introduce system into his experience, and so according to plan he favours some and inhibits other impulses. No doubt

he may at times act inconsistently with his plan. In other words, he may lose sight for the moment of the controlling purpose of his life and gratify an instinct which makes its appeal through its sheer strength.

Nevertheless, even though the integration of impulse may not at any particular moment be complete, it is always in operation. Man, simply because he is rational as sub-human creatures are not, must order his life somehow. He is a creature of large discourse, and as such he can consider the specific ends of the different instincts and relate them within a system of conduct. In technical language he is, as the animals are not, a subject of what the psychologist calls "Sentiments." A "Sentiment," we are told, "is a complex mental system formed out of emotions, their excitants and tendencies."¹ An ancient writer observed that God had made man upright, but man had found out "many inventions."² Which, being psychologically interpreted, may be taken to mean that Nature has endowed man with instincts upon which he has imposed systems of organization.

And here we may pause for a moment to review the part played by the principle of integration at different stages in the evolution of Life. "In the evolutionary history of organisms," says Professor Julian Huxley, "two broad contrasting principles stand out—that of aggregation and that of individuation of units."³ First of all there is merely an aggregation of cellular units which form, as it were, colonies. Later this aggregation is, so to speak, more integrated in the form of a single individual. Such individuation, however, is at

¹ Cf. Shand, *Foundations of Character*.

² Eccles. vii. 29.

³ Art. on "The Biological Basis of Individuality" (*Journ. of Phil. Studies*, July 1926).

first very primitive. The Sea-anemone, for instance, possesses, according to Professor Julian Huxley, only "mosaic individuality," because its parts are relatively independent. "The amputated basal disc will continue to crawl very much as it did when it still formed part of the whole animal; cut-off tentacles will continue, on stimulation with savoury substances, to contract towards where the mouth ought to be."

A higher form of integration is developed in creatures that possess a nervous system. By means of a nervous system, and especially with its culmination in a brain, an organism is able to control its behaviour with a delicacy and variety otherwise impossible.

The next step, it is pointed out, is the unification of consciousness—a truly remarkable achievement when it is remembered that conscious process depends "upon the activity of hundreds of thousands or hundreds of millions of discrete units, the nerve-cells."

Now concerning this unity of consciousness as we know it from within, its attainment is expressed in the form of "Sentiments," of which we have already spoken. The "material" which is organized into Sentiments consists of instincts. In recent years there has been a good deal of controversy ¹ on the relation between Instincts and Sentiments, due partly to misunderstanding. Perhaps the relationship may be best regarded as one of difference in respect of the degree and kind of organization. Instincts themselves have a certain degree of organization in that in their reaction to stimulus they may use, according to circumstances, different "motor-mechanisms" (to use McDougall's term).

"No doubt each instinct discharges more readily into some one motor-mechanism than into others; but it is

¹ E.g. between McDougall and Shand.

capable of discharging into others and under appropriate circumstances will do so.”¹

The Instinct of Hunger, for instance, may lead the same animal now to nibble, now to suck, as the case may be. “In such instinctive activity as the pairing or the combat of pigeons, or the capturing of its prey by a wasp, almost all the forms of bodily movement proper to the species may be brought into service.”² Whether, therefore, an animal be urged by the sex, the parental, the herd, or the so-called instinct of self-preservation, it organizes quasi-automatically its different modes of reaction as the occasion may demand. But apparently it cannot carry the work of organization much beyond this. Up to this point the differentiation and integration of activity are rather of the reflex than of the voluntary type.

In the case of man, however, the integration is greater in degree and higher in kind. It is more thorough and it is self-conscious. He organizes his various impulses within larger systems called Sentiments. Sentiments possess, of course, the general aspects which characterize experience at every stage: they are cognitive, affective and conative, with the qualification that those aspects are modified according to the stage which the organization has reached. Thus a Sentiment is organized round an “idea” rather than a “sense impression”; its affective aspect takes the form of a permanent disposition to feel in a certain way rather than that of a momentary excitement; and its practical trend is a plan of action rather than an isolated deed—an “enduring conative attitude,” as it has been called.

Much controversy has raged round the question of the exact position of emotion in relation to instinct; in

¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 117.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 115.

particular as to whether emotion is a part of instinct, or instinct a part of emotion. Perhaps the difficulty will be removed if we regard the emotion on the instinct-level as more specific both in relation to the stimulus which arouses it and the reaction which flows from it. In the Sentiment as such, emotion is aroused by a much wider range of stimuli and expresses itself in a more varied manner. Fear, for instance, on the instinct-level is aroused in a specific way and results in a specific action. A strange object excites an animal with fear; the creature either runs, or is immobile, or conceals itself, according to its species. Human Fear—Fear organized within a Sentiment—is aroused, not by one, but by many different reactions, as the occasion may require. As Shand points out, when a man has acquired the Sentiment of Love for a person or other object, he is apt to experience tender emotion in its presence, fear or anxiety when it is in danger, anger when it is threatened, sorrow when it is lost, joy when the object prospers or is restored to him, gratitude towards him who does good to it, etc.

The view, then, which we have so far reached of the mind of man is that, possessed as he is of many “motor-mechanisms,” some of them perfected through racial experience like sucking, possessed, too, of certain definite instincts or predispositions to feel and act in a specific way with regard to particular stimuli from the environment, of which the instincts of sex, parentalism, and the herd are the chief, man has besides, what sub-human creatures have not, a capacity for self-conscious organization of such instincts and motor-mechanisms.

We have now to consider whether, or how far, Sentiments are innate. Both “motor-mechanisms” and instincts are innate, as we have seen. Is there, however,

an innate tendency in man to organize these in a certain way? Clearly Sentiments cannot be innate in the same sense as instincts are innate. If it is true, as we hold it is, that a Sentiment is the result of voluntary organization, whereas Instincts function quasi-automatically, then it follows that the Sentiment is formed by the individual himself, as an Instinct is not. A Sentiment is built round an idea and its construction depends more or less on the will, whereas the existence of Instincts is independent of the will. The Sentiment, therefore, being of individual origin, cannot be innate in quite the same sense as an Instinct.

Nevertheless, the material with which Sentiments build, so to speak, is supplied by the instincts, at least so far as the Sentiments of lesser range are concerned. An instance of this is the Parental Sentiment, which most people are predetermined to experience in due course. To this extent Sentiments are innate, and we are not at liberty altogether to form whatever Sentiments we please. The Social Sentiment also may be regarded as innate, though in so far as it expresses itself in loyalty to Tribe or to Country it owes something to the formative influence of tradition.

There are other mental syntheses which seem original rather than traditional, as when a person lives for "sport," or "art," or "philosophy."

Now, as might be expected, the formation of such mental systems creates a new problem. It may often happen, of course, that Sentiments may function in harmony. For instance, it may be found easily possible to co-ordinate a love of family with a devotion to Art, or Sport, or Philosophy. Some men have successfully united a political career with metaphysical speculation; others have pursued musical culture along with a strenuous attention to commercial duties. A Prime

Minister may prove famous both as a statesman and a theologian.

But only too often there arises conflict between Sentiments. One Sentiment, it may be, cannot be maintained except at the expense or by the suppression of another. It may be found sometimes impossible to pursue art and business simultaneously, or to combine politics and literature. Conflict, however, between lesser Sentiments—like that between a political and a philosophical career, or between devotion to Family and to Art—will usually be found to imply an antagonism, much more fundamental than themselves—an antagonism, indeed, which is the root and source of all minor conflicts, and that is the opposition between the interests of self and those of others.

Now, of course, conflict will not settle itself. Peace between two or more contending Sentiments can be brought about only by reorganization. The opposing claims must be reconciled, and reconciliation demands a higher synthesis—a synthesis, in fact, so comprehensive as to include, and by including to harmonize, the warring Sentiments. Sooner or later men have to live for some supreme end to which all their interests are subordinated. In short, a Master-Sentiment must be found.

The creation of a Master-Sentiment is man's own work. It means the integration of the whole personality and the formation of a character. A man does not make his instincts, but the task of their organization is his own. His life, therefore, can never be lived strictly speaking on the instinctive level. Though he may be said to be living for "home" or for "work," for "play" or for "sex," in doing so he has in reality identified *himself* with the instinct in question and has organized the activity of impulse within a Master-Sentiment.

As for the plan to be followed in this supreme integration of motive, this, we suggest, is laid down by Nature herself. We accepted at the outset, in line with classic tradition, the guiding principle of Conformity to Nature as the clue to the solution of the problem we have in hand. Our study of Nature has had special reference to life, human and sub-human, and has revealed the fact that it is ambi-functional, so to speak, in that its processes of nutrition and reproduction are interconnected, and, indeed, mutually involved. In other words, the individual and the social interest, while dual in aspect, are fundamentally unitary. Of course, at the insect or animal stage of being there is no conscious, much less rational, relation of these two aspects of life. Indeed, on the instinctive level creatures are blind to the connection between these two aspects, and they can neither appreciate the bearing of one upon the other nor arrive at any adjustment of an intelligent sort when the claims of the individual and its neighbours conflict.

When, however, we come to man, to him is given the power, as a conscious and rational being, of himself integrating in an ultimate synthesis the self and social aspects of life.

With regard to the Instincts themselves and the Sentiments formed from them, we do not propose exhaustively to exhibit the dual reference in each of them to self and others, as it will be easily discernible on reflection. Whatever the nature of the behaviour, the individual and his neighbour are both implicated: the self is, of course, the agent, and as such is always involved, and its specific activity will have now a more individual and now a more social reference. Any final synthesis, therefore, will preserve this dual reference in its essential constitution.

At the same time, man, as the captain of his soul, enjoys a certain momentous liberty in regard to the organization of his nature. The choice open to him would seem to be, not the elimination of all social reference, which is, of course, impossible, but the subordination of others to self, or self to others, or otherwise the co-ordination of self and others.

Now to subordinate self to others or others to self is neither natural (if our study is hitherto correct) nor at all likely to be successful. It will not be successful, because, however selfish a man may be, he will at times be unselfish; and however devoted to others he may be, such devotion will be impossible without some attention to the self. There is good in the worst of men. Nor can a regard for others be absolute except at the cost of suicidal sacrifice.

The only natural synthesis is one which co-ordinates Self and Others in unitary regard. "The lower creatures devote to reproduction all the energies not expended in the sustenance of their lives. The plant lavishes its strength first on the flower-stalk, then on the ripening of the seed. The life of the animal is largely determined by the special necessities which the reproduction of its species involves. But we cannot say that in these cases there is any opposition between reproduction and individuation, for that has meaning only when these are offered as alternative ends. It is only where life wakes to clear self-consciousness that such an opposition can arise." ¹

Shaftesbury was fully alive to this problem of the relation to be established between the "natural" and the "self" affections, and he conceived it to be one of "balance." This solution may seem at first sight only to beg the question. But by "balance" he meant mutual

¹ MacIver, *Community*, p. 325. (Macmillan.)

subservience, each order of passion subserving the interests of the other. This conception, especially in view of his doctrine of human nature as forming a constitution and having parts, implied that the particular impulses escape dualism by means of unitary organization. His successor, Butler, is also aware of the subservience of Benevolence, at least considered as a "particular passion," to Self-love, but the unification of these two "superior principles" is effected externally, so to speak, viz. by "Conscience." Conscience, we suggest, does not sit apart from the rest of our nature and dictate the nature of the final synthesis of impulses; on the contrary, it presumes it. What is ethically right must at least be psychologically natural.

Some psychologists, however, regard the supreme synthesis of experience as of the nature of a "Self-Sentiment." Drever, for instance, thinks¹ that as a unifying principle the Self-Sentiment is "a synthesis of all the Sentiments." And McDougall similarly says: "The only sentiment which can adequately fulfil the function of dominating and harmonizing all other sentiments is the sentiment of self-regard, taking the form of a self-conscious devotion to an ideal of character," and adds: "This sentiment is capable of extension to all loved objects; that is to say, it may become synthesized with, or may integrate within its own system, all other sentiments of love and hate, of liking and disliking: as when a man identifies himself with his child, his family, his country, etc."²

Now here we need to exercise care. By general consent we attain to a consciousness of selfhood only as we have a consciousness of other selves. No one has stressed this more than McDougall himself. "The self-regarding

¹ *Introduction to the Psychology of Education*, p. 77. (Arnold, 1922.)

² *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 526. (Methuen, 1926.)

sentiment has always as its object the self-in-its-social setting, rather than a self thought of in isolation.”¹ So any Sentiment which clusters around the self as a nucleus is compounded at every stage of references to other selves—their attitudes, opinions, tastes, needs, loves and hates. And such a Sentiment implies the consciousness of being a self among other selves, and is, of course, the necessary condition of mental sanity. A Sentiment of Self-Regard in this sense is fundamental as a psychological basis.

But it is the foundation of “character” only in a neutral sense of the term. Indeed, it is the foundation equally of a bad and of a good character. The consciousness of being a self among other selves only creates the ethical problem. The question of my behaviour in such a social setting at once arises. And that is an ethical question. Must I subordinate either others to myself or myself to others, or must I seek to establish a synthesis, not, of course, of consciousnesses, but of interests? It is possible to organize our impulses in the supreme interest of the Self with more or less success, though even in the most selfish man generous deeds will sometimes break out. McDougall has observed that “the Self-Regarding Sentiment of the thoroughly selfish man is a comparatively rare sentiment.”² It may be true that it is rare to find the Ego in the abstract worshipped as an idol: but that the concrete interests of life can be exploited by the individual to his own advantage is, we think, a common experience. Whereas in lower forms of life Nature links creatures together, instincts which she integrates man can and does put asunder, or at least fails to unite. We may say in the language of biology that man tends to suppress the

¹ McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, p. 433.

² *Social Psychology*, 9th ed., p. 161,

reproductive or social side of his nature in favour of the nutritional; he protects himself and not others.

Animals, of course, never consciously oppose their own interest to that of the family or the herd. But situations arise which impose a struggle for existence, and in such circumstances we see in the animal world the effort on the part of a creature to conserve its own life. But in such cases the internecine struggle is more or less incidental and temporary. Moreover, there is no reference to self as an ideal construction. Such a "self" is possible only to a reasoning creature like man. The self which an animal seeks primarily to protect in any struggle for food, etc., is its own life, and so different is this from an egoistic aim that at the moment of need the reaction is a reflex movement. The instinct of self-preservation in animals is an automatic provision for ensuring life-continuity without any prejudgment as to the way in which life so continued shall be used, —certainly without any rigid separation of individual from social tendencies.

Man, however, can detach this instinct of self-preservation from its natural context, so to speak; he can "improve" upon its primary function and work it up into a Sentiment of Self-Regard. In other words, he can inhibit the complete course of the Life-impulse so as to produce, as it were, a "short-circuit." Instead of co-ordinating the interests of self and others by a Sentiment, as animals do perforce through instinct, man characteristically fails to effect the synthesis. His will suffers from an ultimate inertia. His interest centring only in himself, he transforms the activity of the ego into egoism.

If, however, a man would live "according to Nature," he must institute between himself and his fellows that social life of which the adumbration is seen in the

sub-human kingdom. The presumption is that the tendency to sociality which is observable in lower creatures should not be negated or thwarted by man, but carried to a higher stage. If he is the crown of the evolutionary process, then he should bring to a consummate expression the universal trend of life. As a creature of will and reason he should himself forge social bonds between himself and his neighbours. Biology makes us aware of what is sometimes called "the trend towards individuation." Life in its simplest forms begins as an aggregation of cells which form "colonies."¹ This "colonial" unity is maintained and developed in higher orders of life, where many members are bound together as a group or flock. The human body is itself an example of "colonial unity," millions of cells being organized by the brain and nervous system in a unitary whole of great marvel. The principle of continuity alone, therefore, would seem to require that men, differentiated as they are into vast multitudes of self-acting units, should nevertheless themselves work out a compensatory synthesis. Indeed, it seems but natural that man himself should present in his relationship to his fellows the eminent example of "aggregation" accompanied by "individuation." In a word, the task that is committed to humanity is that of forming a social whole. The Whole thus created may be called a multi-individual organism, but as such it differs from any organism in the strict sense of the term, according to which the unity is the end of the parts. Rather in the Social Whole the "parts," i.e. the individuals, do not merely exist for the Whole, i.e. the Community, but have also existence for themselves.

¹ Professor Julian Huxley, "The Biological Basis of Individuality" (*Journ. of Phil. Studies*, July 1926).

It may be thought that in comprehending the whole of humanity into one social unit we are pressing too far the principle of "the trend towards individuation." But for this extension of the principle there appears to be a sound justification in biology alone. For in the process of reproducing one life from another there is a portion of the germinal material which apparently is not used to make the body of the immediate offspring, but is given to be handed on as a trust (to use Galton's metaphor)—as capital for further reproduction. The fact, then, of the germinal continuity of the Race has its counterpart and corollary in the view of mankind as forming a universal Family.

From this point of view family life in the stricter sense performs the primary function of furnishing recruits for the universal Family; it is the method by which the race is continued. It is, of course, a natural group, based on instinct. In addition it is an instance of "individuation" on a small scale, and a centre of social life often of much charm and deep intimacy. But its existence as a social group only creates a problem. For what is to be the relation of these minor groups to one another? Sooner or later, some attitude—either of friendship or hostility—must be taken up.

The same problem arises even when the family extends its bounds to the Clan or the Tribe, for Clan and Tribe appear to have grown by means of the extension primarily of the bond of kinship. Now the tribal code of duty can be tersely summed up in the command "Thou shalt stand by thy kin." ¹ No obligation, however, was felt towards the members of an alien people. An oft-quoted instance of this is Abraham's attempt to deceive the head of a foreign people by passing off his wife as his sister. But again, as in the

¹ Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*.

case of the family, the interrelation of wider groups like clans or tribes only creates a problem in sociality. Should the attitude taken up be exclusive or inclusive? The members of other tribes are, of course, no less human in every respect than one's fellow tribesmen.

To the philosopher, social exclusiveness is an affront to the intellect; it is irrational, inasmuch as it makes the part greater than the whole. This point of view was well expressed by the Cambridge Platonist, Richard Cumberland, as follows:—

“If any man rightly judge that the common good of all who act according to the rule of reason is a greater good than the good or happiness of one man (and this is no more than to judge the whole to be greater than its part), there is no doubt but that God thinks the same.”¹

At a later day Henry Sidgwick adopted a somewhat similar position, and described it as the principle of “Rational Benevolence.” It was, he said, self-evident, “that the good of any one individual is of no more importance from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe than the good of any other.”²

But it is, I think, a historic fact that when men have thoroughly grasped this principle of impartial sociality, called by Sidgwick “Rational Benevolence,” they have done so, not so much as an intellectual axiom, but rather “from the point of view of the Universe.” In other words, they have mediated the extension of their social sympathy through Religion.

“. . . The beginnings of ethics are just the customs of the tribe, which stand for a social good and are as a rule binding on the will of the members. Over these customs tribal religion casts its protecting shadow,

¹ *De Legibus Naturae*, ch. v, § xix.

² *Methods of Ethics*, 6th ed., p. 382.

and invests them with a religious sanction and value.”¹

An instance of this close connection between morality and religion is that of the Hebrew Theocracy; it was the common worship of Yahweh which was the basis of the solidarity of the Hebrew people. Similarly the cohesion of the Roman peoples had a more or less religious aspect. A conspicuous illustration of this alliance is that of Stoicism. When the Stoics spoke of living life according to Nature, they interpreted Nature, not in any merely phenomenal or material sense, but in its cosmic significance. They saw in themselves and in their fellows the same Reason of which the World itself was the expression: a spark of the Heavenly fire flamed up in the breast of every man. Men were to treat one another equally because the World formed one great City—the City of Zeus, in which all men were equally citizens; they were to live together in harmony because fundamentally—cosmically—all are part of the Universal Reason. This is clearly stated in the following well-known passage from Marcus Aurelius:—

“Like as it is with the several members of an organized body, so is it with rational beings who exist separate; the same principle rules, for they also are constituted for a single co-operation. And the perception of this will more strongly strike thy mind, if thou say often to thyself, ‘I am a member (*melos*) of the system of rational beings.’ But if thou say, ‘I am a part (*meros*),’ though thou change but one letter of the Greek, thou dost not yet love men from thy heart. Loving-kindness doth not yet delight thee for its own sake: thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself.”

¹ Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 195, 196. (T. & T. Clark.)

It is significant that in more modern times social thinkers have advocated the gospel of Fraternity with something like a religious emphasis. This is certainly true of Auguste Comte, who, abandoning Rousseau's view of Society as a mere aggregate of individuals, conceived of Humanity as a great Organic Body whose Being is continuous throughout a long past unto a distant future. In this colossal Body, alive in the present, are contained the lives of all posterity. This Body he called the Great Being (*Grand Etre*), and treated it as though it were self-sufficient and eternal. Thus Comte ascribed to the Great Being divine attributes, and made it an object of worship. We are not concerned at this stage to criticize the claims of Humanity to be an object of worship. Obviously such an object of worship fails to satisfy the conditions; it is neither self-existent nor self-sufficient, nor can it be said to be eternal. But Comte's attitude is significant as showing that it is only by regarding our neighbours as sharing with us in some sort of transcendent unity that we can consider them as members of one great family with ourselves and as having claims on our service.

In our next chapter we shall briefly inquire how far this point of view seems to be justified.

CHAPTER X

A DOMESTIC UNIVERSE

OUR brief study of Human Nature raises questions about the constitution of Nature as a whole—in the comprehensive sense of the term in which *Natura* is used by Spinoza. The trend of life, sub-human and human, being what it is, what may we conclude as to the character of the Universe?

Can we conclude anything? Can we who are a part of the Whole know the Whole of which we are but a part? Obviously if the Whole is to be known adequately, It must “know” Itself, whatever that may imply. We who are a part can never fully know the Whole.

Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.

The knowledge of “all in all” would seem to be for ever beyond us, and as men we must be content with a knowledge which at any rate is partial.

Moreover, let it not be forgotten that any knowledge with which we are acquainted is human knowledge, subject as it is to all those limitations and conditions which govern human thinking; in a word, it is anthropic; nay more, it is anthropomorphic. Any and every metaphysical system is inevitably anthropomorphic in the sense that it must be the thought of a man, who has to use such faculties as he possesses, and to submit to such categories of control as he is obliged to acknowledge. Any philosophy of the universe is after all a human, and indeed an individual, view of what the

world as a whole is like. The very variety of metaphysical systems but emphasizes the influence of the individual factor in their formation.

Conceivably Spinoza might have said that his *Ethics* was not the work of a certain individual called Spinoza, but a Divine revelation, the outcome of a super-insight called "intuition," since he states that "we know God under the form of eternity, because our understanding of God is God thinking Himself in us." But if it is "in us" that God does His thinking, then such thought would surely be suspect, for it would be mixed with, or conditioned by, human forms and categories. However pure the water, it will be spoilt and useless if the glass that contains it is infected. A part can never experience the articulated Whole unless, *per impossibile*, it becomes the Whole.

Even the "objectivity" of Science is not absolute. It is conditioned by the limitations of the scientist.

"Word-symbolism, averages, approximations, statistical data, general laws—in every application of the scientific method the individual always escapes, and we construct a world corresponding only very inaccurately to the world of reality. We fit the world on to the Procrustean bed of our own intelligence."¹

In Metaphysics there may seem to be still greater scope for the play of the subjective factor—witness the classification of philosophers into different types, such as the "tender-minded" and the "tough-minded," a rough discrimination between those whose points of view are respectively "idealistic" and "realistic."

Such a distinction is significant as showing that in the effort to interpret the Universe the balance between the subjective and objective factors in knowledge may

¹ Joseph Needham in *Science, Religion, and Reality*, p. 249. (Sheldon Press, 1926.)

be tilted differently by different men. And indeed it is because the balance has not been kept true that systems of metaphysics so various and so contradictory have been propounded.

Idealistic systems, for example, have erred by stressing too much the subjective side of knowledge and emphasizing in particular, and indeed exaggerating, what we may call the intellectual aspect of experience. The Idealisms of Spinoza and of Hegel are essentially intellectualistic constructions. Based as they are on the conception in the former case of "Substance," and in the latter of "Subject," they select out of experience features that are not primary or fundamental. "Substance" and "Subject" are both of them ideas which are the result of abstraction. So far from making the Universe a coherent whole of parts, Spinoza neither derives from "Substance" its Attributes of Thought and Extension, nor does he show why or how these Attributes are related to one another. In Hegelianism, again, the relation of the objective world to the Subject is "logical" in *assertion* rather than in *reality*. Hegel did not really deduce from Reason the concrete Many, nor did he show how Thought constitutes Things as they are. Nor, indeed, from mere thought-relations can you arrive at the concrete "this" or "that." "Nature," which Hegel opposed to Spirit, is, as Professor James Ward declared, a contrary, and not a contradictory, opposite. And, speaking generally, Idealism, while it is bold in asserting that the Many are unified in the One, and that the Imperfect loses its imperfections in the Whole, yet seems on the whole to substitute rhetoric for logic. When contradictions are assigned to the Absolute for liquidation, the intellect thereby capitulates and confesses its impotence to explain the world by dialectic. And Bradley, realizing this impotence,

acknowledged that "Reality is concrete, while the truest truth must still be more or less abstract."¹

We conclude, then, that the attempt to explain the Universe in terms of some abstract category of thought like "non-contradiction" or "coherence" must and does fail. It fails not merely because the mind never succeeds in overcoming obstinate dualisms and resolving recalcitrant antinomies, but especially because that which is merely coherent or non-contradictory is too formal a description of Reality. And it would seem that so long as man tries to solve the problem of the Universe on similar lines he must expect to encounter failure.² Man's very sophistications blind him. On the other hand, the secrets of the world, being hid from the wise and prudent, are revealed to "babes." And one of the respects in which the inquirer must resemble the child is in the spirit of humble receptiveness. That is to say, he must abandon his own "wisdom" and all preconceived thoughts and prejudices about the world, and then, like Margaret Fuller, just "accept the Universe." He must not abstract thought from its setting in experience, nor must he detach experience from its world-context and its relation to Nature as a whole. Contemplating the process of Nature of which he is a part, he must strive to gain an attitude of impartial objectivity. By careful and unbiased observation he must first try to discover what kind of world it is. Such is the salutary lesson taught by the Realists as a corrective to the abstractions of the Idealists.

And yet, be it noted, this attitude favoured by the

¹ Quoted by Professor G. D. Hicks in "The Metaphysical Systems of Bradley and Ward" (*Journ. of Phil. Studies*, January 1926).

² "The chasm that severs logic from nature yawns even wider for the conceptualist mathematician of to-day than it did, a century ago, for Hegel."—Professor W. G. de Burgh, *The Significance of the Argument from Design* (Arist. Soc., 1927).

Realist is not purely passive or merely observational. Things themselves are dumb ; they have no philosophy. It is man who, as he observes, must also interpret. The answer to the question "Where shall (philosophic) wisdom be found?" is in the words used by Job : "The depth saith, It is not in me : and the sea saith, It is not with me." In other words, however respectful of the real the philosopher may be, he cannot, if he would seek to understand, maintain a purely passive attitude ; he must become interpretative. Any theory of Realism is, of course, not the Real as it is in itself, but an interpretation of it, and as such it is anthropic and anthropomorphic. It is necessary to stress this, for a claim is made by some Realists to present facts uninfluenced by values. The attempt to do so, however, seems to us hopeless. What are presented as "facts" are "facts" as these are seen by the philosopher ; which is the same thing as to say that they are inevitably placed in the setting of some theory, and are data for the understanding. Thus, to say the least, the influence of such a value as the ideal of truth is throughout irresistible. That we must maintain docility in the presence of Nature is certainly necessary ; but that the docility should be absolute would, of course, be nugatory. To a mind completely docile and objective "Space-Time" would have no relation to "Deity" whether spelt with a capital or otherwise.

It is important to remember that in knowledge there is always the subjective interpretation of objective facts. We inevitably impose values upon facts. This will appear even as a matter of psychology. For the "facts" are due to a process of selective attention. From their context in Reality we single out certain aspects for emphasis, but the selection is due to, or at least affected by, the influence, implicit or explicit, of some idea

of order. And when these different "emergents" are definitely arranged in a hierarchy, as they are by some Realists, the application of values to facts is obvious. The very judgment that one emergent is "higher" or "richer" than another is a judgment of worth.

It is said that we must suppress any tendency to apply to Reality as a whole the category of Cause, which we use in relation to phenomenal experience. As to this we will merely observe that the legitimacy of the application of any category like that of Causality is not wholly determined by the nature of the subject-matter to which it is applied; we apply the category because, our mind being constituted as it is, we inevitably do so. Of course, the nature of the subject-matter may necessitate some modification in our use of the principle. The time-relation as between cause and effect may be more relevant in some cases than in those where the logical connection is the main feature. But the mind is prone to apply in some form the principle of Sufficient Reason to its utmost limit.¹

And to the human mind no "reason" seems "sufficient" which does not disclose a purpose. Being purposive ourselves in the very constitution of our being, we are constrained to seek the interpretation of the world in terms of Purpose or End. The legitimacy of attributing purpose to the Whole has been denied from Spinoza onwards; modern Realists especially dispute it. Something depends, however, on the way in which "purpose" is conceived. Understood crudely as a design externally imposed upon things and processes by an Artificer, it is negatived by the scientific account of Evolution. But explained as the progressive realization of an immanent end, it receives much support from the facts. The point, however, is that man is constrained by his very nature

¹ Cf. Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 290. (T. & T. Clark, 1914.)

to attempt an interpretation of the world, and, we would add, to do so in terms of purpose.

The view which says that we must be content with the "facts" without evaluating their nature or attempting any comprehensive explanation is, as it seems to us, tantamount to a kind of mental *felo-de-se*: it is to use the mind in order to maim it. Is there any legitimacy in using the mind up to a certain point and refusing its further aid beyond? After all, the mind which we use is such as it is, and to repudiate its help in certain directions involves us in an agnosticism which is inconsistent because it is partial.

The real question at issue, of course, is the competency of the mind to essay *any* interpretation of the Universe. Do the categories of thought hold good of ultimate Reality? It seems to us that there is little difference between the position that they do not and the position that they do up to a point. A partial agnosticism seems a contradiction. Limited knowledge is one thing; but suspicion of the soundness of our faculties is another thing, and, as we say, self-destructive. For if the categories of our thought are suspect, how can thought embark on any sort of interpretation of Reality which is not also suspect? Even the Theory that says that the Real, while it contains value, has itself no value, is, as being an account of things in terms of human powers of thought, surely vitiated by the very scepticism which at other times it favours.

But it is time now to see how far the actual facts about the world will take us. What, let us inquire, is the account which the best-informed observation has to present?

Happily in the observation of the facts of Nature Science has in recent years greatly aided us; so much so as to change the aspect of the world from that

which it assumed to metaphysicians of an earlier century. Recent discoveries in the constitution of the atom favour an electrical theory of the nature of matter. We are told that the smallest unit of matter is force in motion after the analogy of some planetary system. Hence, whereas at one time matter appeared to be inert, and the world to be static, now all things are in motion.

"The universe is a flowing stream in Space-Time, and its reality is not intelligible apart from this concept of activity. . . . The physical stuff of the universe is therefore really and truly Action and nothing else. . . . The dethronement of matter in our fundamental physical conception of the universe and its replacement by action must profoundly modify our general outlook and viewpoints." ¹

A defect of an intellectualistic metaphysic like Idealism was that its conception of the universe tended to be static. Of course it was not denied that movement was real, but, as it was movement within the Cosmos which itself did not move, the "reality" of that movement, especially when it was conceived dialectically, was only partial, or real only in appearance. Spinoza's "Substance," for instance, is itself inert. Hegel's doctrine of Evolution, again, is merely the evolution of the "Idea," i.e. Dialectic Evolution; and so far is such movement of Reason from being the actual movement of the World that it has been criticized as being no more than an "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories." It is "unearthly" in the sense at least that the mental unification of differences is a kind of movement which is far too subjective to constitute a world whose motion is discovered rather than made. However interpretative of the Real the mind may be, it is not constitutive of it.

¹ Smuts, *Holism and Evolution*, p. 326. (Macmillan, 1926.)

Science, then, reveals to us the essentially dynamic nature of Reality; every particle of matter is a centre of motion. Further, as it has been pointed out, all this motion is repetitive. Such a substance as iron, found as it is in many parts of the world, implies a repetition of the same dynamic system that constitutes any particular specimen of iron. Thus the world's iron, as indeed is the case with all its other elements, is the result of incessant repetition.

But such repetition is necessary, not merely for the distribution of any element over space, but for its durability through time. No element can, in fact, exist save as it exists from moment to moment, and such durability is possible only by the continuous renewal of the energy which makes the element what it is. And if this is true of the existence of any particular element, it is, of course, true of the existence of all elements, and indeed of all matter of whatsoever kind. In fact, so far as the world as a whole perdures in time, it does so only because the energy which it expresses and by which it is made possible is momentarily renewed. The world is a world at all because it is kept in being. And it is kept in being by energy that is continuous and therefore ever repeated. This energy is in its effect at any rate clearly conservatory and protective. It turns the earth on its axis and keeps the stars in their courses. The very continuance of the world from moment to moment is a supreme example of a process of reproduction.

Now the energy of the Universe which by continuous reproduction conserves all things seems certainly intelligent, for it ensures as a fact what are generally recognized to be the effects of intelligence, viz. stability and order. The power behind the world is a power which makes for order and harmony. To use

General Smuts's word, it is *Holistic*—intent on making a Whole. And so cautious a Realist as Professor Alexander admits that "there are signs in the universe of something which, in some respects, resembles human mind." Granting the resemblance we must, I think, interpret it to the advantage of the intelligence of the Universe rather than to that of the merely human part of it.

Can we go farther? Can we attribute not only Intelligence but Goodness to this World-energy? That a vast Whole is kept in being, that it is being continuously reproduced, shows, we have just said, intelligent power. But that it shows more, that it shows a good intent—a moral purpose—cannot be asserted without further inquiry into the nature of the Whole which is thus maintained in being. The Pessimist would say that it would be better that the Whole should be dissolved. But Pessimism has certainly not been the considered belief of any large portion of the human race. Its advocacy has in some cases been motivated by specially unfortunate personal experience of which the subject has been the victim, either through his own or other people's folly. Sometimes a hyper-sensitive sympathy has tended to exaggerate the world's suffering and has theorized accordingly. Pessimism has by others been based on the highly questionable argument that the desires of man are inevitably a source of suffering, since they are doomed to be unsatisfied. We think, however, that if the verdict of the majority of creatures could be given voice, it would certainly be that it is good to be alive, and being alive, to desire.

Of course it is impossible to get the verdict of sub-human creatures on such a question. Philosophers and poets have, it is true, compared life in the animal kingdom to a shambles, and have represented it as the

scene of wholesale murder and bloodshed. Such a view is now more and more acknowledged to be a gross exaggeration. It is in conflict with the considered opinion of expert naturalists who assure us that there is most probably an enormous amount of joy among the lower creatures, and that though there is pain—the pain of being injured and killed by their foes—such pain, however, is for the most part temporary, often quite momentary. Their nervous organization being simpler and ruder than man's, their being destitute of the power "to look before and after," very much reduces the pain-capacity of insects and animals. Life to the lower creatures is, we must conclude, not a burden or a source of misery, but apparently a boon.

What, however, is the verdict of man? This is certainly more obtainable. But it is also in certain ways apt to be misleading. For the alleged sorrows of existence will be found to be far less numerous and far less serious if the effects of human folly and injustice are eliminated. There will always, of course, be the pangs of birth and the anguish of death, though even these sufferings can be very much mitigated. When we allow that most of the tragedies of life are tragedies of desire, we mean that desires are not the cause, but only the occasion of tragedy. The tragedy, in fact, results from the mishandling, so to speak, of the appetitive life. The appetites of hunger and thirst, of sex, of acquisition—all these are made the occasion of selfish exploitation, whence comes most of our human woe. If "countless thousands mourn," the cause lies very largely where the poet Burns placed it, viz. in "man's inhumanity to man." Anger at the Universe is mostly misplaced. Earthquakes and hurricanes certainly have their terrors, though man by his prudence may find out ways of countering or avoiding their destruction. As

for the ravages of disease—these he is gradually learning to overcome. No doubt the Universe cannot be described without qualification as a “House of Joy.” But neither can the “scheme of things” be justly called “sorry.”

And when we turn to consider the character of the Power that lies behind the movement of the Universe we find that its urge or drive is, as a matter of fact, towards a kind of life for man which, whether we call it “social” or “fraternal,” would, so far as it is realized, remove or at least mitigate those evils with which men are prone to charge the Universe itself.

What, then, is our justification for so describing the Life-tendency? The evidence which we have thus far accumulated appears to warrant us in regarding the Power which expresses itself in the Universe as characterized not only by Intelligence, but also by Love. For It not only practises Reproduction in the continuous gift and enrichment of life, but It confers also with that gift that very reproductive ability as a delegation to its creatures to enable them to share in the work of giving life, and that more abundantly.

In the first place, then, the Universe is an instance of reproductive power on a grand scale. Atoms have been described as having “a power of self-maintenance without wearing out.” Now this so-called “self-maintenance” really means that they maintain themselves by repeating themselves, not merely in the sense that the atoms that compose iron are found with the same scheme of arrangement all over the world, but rather that they perdure in time only by momentary reassertion, so to speak. And what is true about the atoms of iron is true of all elements, and indeed of the world as a whole. It is as though the Universe were all the time saying “ditto” to itself. Clearly the world continues only as it is repeated. Not that the mere repetition of

the world by the Power that controls it is in itself any evidence that this Power is ethical; an artificer may care for the product of his art and strive to preserve it simply because it is his own, and such care would not necessarily indicate love in the full sense of the term. It is only when we realize what care of the Cosmos means that we see that it is the expression, not of Power only, but more especially of Love. For such care means, as a matter of fact, the sustaining of countless millions of lives, sub-human and human, with all that life implies of capacity for joy, pre-eminently the joy which in rational creatures proceeds from love. It follows from this, then, that every moment of time is pregnant with ethical significance; it is eloquent of Love's solicitude. Thus the Cosmos is not so much a great Fact as an affecting Value.

Recent investigations into the constitution of Matter appear to us to lend strength to the foregoing argument. If a particle of matter is really but "a great number of events having causal connection with one another," then matter can endure only through the unceasing repetition of the events which constitute it; and so the whole material Universe and we ourselves likewise, so far as we share its energy, endure only through the same continuous repetition of "events." Now mere repetition would seem to be incapable of producing a Universe; in addition there would be necessary some directional control over the "repetition," especially if the "events" so repeated have "causal" connection. Further, it is difficult for us to form any other idea of such directional control than that it is purposive. So this reduction of the Cosmos to "events"—events which, according to our view, do, as a matter of fact, favour the evolution of Values—gives to Time not only a radical importance, but a moral significance. For if Love

is the goal towards which emergent qualities seem to tend, than Time is in league with Love, so to speak, in the sense that it is at once an expression of Divine, and an opportunity of human, love. Thus the Hebrew poet who said "Day unto day uttereth speech" made a statement about the world more metaphysically significant than he himself perhaps knew. Time, though it has no voice, is a dramatic declaration of the ceaseless activity of Cosmic Love. Giving to Berkeley's formula an axiological meaning we, too, regard the World as a "Divine Language."

But further, if our interpretation of the Universe as a Valuable Fact be correct, if, in other words, the Universe is Love in action, the only sort of world that would appear to be an adequate expression of Love's activity would be one that was made for "lovers," i.e. one that made possible the experience of love. The late Professor James Ward argued that a Creator could be satisfied with nothing less than the creation of creators. Similarly we would say that Creative Love could have as an adequate purpose nothing less than the creation of love, or, more strictly speaking, the creation of its possibility. If, then, we find, as we suggest is the case, that the history of the world briefly stated is, as a matter of fact, the evolution of creaturely love, we have at once a confirmation of our interpretation of the Universe as Creative Love, and also an explanation of the nature and trend of the World-Process.

Let us, then, shortly recapitulate the evidence of the nature and trend of that process, which we accumulated in the foregoing chapters.

According to recent speculation, even the constitution of the Atom adumbrates the principle of Fellowship, which seems destined to reach ever fuller expression in the highest orders of life—even the

rational. Dr. Whitehead, indeed, would apply the idea of organism to atomic structure. Professor Lloyd Morgan is sympathetic with this view, but suggests tentatively the term "fellowship" as a description of the character of Evolution at all levels.¹ According to this point of view, then, even the parts of the atom behave in sympathy, and practise a kind of mutual aid. Atoms maintain themselves by repeating themselves along with their fellows of the same atomic structure. They do not, of course, continue their being by sexual reproduction; but reproduction of some sort seems to take place, even though its only effect is the reassertion of themselves in company. The "fraternal" behaviour of the parts of the atom widens out, however, into fellowship with a larger "community," that of the molecule. Lloyd Morgan arranges the grades of "fellowship" in the "emergent hierarchy" as follows: Atom, Molecule, Colloidal unit, Biocule, Cell, Multicellular Organism, Community of such Organisms.²

If we now try to interpret the significance of this hierarchy of fellowship, we take it to mean that Nature is intent, not on the mere reproduction or maintenance of itself, but more and more on a certain type of maintenance—a type according to which the work of reproduction and preservation is delegated more and more to Nature's creatures themselves. And we find, as a matter of fact, that organisms, especially those of the higher order, are qualified to maintain, enrich, and reproduce life. We have at some length made an examination of the basic impulse in animals and man, and found it to be protective of life both in themselves and their fellows. This protectivity, while at first

¹ Lloyd Morgan, "A Concept of the Organism" (Aristotelian Soc., February 14, 1927).

² *Op. cit.*

asexual, was greatly enhanced by the device of sex and its subsequent corollary, the family. Thereafter these "inventions" make for a greater development of protectivity and fellowship than is possible under the system of asexual maintenance. In proportion as family care has developed, organisms have been able to advance beyond the comparatively low standard of life attained by insects and fishes. Sutherland has pointed out that thereby there has been made possible the evolution of creatures of intelligence, and especially man, since in his case his maturation involves family care for a long period.

But this same impulse of Care, of which the nest, the den, and the home are vehicles, not merely seeks the one-sided expression which it gets in parental solicitude, but develops a mutuality such as we see in the herd impulse, and this mutual care in masses tends towards maintenance and enrichment of life. Darwin himself warned us that the phrase "struggle for existence" must be so applied as to include in its meaning the dependence of one being on another, and said that "those individuals which took the greatest pleasure in society would best escape various dangers, whilst those that cared least for their comrades and lived solitary would perish in greater numbers."

When we consider the development of man in history, it is not too much to sum up the story of civilization,¹ in spite of all its tragedies, in the succinct statement that "the whole course of history is in its main features the emergence of the type that is capable of union, and the subjugation or absorption of types less capable of consolidation." The horrors of the recent Great War have at least served to prepare the peoples of Europe for what otherwise they might not have considered or favoured—an International combination for the pre-

vention of war and the avoidance of the causes that lead to it. In one way or another the trend towards social coherence has made enormous advance since the era of primitive man. The history of man, broadly regarded, reveals a *nisus* towards the highest type of fellowship, and may be described shortly as the Evolution of Love.

Professor Lovejoy, however, in considering the process of Evolution, is impressed by what he regards as its irrational aspects.

"The process called 'evolution' might more significantly be named 'retardation'; in essence it is a postponement, either in nature as a whole, or in some limited region of it, of the existence of certain forms of being which are logically and even physically possible: and among these are all those that, so far as we can judge, possess value. Any system, therefore, of which the history is that of an 'evolution'—certainly any in which the higher types of conscious life are but tardily evolved—*eo ipso* betrays a non-rational strain."¹

In reply, we at once admit that the Universe does not "hustle." It seems slow in its operations—at least as far as we can judge. A Bishop Butler, however, would remind us that we are really incapable of judging very far; and that, after all, speed is a relative matter. What seems a tardy pace to us may not be so to a Mind that can see the whole process, and can appreciate all the conditions involved, both cosmic and creaturely. Because *we* cannot see the reason why the evolution of the best and highest things did not start earlier, or attain perfection earlier, we are not warranted in charging the process with irrationality.

The conclusion to which we are working is that in

¹ A. O. Lovejoy, "The Meanings of 'Emergence' and its Modes" (*Journ. of Phil. Studies*, April 1927).

view of the character of the evolutionary trend—its *nisus* towards ever wider and deeper sociality—the hypothesis of the Universe as the expression of Love both provides an explanation of the process and itself receives confirmation therefrom. We have already pointed out in what sense love in evolution “confirms” the hypothesis of a Fontal or Original and Originating Love. We add a few lines in exposition of the statement that in such Love there is provided an adequate explanation of the love that evolves in the history of creatures. We fail to see how love can evolve unless throughout the process there is a guiding influence exercising direction and inspiration. Grant that the *telos* is immanent, yet that a process should guide itself in orderly fashion without the influence of some presiding purpose strikes a plain man as simply an unreasonable, if not an absurd, supposition. And if that is so, what can influence and direct the evolution of love except a Power that is in itself loving? A love that “becomes,” that develops, demands a Love that pre-exists, and which is its controlling dynamic.

General Smuts, while admitting that the Cosmos has a “trend,” a “list,” an “immanent Telos,” and that its process is ever towards life of higher and higher types,¹ nevertheless adds that “no reference to a transcendent Mind is justified.”² He asserts, however, that “there is something organic and holistic in Nature which shapes her ends and directs her courses.” We submit that it is impossible for us to attach any meaning to a force which “shapes” and “directs” the course of things if it is not mental, or at least analogously so. And a Mind which “shapes” and “directs” can do so only in the execution of a Purpose. That this Purpose

¹ *Holism and Evolution*, pp. 178–9. (Macmillan.)

² *Op. cit.*, p. 342.

is not ethically neutral, much less evil, is clear from further statements by General Smuts, of which the least ambiguous is the following:—

“The creative intensified Field of Nature, consisting of all physical organic and personal wholes in their close interactions and mutual influences, is itself of an organic or holistic character. . . . It is the environment, the Society—vital, friendly, educative, creative—of all wholes and all souls. It is not a mere figure of speech or figment of the imagination, but a reality with profound influences of its own on all wholes and their destiny. It is the *oîkos*, the Home of all the family of the universe, with something profoundly intimate and friendly in its atmosphere. . . . Without idealizing it unduly, we yet feel that it is very near and dear to us, and in spite of all antagonisms and troubles we come in the end to feel that this is a friendly universe. Its deepest tendencies are helpful to what is best in us, and our highest aspirations are but its inspiration. Thus behind our striving towards betterment are in the last resort the entire weight and momentum and the inmost nature and trend of the universe” (p. 343).

Now this remarkable passage seems to us logically to grant what we are contending for. If that which “shapes” and “directs” the course of things be, as we think it must, regarded as Purposive Mind, and if that Mind so shapes and directs the course of things as to make and keep the world “a friendly universe,” then we fail to see how the conclusion that there is a Friendly Purpose behind all things can be resisted. And we are therefore constrained to apply General Smuts’s term *oîkos* not merely to the “field of Nature,” or to the “universe” as experienced by us, but to the universe in its ultimate character as Creative Love.

Of course, with this conclusion we do not solve all

problems, or escape all difficulties. The history of Metaphysics, indeed, is the story of many resolute attempts in spite of repeated failure to understand and elucidate all such mysteries. Success, however, has been only partial. He would be an optimist indeed who expects that the future of metaphysical speculation will make all things clear. Perhaps a complete and satisfactory philosophy must finally elude man: perhaps we can never hope to know otherwise than in part. I am referring to such problems as those of the relation of the Infinite to the Finite, of the Timeless to Time.

The specific difficulty before us at present is that of the relation between the Love which we regard as Cosmic and human love. If the nature of Reality is ultimately Personal, Purposive, and Loving, why should it provide for, and inspire, the development of finite love in a time-process? Why should that which "is" also "become"?

In reply we can at least say this: If once you grant the hypothesis of a Creative Love, no form of creation would seem to be congruous or adequate which was not a creation of love, so far as it could be created. And it could be created only by the provision of a world in which potential lovers could live and interact.

The creation of creatures able to love is compatible in different ways with the principle of Emergence. As a matter of fact we find that it is only after a long evolution that creatures who are able to love in the ethical sense "emerge" in our planetary history. A further kind of "emergence" is then made possible; there ensues upon this evolution the emergence of a "will," a power of self-determination. It depends upon the direction of this will, upon the use of this power, whether there "emerges" love or its opposite. Great issues will result both for man and the world so far as

it is affected by human conduct. Intelligent Love would mean for all men a world-wide fraternity with its inestimable corollaries of peace and joy; it would also affect the life of sub-human creatures; and it would in different ways influence the physical environment. But men may fail to love; they may "love" merely themselves. Inhumanity to man means hate, discord, and strife, and involves disharmony, dispeace; and these things bring in their train sufferings of various kinds, as they also change the character of man's physical surroundings. Thus man certainly has it in his power to "add" to Reality. He adds to Creative Love his own contribution of love. No doubt the idea of adding anything to what is already Infinite is paradoxical, and must remain so, as long as we conceive Infinite Love after the analogy of infinite space or number. We must regard Divine Love as Infinite in the sense at least that it is Perfect. But how can a finite being like man dogmatize as to what would be compatible or otherwise with such a Love? He can only reason by analogy from experience, and point out that human love grows in eminence in proportion as it increases the scope of its affection; it does not limit itself, but expands, by multiplying the number of its objects.

Man, however, has the power also to add to Reality in a sinister manner. He can repudiate love as a principle of life, and by so doing "finds out many inventions," changes the course of history, and is at enmity with the universe itself. All this certainly implies some qualification of Reality in the sense at least that it makes the world different from what it otherwise would have been.

It is, of course, easy to imagine a world in which there might have been less suffering. Had Evolution stopped short with a sub-human type of life, the world,

though it might not have been altogether painless, would have been immune from all that misery and agony which have proceeded from human selfishness and hate. Yet Evolution, arrested in this way, while it might have spared the world much pain, would have deprived it also of a peculiar glory. For the world as we know it is at least "a vale of soul-making"—a theatre for the development of character.

The view of the Universe, then, at which we have arrived in this chapter is that it is the expression of Love. The Cosmos mingles Actuality and Value. In that Love originates, sustains, and protects the great Whole of which we are part, we may use General Smuts's term and call the Universe an *oîkos*. It is thus in a Domestic Universe that we live, move, and have our being.

Man's task, then, is to live "according to Nature" so interpreted. The protective impulse which he feels within him more or less as a continual urge is this "Nature" making itself felt in the soul—the voice of God, as it were, speaking to him. What the promptings of his heart dictate his reason endorses. Reason and impulse combine to enforce on him the duty of behaving as a child in this World-Household and of looking upon his fellows as his brethren.

But the normal attitude of man to the Universe is religious rather than philosophical; his standpoint is not purely rational, but includes the reaction of his will and emotion. And it is a universal characteristic of man that he attributes to the World as a whole Life, Purpose, Personality, with, of course, varying degrees of consistency, according to the state of his culture. No doubt Religion in its cruder forms expressed itself as a belief in Spirits, or in the worship of the great Powers of Nature. Nature, as worshipped, was conceived

as in some way living. The character of this Living Power was differently regarded according to the culture of the worshipper. A pastoral people like the Zoroastrians tended to think of God as Being of Light and Life. Among the ancient Egyptians, too, the Gods were Givers of Life. Where the rule of brute force was rife, as in savage tribes, the supreme Powers were regarded with fear and servile dread. The Chinese for long generations have allowed the more basic instincts to have sway—even the domestic; and so we are not surprised to read the statement of Sir James Frazer that the God of the Chinese is paternal, so that men trust to him as a child trusts to the help of his living father. The Hebrews in their tribalistic days thought of Yahweh as a God of battles, powerful and jealous; later, ethical elements were added to this conception under the inspiration of the Jewish prophets, while attempts were made to eliminate the unethetical. The Sovereignty of God, however, remained as a determinative idea in the worship of the synagogue along with a secondary title of the Almighty as "Father in Heaven."¹ The greatest of the Jews, Jesus Christ, elevated this secondary description into the premier place; and Christianity is based on the definite doctrine that God is a Father and that His Nature is Love. The Christian ideal of Society accordingly is that men should form a Brotherhood in the Divine Family—and thus constitute a Household of God. Such an ideal we have sought to justify in the previous chapters of this book, first by a study of Human Nature, and afterwards by reflections on the data furnished thereby. In Part II, which follows, we seek to find how this ideal should express itself in social, political, and economic life.

¹ Walker, *What Jesus Read*, p. 60. (George Allen & Unwin, 1925.)

PART II

THE LIFE OF THE HOUSEHOLD

CHAPTER I

THE RATIONALE OF SEX-LOVE

IN Part I we saw some justification for regarding the Life-tendency as an impulse towards the social enrichment of life in all who possess it, and the so-called sex-instinct as a specific differentiation of this impulse. We saw also that in man the Life-impulse is subject to a control to which animals are strange, or which at least in their case is potential—the control of what is called Reason. The possession of Reason gives to man a power of conscious direction in respect of the life-tendency. Whereas an animal inevitably obeys the urge of instinct and makes to it a predetermined response of a specific character, man, on the other hand, is capable of greatly modifying his behaviour. Human life is never lived on the merely instinctive level, for in man's case impulse "partakes" (to use an Aristotelian word) more or less of reason to the extent at least that its expression is modified by intelligence.

The crucial question which man has to settle with regard to the life-tendency, in so far as he has the power to direct it, relates to the scope and range of sociality. Within a definite sphere like the Family man is social by instinct. The tie of blood binds him also instinctively to his kindred in the Clan. Social unity was still further promoted by the influence of neighbourhood and life in a common territory. Ritual and Magic were used to preserve such social unity as had already been attained. In achieving a still wider social integration the need of a common Polity played an

important part. At length, however, man found through the religious outlook a basis for social unity far more comprehensive than blood or neighbourhood or polity, even that of identity of cosmic origin, so to speak. As the flight of his Reason soared higher, so his social interest grew broader and deeper. In the words of a recent writer,¹ "the primitive tribe is never so deeply one as when under the influence of one common religious impulse." As man attains the high conception of a world-unity, so in the sphere of conduct does his social sympathy tend to become universal. He does not compass this universal outlook by thinking of himself and others as being each of them an "end in himself"; that is the point of view of the theorist, and is, of course, famous, although it is abstract and would appear to be hopelessly monadistic. It is rather by regarding men, not as "units," but as forming with himself a vast unity, that he moralizes his social instinct by giving it a universal range. Thenceforward he sees it to be his duty to enrich, not this or that person only, but humanity as a whole. When man acts, therefore, he must act, not on instinct merely, but also in accord with this universal and obligatory aim.

This is an ideal which, of course, never presents itself to sub-human creatures. Animals, being the subjects merely of instinct, never, as Walt Whitman puts it, worry about their "duty," nor lament over their "sins"; and for the reason that they can have neither duties nor sins. Indeed, they can never know man's peculiar experience, who perpetually has to confront impulses with ideals. In animals the Life-tendency makes simple expression; from man it asks interpretation. In animals the Life-process goes by uninterrogated; to man it presents a problem for solution.

¹ Dr. John Murphy, *Primitive Man*, p. 284. (Oxford Univ. Press, 1927.)

Reason, then, dictates, as we have said, universal affection. Man and his neighbour must aim at mutual enrichment of life. Love must have no limit. Does this mean, however, that particularized affection is precluded? A metaphysical universal, so far from excluding the particular instance, is arrived at by an induction from particulars, and does not exist in independence of them. This we may say without any further inquiry into the nature of the existence of such universals. So also is it with the Ethical universal. The love of humanity is not incompatible with the love of smaller groups, but, on the contrary, is to be realized thereby. And we find, as a matter of fact, that human affection finds a natural expression in racial coherence and tribal solidarity. We call that expression "natural" because the facts of geographical proximity, common descent, and similarity of tradition do seem to provide a basis for mental and moral unity among the members.

Friendship, again, is an example of affection between small groups of persons, often, indeed, between only two individuals. Hegel said of it that it is "a relationship which is tinged with particularity." In his opinion men are friends, "not so much directly as objectively, through some substantial bond of union in a third thing, in fundamental principles, studies, knowledge." Friends, however, are attracted also by subtle affinities of disposition, which in some cases coexist with opposite qualities of mind.

The particular form of attraction which we consider in this chapter is that between two individuals of opposite sex. This form of attraction is more or less inevitable: people are said to "fall in love," and the *rapprochement* of the parties concerned is more or less involuntary. The allurements arise partly out of physiological differences, and partly from the charm

exercised by strength of body or mind, or by beauty, or by manner. So impelling is the attraction in some cases that men and women fall in love at first sight, and so permanent can it become that "many waters cannot quench it," and death itself can scarcely sever it. And of all forms of association it can be, and often is, the most exclusive, in many instances even permanently so, being continued in thought and will after the death of one of the partners.

Yestreen, when to the trembling string
The dance gaed thro' the lighted ha',
To thee my fancy took its wing,
I sat, but neither heard nor saw;
Tho' this was fair, and that was braw,
And yon the toast of a' the town,
I sigh'd and said amang them a':—
"Ye are na Mary Morison."¹

But exclusive as is the attraction between the sexes as to its natural basis, it should not, from the ethical point of view, so remain. On the natural basis a moral superstructure should be erected. Man being, as we have tried to show, eminently rational and moral, it can never be right that sex-attraction should function simply on the natural level and in independence of rational principle. If the impulse towards the enrichment of life be accepted as fundamental, then nothing but the elevation of that impulse into a universal principle with unlimited scope and range is worthy of the nature of man. It follows that every part of his life must be consistent with that principle. Not three-fourths, but the whole of his life is the realm of conduct. So, however much the love of the sexes appears to be its own justification, that is most certainly an illusion of the mind. No doubt on account of the strength of

¹ Robert Burns, *Mary Morison*.

the sex impulse lovers easily become engrossed in their experiences sometimes to the verge of a quasi-madness, and regard their love as their own concern. They let the world go by, in the sense that they are oblivious not merely to its criticisms, but also to its needs—and all this at times with tragic results to their own good and that of Society. The antithesis of our view is that the sex relation is, as has been said by Mr. Bernard Shaw, “impersonal.”¹ In *Man and Superman* Don Juan says:—

“The great purpose of breeding the race will no longer be confused with the gratification of personal fancies. Sex relation is not a personal or friendly relation at all. . . . In the sex relation the universal creative energy, of which the parties are both the helpless agents, overrides and sweeps away all personal considerations and disposes with all personal relations. The pair may be utter strangers to one another, speaking different languages, differing in race and colour, in age and disposition, with no bond between them but a possibility of that fecundity for the sake of which the Life-Force throws them into one another’s arms at the exchange of a glance.”

We do not know how far this represents the present view of Mr. Shaw, but in any case it implies a doctrine of truncated evolution, and is in our opinion poor philosophy. Moreover, it seems self-contradictory; for if union is mediated through a “glance,” a certain amount of mentality is involved, and therefore of personality too; and if it is somewhat personal, why not completely so?

The truth is that the sex relation is inevitably personal, but ever prone to be exclusive. This, indeed, is the peculiar vice of all groups, large or small. Whence come wars and strifes with their usual heritage of

¹ In *Getting Married*, Preface, p. 150.

pestilence, famine, and death? Is it not because the clan, the tribe, the nation has loved itself too "well"?—so well, indeed, as to cling to its ideal of independence or sovereignty, sometimes at enormous cost. And within the group itself cliques and coteries are often formed. Even friendships can become unsocial. This peril it is which besets the alliance between two people of opposite sex. In itself the experience of mutual allurements is a-moral. But it cannot remain so. For the partners to the experience will sooner or later have to decide whether, to use the words of another writer,¹ their association shall be "æsthetic" or "co-operative," whether, in other words, it shall be merely mutually gratifying or also socially helpful. In what is called "æsthetic" love the basis of attraction does not rise much higher than sensibility: each admires the other's qualities, whether of crude sex, or of secondary sex characters like beauty and strength. Some assert that there is a characteristic difference in the way in which man and woman attract each other, the man desiring primarily the woman's body, the woman desiring to be loved. Even in this case the association is still on an "æsthetic" basis in the sense explained, for the union is tinged with selfishness, even in the attitude of the woman, who desires to be "loved," but yet "for herself."

At this stage there are two words of caution to be spoken. In the first place it is not denied that the love that "co-operates for a transcendent end," i.e. ethical love of the sexes, may or must arise from an "æsthetic" basis. It is to be called "æsthetic" if it rises no higher than the mere gratification of each other's desires, if it stays within the region of sensible or emotional attraction. Then, in the second place, it is doubtful if, though an alliance may be predominantly "æsthetic,"

¹ Felix Adler, art. on "Marriage" (*Hibbert Journal*, October 1923).

it can after all be exclusively so. For our central thesis has been that, as love is fundamentally the same in ultimate origin, however differentiated into sexual, parental, or gregarious forms, there can be no manifestation of any of these forms which does not possess the characteristic of all love, i.e. the desire to enrich together. Any specimen of sexual love may accordingly be expected to have more or less of this quality. And lovers' language the world over seems to bear this out: it is the language of protection and appropriation, as we have said.

It must always be something of a marvel that a potentially moral attitude, viz. the will to care for another, can be stimulated by what in itself is not moral at all, such as a glance, a facial expression, a certain gait, tones of the voice, perfection of figure or features, vivacity of temperament, etc. The Annie Laurie who inspired the poet to an extremity of sacrifice in her behalf aroused such devotion partly owing to her "neck," which was "like the swan," and partly to her voice, which was like the sighing summer wind. Sexual selection, in short, is influenced by many factors, the charm of which works more or less obscurely. But the wonder is that, the choice having been made, the selection becomes the vehicle for a grand passion of solicitude for the chosen one, which is in its nature spiritual rather than physical. Of course, this spiritual passion, which we regard as an expression of the fundamental Life-impulse, is ever waiting to assert itself when the conditions are favourable. That it waits for conditions such as we have described is, of course, only a particular instance of the general principle of the union of the material and the spiritual—a principle that raises problems which are metaphysical rather than ethical.

Since, then, sexual affection is ever ready to be the

vehicle of solicitous care, though it may be limited to the parties concerned, we cannot set down the devotion of man to woman as completely a-moral and ethically neutral. Indeed, in the worst of men it is generally set down to their moral credit that as lovers or husbands they have been exemplary in their loyalty. And, of course, if it be regarded as supremely moral that men should strive to enrich the lives of their fellows, it cannot consistently be called a-moral that they should enrich just one person, for after all one person is a member of the whole.

Mr. Bertrand Russell has criticized this love of one person on the ground of its being contradictory; for each lover tends to regard his or her idol as the most to be loved on earth. Now, of course, there cannot be two individuals, each of whom is literally the dearest in the world. Whereas each lover is placing the beloved one on the highest throne of affection, it cannot really be occupied by more than one person at the same time.

To this criticism lovers would reply that they do not as a matter of fact regard their idol as of all people the most worthy of being cherished in an absolute sense, but rather as the dearest relatively to themselves. But, even so, adoring couples often show a mutual engrossment which, if permanent, becomes unsocial. There can be, as it were, an egoism of two. Sooner or later, however, devoted couples come into contact, and it may be competition; they also find ere long that they must take up some kind of affectional attitude to others and to society, whether that of exploitation or that of service. And the only point of view which will bring the logical solution to the competitive adoration of these small groups and dissolve their "egoism" is the recognition that the love of humanity is the paramount consideration.

It is the peculiar failing and vice of man, not that he does not and cannot love, but that he persistently loves only a few; and that to those outside his favoured group he is ethically blind. The case is flagrant if affection is so exclusive as to be confined to one particular member of the opposite sex. Traditionally love is blind. The blindness, however, is of a peculiar kind—not total, but restricted. The lover sees in his idol qualities that others do not see, and fails to notice features that others observe. In this respect vision is distorted rather than blind. It is due to a fact that is often forgotten, viz. that attraction is based not so much on objective qualities as on their subjective interpretation. For lack of remembering this a third party will often wonder what an amorous couple see in each other.

But the more serious defect of vision is the near-sightedness which sees the foreground without the background; which is obsessed with the more obvious qualities in the beloved without realizing their significance in terms of human service; which observes the opportunities for mutual pleasure rather than of social responsibility. The love of two, especially two of opposite sex, unless it gains social perspective, is a love that is without horizon and without stars: it is scopeless and aimless.

This subordination of sex-love to the love of men introduces that universal element which, by ridding romantic love of its harmful particularism and inconsistencies, will harmonize all couples with one another and with Society.

There can be no doubt that apart from this wider outlook the sex interest because of its intrinsic strength tends to become a dangerous obsession. In our Cinemas it is portrayed on the screen as something sufficient

in itself; we have Sex Plays and Sex Novels, in both of which Sex is presented as a mere instinct and detached from its true ethical setting. In some countries, especially in Western, women's dress, or more strictly speaking the comparative absence of it, does, whether from design or otherwise, make a definite sex appeal. Newspapers and periodicals are full of accounts of the frailties of sex, and thus gain popularity. In short, the subject of sex, to say the least, is very much overworked; it obtrudes itself in the streets, in the halls of entertainment, in the Press. Altogether we may say that the modern man is bombarded from different quarters by suggestions of sex, its claim on his attention being supposed to be intrinsic.

The result of this is unfortunate. No doubt the fact of Sex is in various ways a vast source of human happiness. But detached from its relation to ultimate human value it is a menace to the joy and peace of mankind. It engages thought and emotion in a thoroughly wasteful fashion; it uses up energy that might otherwise be spent in fruitful enterprise; it keeps the mind of the victim of a "sex complex" in a perpetually distraught condition. Had the energy which was consumed in purely vain sexualism, especially at certain crises in the affairs of men and nations, been diverted to social solicitude and useful works, the very course of history might have been different.

It is, then, this wider outlook on humanity as a whole, this sense of social responsibility, this realization of a partnership with many others in the vast issues of life—it is these thoughts that calm the ebullitions and steady the disturbances of sex emotion. The devotion of the sexes develops a rare intensity through being informed with a spiritual, and not merely a physical, significance; and thus the bliss of courtship becomes

touched with solemnity. Influenced by such idealism, the ardour of many couples can never be mutually exclusive or inconsistent in its fervency, for the supreme aim of each and all is then one and the same, viz. the service of man by the consecration of sex.

The position to which this leads us is that sex is given to man in order to be, not, of course, negated, but transcended. In other words, man must learn more and more to inform the limiting interests of sex with the universal point of view. For, of course, the union of all humans must be a super-sexual union, and the love of humanity a super-sexual love. Do we not even detect this super-sexual element in sex-love in its loftiest achievement? Its aim is to create the condition in which "two hearts beat as one." In that experience the union of selves is so close and intimate that the physical features that make for difference are more and more subordinated. The union is certainly mediated through sex, but *qua* union it is a union of hearts—and hearts have no sex. There seems, indeed, in the nature of the case no essential reason why in an ideal society more than two should not share in that union, or why such a union of two should not in its perfection virtually include many more.

Something like this seems to have occurred to Shelley in his *Witch of Atlas*. In this poem Shelley thought of a "new type of human being . . . having the grace of both sexes, and full of such dreams as would one day become the inspiration of a new world-order, yet of such a nature that its love would not be dependent (as, indeed, most loves now are) on mere sexual urge and corporeal desire, but would be a vivid manifestation of the universal creative Life." ¹ Indeed,

¹ Ed. Carpenter, *The Psychology of the Poet Shelley*, p. 30. (George Allen & Unwin, 1925.)

the word "sexless" occurs in this poem more than once. Shelley apparently looks forward to a development of humanity along "sexless" lines, as being a higher stage of evolution. "Is it not very probable," asks a well-known writer, "that those human types of the future which have *both* elements, the masculine *and* the feminine, present in their natures, will *not* be so sexually excitable as those other types (with whom we have been more familiar in the past) who, being built, like Plato's divided sections of humanity, on a lop-sided plan, are always rushing about to find their lost counterparts, and rather madly and incontinently plunging into new relationships, which again they dissolve almost as soon as contracted? And may we not reasonably expect that those people whose natures contain both elements will be more stable and reliable than the others, while at the same time—since they share the great driving-force of the universe—they will by no means be wanting in life and energy?"¹

Whether Shelley knew that physiologically we are all bisexual, we do not know, but it is, of course, a fact. What he desiderates is that we should become bisexual in mind and will—and have the mental and moral qualities of both sexes. Such bisexuality is equivalent to sexlessness of soul, and is, according to our view, a requisite for that universal love of humanity which is the ideal.

Thus whereas physical life has evolved from a sexless to a sexed condition of existence, and has developed in the interests of reproduction a degree of hetero-sexuality, yet man, who can survey and stand aloof from the whole evolutionary process, is able to perceive the aim and divine the meaning of the Life-force. Realizing the ultimate purpose of his being and the subordinate

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

function of sex in relation thereto, he can attain to that sexless love which loves one's neighbour as oneself, and can bring into harmony with it the love with which he loves his sexual partner.

Such an ideal, let us say once again in conclusion, does not seek to abrogate or disparage the sexual, but to subordinate the androgynous to the interpersonal, the sexual to the human.

CHAPTER II

THE PATHOLOGY OF SEX

HAVING dealt briefly with the Rationale of Sex, we think it advisable to devote a short chapter to the subject of its irrational or, as we may term it, its pathological use. There are several types of pathological love; we will give a few instances.

1. It seems natural to mention first the type which is ethically the lowest, viz. Lust. In this instance gratification of the sex instinct takes place without reference to any other than the mere sex quality of the man or woman; that is to say, without regard for any other attraction than the other's body. The instinct, powerful in itself by reason of its age-long evolutionary history, is by the mind given added power until it so completely dominates the attention that every mental and moral aspect of the situation suffers eclipse. Such conduct is, of course, a reversion to the animal level. The practice of this conduct is to be condemned on the ground at least that it is a serious misinterpretation of the significance of the Life-force. If the Life-tendency is essentially social and protective, then there can be nothing social or protective in conduct which has been tersely described as "a mere exchange of egotisms." When the sexes use each other as mere means to each other's transient pleasure, they clearly perform no moral service to each other or to society. The aim is not to serve, but to exploit. The Life-tendency is simply "short-circuited"; and the circuit is completed within the area of the individual. Lust, in short, dis-

qualifies a man from membership in "the great household of brothers and sisters and makes him a solitary."

It might be thought that little mention of this pathological form of sex-life need be made, were it not that some writers definitely assert that the sex act is quite "impersonal." That sex relations may rightly take place without reference to any particular mental attitude of the partners to the act other than agreement finds advocacy in modern literature. We have already called attention to the view in the previous chapter. It is sometimes defended on the ground that what alone matters is the production of offspring. Of course this raises large questions into which we cannot here enter. Offspring, from our point of view, are recruits for "the great household"; they are the potential lovers of their kind, the future servants of humanity; they are the repositories of the Life-force so interpreted. The meaning of the Life-force as construed under a system of Free Love would, to say the least, radically conflict with our interpretation as concerns both the attitude of parents and the probable conduct of the offspring when grown mature.

Others hold that sex intercourse should be, if not impersonal, yet irresponsible in the sense that it should be unrestricted by social convention and social obligation. A recent advocate of this view says:—

"While poverty and parents forbade the certainty of marriage . . . our modern Aspasia's took the love of man and gave the love of woman, and found this union, free and full on either side, the most priceless gift the immortal gods can bestow. There is nothing new in this, the moralist will say—it is just wickedness. Yes, there is this that is new: that, though these younger women may be driven from fear of starvation to the outward acceptance of old codes and conventions,

inwardly they know they have done no wrong and will not admit a conviction of sin. Sex, even without children and without marriage, is to them a thing of dignity, beauty and delight. All Puritans—and most males so long as they can remember—have tried to persuade women that their part in sex is pregnancy and childbirth, and not momentary delight. As well tell a man his part is the hunting and skinning of animals for food and clothing. To enjoy and admit we enjoy, without terror or regret, is an achievement in honesty.”¹

Now it may be possible to admit that sexual intercourse under certain conditions is justified otherwise than as merely instrumental to the continuation of the race; but to ascribe to it inherent “dignity” seems to imply misunderstanding of the word. Any act can possess “dignity” only as it realizes worth or applies a standard of value. So the dignity of sexual intercourse, as in the case of eating or drinking, or indeed any other act, must, in such a rational creature as man, be derived from its purpose, which purpose in turn must have some definite relation to man’s life as a whole. This ultimate purpose, we have seen, is the common enrichment of the life of all men, and is therefore essentially social and mutually protective. Thus sex experience can never be irresponsible, any more than can eating and drinking, getting and spending. The parties immediately concerned are not solely concerned. As regards the parties themselves, it is a question not merely of their “enjoyment,” but of whether their experience of ecstasy has contributed to the enrichment of life in themselves and in others. If our previous analysis is sound, the trend of the Life-impulse is not directly towards

¹ Russell, *Hyphatia or Woman and Knowledge*, pp. 32 sq. (Kegan Paul, 1925.)

“enjoyment,” but to the social culture of each other’s being. Now there is nothing in a mere feeling of pleasure to bind personalities together. And so far as sex experience is regarded as merely a source of “enjoyment,” the act of intercourse need be no more than, and will tend to be no more than, “an exchange of egotisms.” This is borne out by facts. That mere physical intimacy does not in itself guarantee any spiritual union, or imply any mutual care on the part of those associated in the act, is grimly proved by the attitude of utter indifference, and even worse, which often follows.

But if our thesis is correct, no form of intercourse is right which does not imply as its supreme aim a care, exquisite in its solicitude if you like, for the enrichment of personality and the development of human fellowship. Clearly a merely fleeting or fleshly form of sexual union will be incompatible with such an aim. The physical relationship is in itself so transient as to make impossible the provision for the mental and moral culture of the participants. Thus, to say the least, a more or less permanent union is necessary, and this requirement would best seem to be met by marriage.

We so far conclude, then, that the sex-act cannot be simply impersonal, or irresponsible, but must be accompanied by a definite inter-personal attitude. This attitude, however, need not be a disinterested one, but may be in different ways ambiguous.

For instance, love may not be simply fleshly but yet may be selfish: the seducer may desire his or her victim for reasons partly physical and partly psychological. Kundry, in Wagner’s *Parsifal*, uses the typically ambiguous language of the seducer when she says to the innocent youth whose downfall from purity she tries to compass:—

"With my kiss the world's own heart have I shown thee!"

"The world's heart," forsooth! Not so cruel, nor so damning, is the heart of the world, if our psychology is correct! No wonder that when she is thwarted her frenzy reveals the true character of her boasted "love," as she shouts:—

"Every path that leads thee from Kundry I curse neath thy feet."

By contrast consider a classical example of the love that blesses and does not exploit:—

"When I (Dante) saw her (Beatrice) coming towards me and could hope for her salvation, the world held no enemy for me, yea I was filled with the fire of brotherly love to such an extent that I was ready to forgive anybody who had ever offended me. And whoever had begged me for a gift, I should have replied: 'Love!' and my face would have been full of humility."¹

A somewhat different case of what we may call pathological love is that in which the sex relation is exploited, not so much in the interest of selfish enjoyment as in that of the proprietary instinct, which itself is, as we saw, an outcrop of the Parental Sentiment. The tragedies of love through the thwarting of the proprietary claim to the loved one are legion. The story of love-jealousy issuing in hatred, in despair, in murder, in suicide, is a story as old as human nature. History and Fiction are full of such incidents which are the subject-matter of cases in the Law Courts. I may perhaps be permitted to refer again to a tragedy reported in the Press of a girl who after first trying to kill her lover then committed suicide, leaving behind the following statement:—

¹ The *Vita Nuova*—quoted by Emil Lucca, *The Evolution of Love* (George Allen & Unwin).

"I cannot stand it any longer. I cannot bear the thought of another woman taking *my* Roy away, so I am going to take him with me."

Who in judging such an action can maintain the due balance between sympathy and blame? As some condonation of the action it may be said that woman (as distinguished from man) *lives* for love. But such jealousy is nursed as zealously and expressed as fiercely by man. It is also remarked that those who commit such crimes loved "too well." And this may be admitted if the phrase be used in a psychological sense. So much energy may have been spent in the development of an erotic system that has suffered injury that there is none left for sublimation.¹ Otherwise expressed, this means that, in the absence of any social principle such as would give breadth of view and maintain balance of mind, love takes the form of mere erotic passion generating heat without light, strength without control.

The impulse to protect, if limited to the care of just one life, tends to become overwhelmingly intense; and as its scope is so restricted, it is liable to frustration, and when thwarted may lead to a mental disorganization so complete as to endanger sanity.

The next type of pathology in love is somewhat like the preceding in respect of the extreme limitation of affection to one individual. But it differs from the former species in being free from any taint of wounded pride or frustrated desire to possess. In the present instance the desire that is defeated is the longing of two individuals of opposite sex for absorption in each other—a defeat followed by the tragic *dénouement* known as the Love-Death.

"So intense can love become, and the desire to unite, that individuality and the eternal duality of being is

¹ Cf. Bousfield, *Psycho-Analysis*, p. 269.

felt as a curse. . . . Inevitably there arises in the soul the desire and the will to escape together with the beloved the insufferable solitude of existence, to achieve in death what life denies.”¹

In this connection we think of the tragedy of Romeo and Juliet. Romeo is ignorant that for his sake Juliet feigns death in a tomb, and when he discovers her there and thinks her really dead, he takes poison and dies. Juliet on waking and seeing her lover dead beside her snatches his dagger and, stabbing herself, dies with him.

A similar case is that of the Wagnerian version of the love of Tristan and Isolde. Says Tristan concerning their passion:—

How could Death alloy it,
Weaken or destroy it?

Death, he adds, could kill nothing but the curse of their separate individuality. And forthwith they engage in the Death-song:—

Might we then together die,
Each the other's own for aye,
Never fearing, never waking,
Blest delights of love partaking,
Each to each be given,
In Love alone our heaven!

In the case of Romeo and Juliet death is prompted by despair; in that of Tristan and Isolde it is desired in hope. In the former case it is sought because union with the beloved in life has been baulked; in the latter instance it is sought in order that union with each other may be the less hindered.

Isolda at first shrinks from death on the very ground that it would annihilate their individuality:—

“Our affection,” she asks, “is it not Tristan's and Isolde's?”

¹ Lucca, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-3.

"That word of sweetness 'and'! Love it bindeth in tender band.

"If Tristan died, would death not loosen this?"

Eventually, however, in their ecstasy they contemplate a state of death, in which there is no more Tristan and no more Isolda, where each calls the other by his or her name indifferently, the implication being that love in its perfection wipes out the separateness caused by individuality. Since death alone is thought to do this, death is welcomed as making possible the climax of aspiration, viz. a nameless indivisible single consciousness. Hence their story is called tragic because their love was thought to be doomed to dissatisfaction on earth.

Incidentally we may record our disagreement with this view of the tragic nature of love. Take away the personality of the lovers, and you take away the very basis of love, leaving only an unreal abstraction. Love, indeed, is a reciprocal relation between two or more subjects of love, and without the subjects the relation could not exist, for in that case there would be nothing to be related. Love is an identification, not of individuals, but of wills. It is individual interest, not individual existence, which hinders the course of love.

But such love as that of Romeo and Juliet, or of Tristan and Isolda, or of similar modern types, so far from finding the solution of its problem in death, really lacks the element which gives it the promise of progress, inasmuch as it is entirely unrelated to humanity and its interests. The love of Tristan and Isolda is just a fever; that is why we feel the atmosphere of the Opera to be so hectic. It is mere infatuation uninformed by any higher significance or meaning. It is an egoism of two, so to speak, and has no relation to the claims of men. Love that is so completely insulated, so exclusive, leads

to moral suffocation. The Life-force, instead of being allowed to flow as a river from heart to heart gladdening and refreshing the lives of men who in their love-thirst crave a draught from the waters proceeding from the eternal Fount, is by two souls dammed up for their mutual use. So selfish is the love of the sexes when it is severed from the love of men.

CHAPTER III

SUPER-SEXUAL MARRIAGE

MARRIAGE is defined by Westermarck as a "more or less durable connection between male and female lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of the offspring."¹ As a social institution it has behind it a long history. Among different peoples and at different times marriage customs and laws have varied exceedingly with regard to both the duration of the alliance between the sexes and the proportion of the sexes concerned in the union. Marriage has been now polygynous and now polyandrous. The trend, however, has been towards monogamy, at least among modern civilized peoples. As a social institution marriage carries with it certain rights and duties—usually the right to sexual intercourse, and responsibilities towards offspring.

In recent times especially marriage has been subjected to criticism. It is necessary for our purpose that at the outset some notice should be taken at any rate of that type of criticism which would effectually undermine the institution. We refer to a view of the sex relation already mentioned, viz. that it is "impersonal." If this view is correct, then no such "durable connection" of the sexes as was mentioned in the definition of marriage is necessary. Accordingly those who uphold the view do not hesitate to say that sex intercourse is an instinctive act, unrelated to any mental or moral attitude between the parties, and should not imply

¹ *Hist. of Human Marriage*, vol. i, p. 71.

permanent possession of another's body. Marriage, they say, should be as easily dissoluble as any other partnership, and a change of partners allowable.

We have in a previous chapter pointed out that sex in rational creatures cannot be isolated from the activity of their whole nature. Man's possession of Reason virtually makes it impossible that any act, if it is his, should be detached from his personality. He cannot therefore exercise any function, even a physical, otherwise than as an item in a rational life. The union of the sexes certainly constitutes them "one flesh"; but a unity of "flesh" which implies no sort of unity of mind or spirit is compatible only with a sub-human state of existence.

The defence which is sometimes put forward in the interest of this "impersonal" theory of the sex relation is that it is not the parents but the child which is the supreme concern. This "generic" theory of love has been held by many. Schopenhauer, for instance, contended in his *Metaphysics of Love* that sexual attraction means little or nothing for the subjects of it, and is really the unconscious influence of the will to live seeking to "protect" the future offspring. The idea finds expression also in the writings of Mr. G. Bernard Shaw, though we do not know how far he would endorse the statement of one of his characters in *Man and Superman*, who says:—

"The great purpose of breeding the race will no longer be confused with the gratification of personal fancies. Sex relation is not a personal or friendly relation at all."

Is the *child*, then, to be the *only* consideration? Such a view seems to us to reduce to absurdity. It makes the relationship between the parents merely instrumental, and insignificant on its own account. The child, too, is

a potential parent, and in that regard becomes an instrument for production. And thus it seems to follow that because man is a creature of sex he can never really be an end in himself at all times and in all experiences. Surely man exists for much besides the production of another man, and does not even by the act of propagation forfeit his dignity as an end in himself. Nor, looking at the matter from a different standpoint, does the Life-tendency express itself in the reproductive aspect only, but also as self-maintenance; its urge is, to use ethical language, neither strictly egoistic nor altruistic, but social. After all, husband and wife are not only man and woman; they are human and rational; they are persons.

It may be historically true that it was for the benefit of the young that the parents continued to live together, and that, as Westermarck says, "marriage is rooted in the family rather than the family in marriage."¹ But this does not contradict the idea that the mating of male and female is based on independent grounds; it merely adds a practical reason of great force for the continuance and permanence of the alliance. Even in birds, mating appears to have reasons of its own, since the same partners in certain cases come together year after year.

Having briefly considered the subject of the permanence of sexual union, we will go on to say a little about its conditions. Should marriage be polygynous, polyandrous, or monogamous? Nothing like an exhaustive treatment of the problem can be attempted. We can merely indicate in outline our own view.

The sex-act is in itself necessarily exclusive in the sense that only two individuals of either sex can, by reason of the constitution of the human body, partici-

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 72.

pate in one and the same deed of intercourse. Yet the same woman may be attached to a definite group of men; or the same man may associate with a specific set of women—in which cases respectively we have polyandry and polygyny. "It would not be wrong," says a modern English writer, "for a man to have six wives provided he and they found mutual happiness in that arrangement; nor for a woman to have six husbands and a child by each, if she and they found such a life satisfactory. The wrong lies in rules that are barriers between human beings who would otherwise reach a fuller and more intense understanding of one another."¹

In reply we will confine ourselves to two objections against polyandry and polygyny. We postulate that men and women are ethical subjects, and that sex activity must be always subordinate to the moral interests of the parties concerned. This being so, no conditions of sexual intercourse are right which do not conduce to the mental and spiritual culture of the participants. Bodily union has as its counterpart the commerce of minds and hearts. As the relation on the physical side is so intimate, not less intimate should be the mental and spiritual fellowship between husband and wife. Now in polygamy the possibility of mental and spiritual discipline accompanying sexual intercourse is wellnigh precluded. For the physical relation is itself of a transient character; and where, by hypothesis, the partners are varied, there is little opportunity of following up the bodily union by learning its significance for the spirit. Indeed, where a group of men or of women is concerned, the conditions for the intensive culture of heart and mind corresponding to the intimate nature of the physical relationship—in which two indi-

¹ Mrs. Bertrand Russell in *Hypatia*. (Kegan Paul, 1925.)

viduals specifically are involved—are quite lacking. An exclusive physical intimacy requires as its complement a specially close intimacy of mind and soul.

The second objection which we will mention is of a more practical kind. Where there are many husbands, or many wives, the conditions do actively tend to preclude that culture to which we have referred, in that they are apt to produce domestic strife arising out of a competition for favour with its accompanying jealousy and hatred. Where under conditions of promiscuity and polyandry offspring are produced, it is difficult, if not impossible, to certify the paternity; children, therefore, are deprived of fatherhood with its important cultural discipline on both sides. In polygyny there might be children by different wives; and this would militate against unity of parental control, and would create partiality and discord. Family discipline requires unity of control and harmony of interests; these requisites are not forthcoming under polygyny.

For the foregoing among other reasons the trend of development in the institution of marriage has been towards Monogamy. The union of one man and one woman alone seems to provide the proper conditions for mutual culture as well as for satisfactory family discipline. Moreover, an unequal proportion in the union of the sexes seems derogatory to human nature, as it subordinates rational considerations to physical.

But at this stage of our discussion the question arises whether monogamy does not make the cultural interest too exclusive. Ethical love, as we saw at the end of Part I, must be universal in its scope and range. At first sight, therefore, the love of two persons of opposite sex may seem, if not contradictory, at least out of relation, to the love that is universal. And it cannot be denied that the risk of this is great. Marriage may

reduce to a kind of co-operative selfishness. Each of the parties may exist for the other, and *only* for the other. Social responsibility may as far as possible be disregarded. Hence the modern home has been described as "stuffy." We will say no more about the abuse of the physical side of marriage than to quote a criticism that it is "the most licentious of human institutions"—a criticism which by its very exaggeration calls attention to a possible evil. The danger of confining emotion and culture within the narrow range of monogamy is referred to by Mr. Bernard Shaw in the following appeal:—

"For God's sake do not sit in your parlours: the family circle is a stagnant pool, and four feet on a fender means two minds dulled, dwarfed, atrophied."

Through an excessive proprietary feeling the home is looked upon as a "castle," and accordingly the call of opportunities or the presentation of demands from the outside is regarded as an irrelevance or an intrusion, as the case may be. This same proprietary claim is extended to the children, who are nurtured with a view to their private advantage rather than for the sake of public service. In short, the doors of the home are closed, and the world shut out.

This danger was realized of old by Plato, who, however, adopted the drastic remedy of abolishing the possession by the highest class in his ideal State of private property, of wives and children of their own. "No one," he said, "should have a dwelling or storehouse into which all who please may not enter; for when they (the Guardians) come to possess . . . houses . . . they will become hostile masters of their fellow-citizens rather than their allies. They will hate and be hated, plot and be plotted against, and the State will suffer." ¹

¹ *Republic*, Bk. III.

No one, he added, shall have a wife of his own; the children shall be common, and the parent shall not know his own child, or the child his parent.¹ The appropriate comment on this desperate resort could not be better given than in the words of Nettlehip:—"Nowhere does the selfishness of man come out more obviously than in matters connected with the institution of the family. But also nowhere does the unselfishness of man come out more obviously."

That it should be unsocial is not an inherent defect of marriage, or indeed of any form of group affection. As a matter of fact, it is in smaller or larger groups that love, though universal in its ideal range, first learns its lesson—a limitation imposed on man which is due to the restricted scope of his powers of speech, observation, and action. It is in those sections of humanity with which he is brought into touch most closely by the accident of birth, endowment, or station that he must express affection which is in principle capable of universal range.

Nevertheless, while the individual must perforce limit his sphere of activity to the groups to which he happens to belong, he should not limit his outlook. In practical working love must submit to a degree of restriction; but in idea and motive it must be universal. Exclusive it must necessarily be in its task, but not in aim and desire. So marriage, by reason of its limited sphere of affection, tends to beget intensity of devotion, which, however, will lose purity and dignity if it be not informed by a regard for humanity as a whole. It is the stagnant pool that breeds foul and pestilential vapours; the running stream is kept pure. Purer still is the loch which, however enclosed by the land, still retains its connection with the sea, and is from time to time

¹ *Republic*, Bk. V, tr. Davies and Vaughan.

refreshed by the incoming tides of ocean. So married love, physical and psychical as to its conditions, must find its regulative principle in a supreme devotion to the welfare of mankind. In short, marriage, though sexual in its basis, must be super-sexual in spirit. Lacking this wider outlook, it becomes, to use Dr. Felix Adler's term, "æsthetic" merely, of which the ideal is "complementation" as opposed to the superior ideal of "co-operation for a transcendent end." In his view "Complementation . . . is a compact for the exchange of egotisms . . . I can best gratify my selfish purpose by ministering to yours, and you in turn by ministering to mine." We ourselves would not give quite such a pessimistic account as this; we believe that, even where the wider outlook is lacking, there nevertheless is in the so-called "æsthetic" marriage a devotion of the partners which is really unselfish. The Life-impulse is, after all, no respecter of persons; on the contrary, it is precisely persons in possession of this cosmic force who fail to respect its essential logic and do not "follow through" with their affection to its ultimate limit.

Before concluding this chapter we will try to indicate a way in which the sexes may be helped to gain this super-sexual outlook, and will briefly refer to one or two of its practical consequences.

There is in marriage a tendency to create an ambisexual mind. Bisexual we all are in some degree in mind as in body. The balance of this bisexuality is tilted differently in different persons, some men being more feminine, and some women more masculine, than others. But in marriage, through the reaction of the partners on each other, the tendency is for the balance to become more and more even.

"All men possess latent in them the qualities of woman; all women have latent in them the qualities

of man. . . . Such possession, in latency, of the qualities of the other not only enhances for members of both sexes the potency of their own, inspiring and enriching these . . . but it engenders more perfect sympathy and understanding between them.”¹

Thus as each of the partners grows to this ambisexual mind, the personalities of each become fuller and more complete. For one thing, each sex grows to a fuller understanding of the opposite sex. Perhaps this is why the married exert upon the unmarried, and the unmarried upon the married, a reciprocal attraction which has in it a quality of sympathy which is often absent between the unmarried of either sex. However, this accession of ambisexual sympathy which is generated by marriage is a stage in the progress towards a sympathy which transcends sex, and becomes super-sexual and human. Such a stage when reached is ethical, at any rate when at last the husband and wife unite not merely their sympathies but also their wills with “the general will”; when, in other words, their interests have become communal.

This stage having been achieved, those who propose to contract a marriage regard themselves as stewards of the race, to refer to no higher point of view. Their bodies, minds, and wills are no longer their own, for they hold everything in trust for the service of humanity. The work of propagation, for instance, is a solemn responsibility delegated, as it were, by society to the parties concerned. Children will be born with every previous preparation possible on the part of the parents, of body, mind, and soul. Transmissible disease will be felt to disqualify from this task. For children are to be members, not only of the smaller family, but

¹ Arabella Kenealy, *Feminism and Sex Extinction*, pp. 27, 29. (T. Fisher Unwin, 1920.)

of the Great Household; and in it they are to be servants able to minister. Thus marriage is a great vocation; it is to be inspired by the spirit of this Household, and in that spirit it should discharge the task of renewing its members.

CHAPTER IV

THE WIDER FAMILY

ON purely psychological grounds we make no distinction between the Family and any larger human group in respect of their mere associational basis. In accordance with our findings in Part I we hold that it is one and the same fundamental impulse which brings people together in families, in tribes, and in still larger groupings. These are all the expression in different ways of the same social instinct. We say "in different ways"; for in the case of the family this social impulse is specifically and uniquely conditioned by sex. When we say, therefore, that the basis of the family is established on deep and ineradicable instincts of human nature, what is meant is that the social tendency of human nature is so strengthened by the specific attraction of sex and its domestic corollaries as to make the family, of all forms of association, the most natural in the sense that it is at once the most powerful and indispensable.

Whether the Family is the most *primitive* form of society has been a matter of controversy, waged perhaps unnecessarily through a misunderstanding of the import of the term. The evidence seems on the whole to be against the theory of a primitive promiscuity.¹ And indeed the implication that children are at first regarded as belonging to, and are cared for by, the tribe presupposes a degree of tribal culture and responsibility which is beyond belief. The Family, *as we*

¹ Cf. Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, 5th ed. (Macmillan, 1921.)

know it, may not have been the most primitive form of society. But that family life existed in some form from the first seems undeniable. Most likely in the beginning the boundary between the Family and the Clan was more or less undefined. Marriage in primitive times may well have been polyandrous, but the clan to which the mother belonged probably protected her in the possession of her children. Obviously such protection of the mother would be necessary during the period in which children were being born and reared. How far this led to mother-rule as the original form of the family is another subject of dispute; but, as kinship with the mother was a relationship which was more certifiable, this reason alone would lead us to regard the patriarchate as a later development.

The Family, however, while in some way to be regarded as the primitive form of society, has in the course of its history undergone many changes in its constitution and economy. Generally speaking, its circle was wider in ancient times, including, as it did, adopted members and slaves. The Hebrew household, for instance, was a fairly large group. "It included the man as supreme head, his wives and concubines, his wives' children, his concubines' children; daughters-in-law; sons-in-law; other relatives; resident foreigners or strangers; male and female slaves, whether Israelite or foreign, whether home-born or purchased."¹

Social organization, having begun in the Family as now explained, proceeded to include ever wider groups. In the case of the Hebrews the patriarchal Family was succeeded by a Democracy of Families, who were later united into a distinctive people under a king. The same development occurred in the history of the Romans. "In Rome . . . loyalty to the State was built up out

¹ Ryder Smith, *Bible Doctrine of Society*, p. 14. (T. & T. Clark, 1920.)

of family loyalty. Every house-father was king in his own household—lord of life and death. And every citizen knew that his civic rights were assured because he was by birth a member of a certain family, a Cornelius, a Julius, or a Sempronius. An alien, when he received citizenship, would be accepted by a legal fiction into some great family.”¹ Thus by this union of “cognates and agnates,” on the basis of consanguinity and of neighbourhood, the Roman people gradually grew in size until they formed a State; and the State in turn through conquests peaceful and forceful has tended in history to become ever larger and larger. Thus the wider associations of men, like Clan, Tribe, Nation, State, are expansions in different ways of the family group.

When, however, we come to inquire into the bases, psychological and ethical, of these greater associations, we encounter a somewhat complex and difficult problem. The primitive basis of union is, of course, consanguinity. This kinship group enlarged, it would seem, through the practice of exogamy, which has been described as “the centrifugal tendency of sex.” Later, people united on the ground of contiguity in place; and still later their union was cemented by a common history, tradition, and language. These reasons for association are not so dissimilar on the psychological side as may at first appear.

Some modern sociologists attribute the forms of social grouping to cultural and economic causes. Such causes, it is true, may have influenced the character of social formation, but they do not disprove the existence of a natural tendency to form groups of some sort. On the contrary, they rather imply this tendency than other-

¹ Cf. Lofthouse, *Ethics and the Family*, pp. 130, 131. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1912.)

wise. Without it, how would men have come together in any way, or at least have remained together? All the evidence points to the existence in man of a social tendency which is natural in the sense explained in Part I. For according to our view the impulse to form families and the impulse to unite them are not disconnected, but are manifestations under different conditions of one and the same fundamental social urge. Human groups expand primarily by extension of kinship, secondarily by gregarious association; but the sex and the herd instincts are, if our thesis is correct, both derivatives of one and the same Life-tendency. Hence from our own point of view we can endorse the statement of Aristotle in his *Politics* that social expansion into what he calls the "State" is φύσει, and that "the State is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a social (political) animal." We can also agree that although in point of time the family comes first, yet it is the State in the sense of a large social group which is the goal of the φύσις of man.¹

Whereas, however, in Aristotle's time the social unit was the City-State, a group which in regard to its size was of the dimensions of a clan, later the groupings were on a much larger scale. We have, for instance, a group as large as a far-flung empire—witness that of Alexander, and afterwards that of the Romans. These empire groups, however, cannot be called "natural," inasmuch as they were composed of heterogeneous elements whose unity was imposed and maintained by a supreme authority able to enforce its will. Nor can the union of the peoples of Europe during the Middle Ages be regarded as "natural," for that also was enforced by authority. Mediæval society in Europe was indeed a remarkable unity, in which the people,

¹ Cf. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicom. Ethics*, vol. i, p. 50.

according to their function or "estate" rather than their country, lived and moved and had their being. But all such enforced groupings are destined to suffer disintegration, as they did. The subsequent groupings of peoples followed lines that were more or less natural.

Left to themselves, peoples associated together as "Nations." The circumstances which determined the formation of Nation-groups are somewhat various. Race was one factor, though modern nations are of composite race. Similarity of language and tradition has certainly played an important part in the creation of a sense of nationality. The force of tradition has been accentuated where there is a history of common sufferings or triumphs. The fact of having originated from the same territory or tract also has its influence. All these causes more or less combined to determine the configuration of society in the modern world; and to these qualifying influences the social trend of the Life-impulse has been subject.

At this stage of our discussion we have to take account of the supervention of the political upon the social tendencies of men. People soon discover that group-life is impossible without the observance of common rule; the very well-being of the group demands some sort of co-operative action to ensure such things as food-supply, health, safety, prosperity, however conceived. This need for law and order has, of course, its sinister aspect, for it implies that the group stands in danger from those who would menace its well-being, whether from without or from within. Thus arises coercive government; such are the beginnings of the State. "The State," says MacIver,¹ "is an association which, acting through law as promulgated by a

¹ MacIver, *The Modern State*, p. 22. (Oxford Univ. Press.)

government endowed to this end with coercive power, maintains, within a community territorially demarcated, the universal external conditions of social order."

Now the fact that man needed to create, and needs to maintain, such an institution as the State is a matter of sinister interest to us in this chapter. It really means that while man is, according to our thesis, a social being, he cannot be social enough. For the very existence of the State implies that there are those, both without and within its own borders, who, rightly or wrongly, are to be regarded as enemies, and controlled accordingly. And there is, of course, the further case that those who exercise the control may themselves be unsocial, and even tyrannous, in the use of force. Society, however, has found coercion to be necessary. This fact raises important questions of psychology and ethics.

We have already said something about the psychology of egoism. The inhibition of the social impulse, its restriction to the individual and his family, or to the tribal group and its interests, is, metaphorically speaking, a short-circuit; the area of affection is narrowed to a range so limited that the particular group, it may be very small or comparatively large, loves only itself. When we inquire further into the psychology of the "short-circuit," we find it to be due to what would be called in religious language a lack of "faith." This failure of "faith," expressed in psychological terms, means a disintegration of the mental system or Sentiment of Love in respect especially of its intellectual or judgmental element; the individual or the group loses sight of, or fails to grasp, the idea of a unitary view of mankind. Not that this failure is solely intellectual; bound up with it is the interest of the self of the individual or of the group in its own preservation, an

interest, indeed, which is so insistent as to affect the whole Sentiment of Love and especially foreshorten its intellectual view of the claims of men. Certain emotional changes ensue; the inhibition of the social impulse is accompanied by fear—fear of the unsocial within the group, and fear of the outsider and the stranger. Hence the individual covers himself with the armour of “reserve”; the Family tends to live an enclosed life; the Clan or Tribe becomes exclusive and suspicious of those outside; the State fences itself in, and its attitude to other States becomes latently hostile. When the members of a Family look upon it as their larger self, an extraordinary domestic bias is apt to be engendered. In the case of a Tribe the individual, identifying himself with its fortunes, knows no joy or sorrow, no triumph or defeat, save in and through his Tribe. Similarly, devotion to Country is often devotion to the Country as the protector of one’s interests. From this point of view Patriotism is an enlarged egoism, and its motto is “My country, right or wrong.”

All this is not to imply that within the particular Group there may not be much disinterested devotion. The “egoism” to which we have just referred is, however paradoxical it may seem to say so, often a co-operative egoism. Group-exclusiveness is quite consistent with an internal devotion often amounting to great sacrifice; men have died for their family, their clan, their country. And indeed such devotion is what we should expect on the supposition of our view that the Life-tendency is social. We have said that the State has arisen because men are not, as we put it, sufficiently social; by which we mean, once again, that their sociality is sectional and exclusive. Divisive acts within the community ever threaten to break out, aggressive and hostile measures are taken also by those belonging

to an alien community. Thus a people finds it necessary to create an institution for the purpose of enforcing order within its group, as well as for defence at least against the outsider. That institution is, as we have said, the State.

Now the characteristic feature of the State has been its claim to Sovereignty, the claim, that is, to be supreme master in its own house; its authority on all matters that concern the civic life of its people is absolute. Further, this authority has been claimed to be absolute in the sense of being independent of the will of any other State. Any inter-State dispute which could not be otherwise resolved was in the last resort decided by a trial of strength in War. It is clear, of course, that claims to a Sovereignty of this kind on the part of States must inevitably lead to the clash of war.

Whether, therefore, we consider the internal or the external relations of the State, its rule involves the coercion of some against their will. It means that in human society there exists as yet no "will" that is "general" enough to be unanimous in the literal sense of that word.

Of course, the very fact that such an institution as the State can apply coercion against some of its own citizens, and against the citizens of other States, implies the existence of a great body of popular support for its action, either actively or passively given. So far the State itself is founded on "consent." And we have just admitted the fact that within the community administered by a State there may be social devotion up to the point of sacrifice even of life itself. It is unnecessary to refer at any length to national loyalty, for instance. All the many forms of service to one's country find their climax in the sentiment: "Sweet it is to die for one's fatherland." We have called this

devotion within the group "egoism" when it is limited to the group; egoism, that is, of a co-operative kind, if this is not too paradoxical a description. We will now try to show what exactly is implied.

The justification for speaking of a "co-operative egoism" is that the devotion is restricted to "my" country, "my" tribe, "my" class, "my" family. Within such areas we have no desire to disparage or to minimize the quality of the loyalty. At the same time we must attempt as just an estimate of it as we can give. Mr. Bertrand Russell has voiced the opinion of most people in saying: "We cannot avoid having more love for our own country than for other countries." Quite so. But the question still arises as to the nature of such love, especially from the ethical point of view. Our own test of the love that is truly ethical is its universality, its ability to love man as man. Judged by that criterion, the devotion that loves merely "my" family, or serves "my" country, is at least imperfectly ethical; rather it is psychological in the sense that its character is of the instinctive type and determined by such factors as consanguinity and neighbourhood. Truly the Life-impulse to sociality works through such factors, but suffers thereby limitation. And therefore its universal reference is not realized by a mind and will which confuse, and are prone to confuse, factors whose function is partly vehicular with the essential constituents of an ethical devotion. Love in its essential character is not a regard for our neighbour merely because he is the immediate offspring of our body, or physically or culturally proximate to us. Rather must it see the man in the son, the townsman, the fellow-citizen. In short, it must in devotion to the particular individual, tribe, or country preserve the universal point of view. If it is "sweet" to die for one's native

land, it follows that it can only be so completely if one dies at the same time for the land of the enemy, and not for his alone, but for all lands. In other words, it is by a motive of purely human interest, issuing in a devotion whose ideal of service has the widest scope, that the minor loyalties are redeemed from "egoism" and made subservient to the grand loyalty of man's love for man. A world-society composed of individuals so inspired would attain a "Will" so "General" (to use Rousseau's language) that it would be "single," substituting "reason" for "instinct," duty for impulse, intelligence and humanity for stupidity and animality. It would be a World-Community, not in any merely sociological sense, but in an ethical. The Life-impulse would have been given its widest scope and range, and the Great Household would have been set up.

Long ago Zeno, the Stoic, pictured an ideal society world-wide in its inclusiveness, in which each member was a citizen, the world itself being regarded as one vast City. The Stoic belief was that actually all persons are bound up together in the bundle of life. "The whole universe which you see around you," said Seneca (Ep. 95), "comprising all things both divine and human, is one. We are members of one great body. Nature has made us relatives when it begat us from the same materials and for the same destinies."

Now in the ideal of Cosmopolitanism there are undoubtedly valuable features, by no means the least important of which is the concept of the fundamental *equality* of all men as citizens of the same City. Implying at first equality of status, this idea in history has had a certain explosive power, removing abuses and even changing regimes. To-day equality is interpreted to mean equality in juristic rights, political franchise, economic opportunity, social privilege.

The ideal of Equality has certainly been a serviceable one, and we may have to work on with it for many a long day. Nevertheless, its aim is primarily negative; it implies in fact the existence of grievances which it seeks merely to redress; and "historically it has always emerged in the form of a protest." It did so in the early Roman Empire, at the time of the French Revolution, and in the American Declaration. Yet the defect of the ideal is that it has no binding force. It can knock away chains that hold men bound; it can bestow on the sometime slaves dignities and privileges that aforetime were reserved to their masters. But unless you can bring those who were previously masters and slaves respectively into harmony, the conditions after emancipation will remain unstable, with the risk of further inequalities. Though, indeed, men's chances may be equalized, there is no guarantee that the equalized opportunities will not be selfishly used, that the newly won rights may not be abused. For the claim to equality may be inspired by various motives. On the one side, bitter resentment against unfairness may inspire the demand; on the other side, rights may be granted and privileges surrendered from a merely prudential motive, and out of a desire to safeguard as far as may be the stability of the community.

Such motives are not likely in the result to contribute to a social equilibrium, or to bind man to his fellow. And indeed there is nothing in the conception of equality which will cement society. It is, as an ideal, too external in its reference. It regards rather the amenities and instruments of human life than man's use of them; it is more occupied with institutional problems than with spiritual; with matters of status rather than of personality. For in the last resort man is more than a citizen or subject of government, more

than a unit in industry. He is a person, and as such sustains relations to other persons of a fundamental character, being either in co-operation or in competition with them, either a friend or a foe. He either loves his neighbour as himself, or more or less exploits him.

With all their enthusiasm for world-citizenship the Stoics were individualists. This may seem strange in view of their doctrine of Cosmic Unity in which God, the universe, and man formed a complete harmony (*ὁμολογία*). Nevertheless, in the later Stoics at any rate, *αὐτάρκεια* or self-sufficiency was advocated as the personal ideal: the individual must make it his aim to be independent alike of the world and other men. Marcus Aurelius, for instance, was a lonely soul. The cultivation of "self-sufficiency" along with a belief in Cosmic Unity will seem less of a paradox when we remember that this "Unity" had no personal or moral qualities attributed to it; and that, on the contrary, it was often materialistically conceived, as by those Stoics who imagined the all-pervading Reason to consist of fiery particles. Thus in a world-unity so conceived, where everything shared in the all-pervading Reason, there was no obligation laid upon the individual to achieve any unity with his neighbour beyond that which was theirs already. Each person was divine by nature; but that such "divinity" should draw each man nearer to his fellow was not an implication of their conception of Divine Reason. Hence it was that the inferred idea of human equality, while it imparted a dignity to the individual, did not necessarily bind him to his neighbour by any inner bond of community or love.

Nevertheless, until society is so bound, until it is a perfect unity of heart, until it is one will, there will be always more or less of social disintegration in view of that tendency to "short-circuiting," or ego-centric bias,

to which we have referred. The very existence of the State as a coercive institution is a perpetual reminder of the divisive forces which are ever at work.

Not Equality then, but Unity, must be the basic conception in the wider family—the Family of Man. It may perhaps be not irreverent to adapt a more august saying to express a kindred truth, and to put it in the following words: “Seek ye first unity, cherish fraternity, and social and material good shall be added unto you.”

We pass on now to consider some aspects of the life of this Wider Family.

First of all, let us say that it is the spirit of World-Brotherhood that will give a soul to the varied activities of the world. It is unnecessary to labour the point that the world in respect of such things as transport, industry, communication, ideas, is becoming a rapidly increasing unity. Unless the society of man grows commensurately in soul, all this development of international unity in material and intellectual activity will not only lack ultimate significance, but will be an increasing danger.

We will lead up to this conclusion by considering first the application of our principle to the smaller groups.

Just as the individual who has many activities—physical, social, economic, intellectual, artistic—does, as a matter of fact, organize these interests in accordance with some master purpose, just as there is some end to which the other ends are but as means, so similarly the various associations that function within a State—for most peoples now have attained ordered society—industrial, artistic, literary, scientific, while they are not political in their character, nevertheless do have some influence on the life of the people considered as citizens or subjects, or indeed as members of the community. A Golf Club, a Musical Society, a

Technical College, a University, indirectly affects citizen life. The citizen in his body, in his mind, in his tastes, is made, other things being equal, a better-equipped individual. But when we say "better-equipped," we do not refer to any final purpose or value. We merely mean that as an individual he will "better," i.e. more successfully, accomplish whatever end he adopts in his citizen-life.

The various associations that men form are not co-ordinate with the association which brings men together as individuals; they are within this larger association, subordinate to its interests.

This truth at least lies behind the expression, "the omniscience of the State." It is no essential part of our argument that this omniscience should manifest itself in the form of State-sovereignty, a doctrine, indeed, which we have repudiated. Neither do we ignore the fact that the associations which men form in any one country are becoming more and more international in their scope.

What we contend for is that, just as the various associations within a country should function, not as ends in themselves but for the sake of the life of the country as a whole, so these associations in art or science, which tend more and more to become international, should be auxiliary, not so much to the life of their respective countries as to the well-being of humanity as a whole, of which these countries are but sections. Or more briefly, the vocational community should be regarded extra-nationally, and should aid the life of *the* community, viz. men in their interpersonal relations with each other.

Hitherto there has been much international culture, but it has failed at the crucial test to preserve the international interest. Many hoped that, as the world was

pooling its culture, the friendship of peoples would be thereby strengthened, if not safeguarded. The Great War provided the *experimentum crucis*. Though the antagonists shared each other's music, literature, science, and even theology, these common interests did not in themselves produce any deep bond of the spirit. On the contrary, the gains of culture were prostituted to the cause of political separateness; they were devoted to the worship of the idol of State-Sovereignty. The knowledge of the arts and sciences which should be for the help of humanity was exploited in the name of political independence.

The World-Community, we say, should be served by the world's imagination and brain. The idea of service to Society already inspires certain pursuits like medical research, however limited the bounds of this society may have sometimes been drawn. But it would be possible to make all Art and Science into a much greater public service, so that all the peoples of the earth might benefit. Before enlarging on this question, however, we must say a little about the administration of the Great Household.

The various associations that function within a community require to be adjusted in their relations so as to subserve its well-being. This is the work of a supreme organization. The administration of the life of the whole family of man would, of course, need an organization of colossal proportions which, however difficult to establish, is not inherently impossible. We refrain from describing it as "omnicompetent," because the associations of the word are those of force; and in a World-Household coercion would not, by hypothesis, be necessary. Its administration would rather be "omni-integrative." This vast Family of Mankind could not by its very constitution be administered pre-

cisely after the analogy of the private household, where in the nature of the case the control must be parental. Its members, being fully responsible and rational, would be self-governing.

In the Great Household, as here conceived, certain rather troublous problems of the modern world would occasion no difficulty. Much controversy rages nowadays as to the relative authority of the political and economic spheres. The economic life of the Great Household is so important a subject that to it we shall have to devote a separate chapter. But meanwhile we may observe that in our ideal society the work of administration would be exercised, not as at present on the basis of exclusive territorial possession, but in the catholic interest of humanity. Nor would it be exercised by those who, from the economic point of view, function in the capacity of consumers, as in the Parliamentary system of government. That consumers as such have dominant rights over producers is a grievance in many quarters to-day. And indeed it seems unfair that political power in an omniscient State should be wielded, however indirectly, over producers by citizens who themselves may "produce" nothing, whether they are idle poor or idle rich.

As a revolt from this situation Ergatocracy has been preferred in some quarters to Democracy: that is to say, political power is given only to those who work. Indeed, the revolt has gone so far that in Europe different trans-continental organizations of workers and wage-earners have been formed under the common title of "The International."

Now it cannot but be admitted that such a revolt, however motived, has in itself, in view of our whole discussion, a sound basis in ethics. There is, of course, a certain amount of parasitical life in sub-human

nature; but these parasites have a very active life of their own, and as the Life-impulse expresses itself in man it increases the power and variety of productivity. That there should be human consumers who do not "produce" creates a condition of irrational inequality as between themselves and that section of the community which supplies them with the wherewithal of life. In view of the twin aspects of the Life-impulse—its nutritional and reproductive sides—there should be no consumers who are such merely, or exclusively. Instead, therefore, of meeting "The International" with scorn, we must try to appreciate the reasons which have led to its formation.

At the same time the distinction between consumer and producer is apt to be too rigidly drawn. And in some quarters those only are thought to "produce" who work with their hands. It may be that some physical labour is good for all. If, however, it is true that man does not live by bread alone, then the products of man's mind and heart, while not so urgent as bread, clothing, and shelter, are more vital according to any adequate test of life. Hence scientists, artists, musicians, actors, poets, scholars, teachers, prophets, have a strong claim for recognition and consideration. Even an invalid who "produces" nothing tangible—who, indeed, can only "stand and wait"—may inspire a desire for certain goods of the spirit, like patience, fortitude, and faith, which, after all, are the things by which men really live, and in which is the life of their spirits. In this ideal Household every form of good would be rendered by each according to his capacity, to each according to his need. All would work, not in the same way, but in some way. And all would labour at their task for the love of the Household. Under such circumstances the

problem of Democracy *versus* Ergatocracy would have lost its meaning.

So far, however, we have made little reference to problems which are only too common in the private family, and which have their counterpart in the world-family.

In the family, strictly so-called, the differences between the members in respect of physical and mental power are sometimes so great as to be notorious. But these differences do not normally in any wise disturb or lessen the affection of the members one for the other. On the contrary, they sometimes help to stimulate it. If one is born a cripple, or is natively more dull and less quick-witted, the love and assistance of the rest are bestowed upon such with scarcely any sense of sacrifice. Inequalities are in the ordinary household made to enhance, sometimes in beautiful and even pathetic ways, its fundamental unity. Illustrations are unnecessary.

Outside the home, however, the world is prone to attach to these inequalities an importance that is at times quite irrational. In India it is the accident of birth which decides whether one man shall have dealings with another. In the Occident the question of brains or money, both of which depend largely on the luck of birth or opportunity, often determines the class in society with which a person will mingle. The rich and the clever tend to seek association with their like, while those who find themselves without either wealth or ability similarly segregate themselves. The former class do not find it easy to be patient with the poor and the slow of wit; the latter readily become envious at the rich and the wise, and sometimes grow hopeless and despairing. We need not here discuss whether the luck of circumstance should be allowed to play such a part in

the social life of rational creatures. Our special concern is the relation of such things to the great Life-impulse. Within the home this Impulse is tender—brooding over the weakling; taking its own eyes, as it were, and giving them to the blind; making over its very thoughts to endow the simple; longing to lavish its gifts on the ungifted. And if men in the world would yield themselves to this great Life-enriching force, they would discover the wondrous truth that power, and even wisdom, live with kindness, that the truest and deepest social bond is the union of human hearts enriched by the gifts of hand and brain. *Noblesse oblige!*

Dullness and deficiency in the private family are, as a rule, congenital. We cannot, however, assume that whole peoples are “backward” in quite the same sense, although many do not hesitate to accept the parallel without qualification. The “backwardness” of races does not appear to be quite so clearly a case of heredity as is sometimes supposed. The evidence of recent biology goes to stress, not the sole or even the supreme importance of the unit factors which are inherited, but rather the *interplay* between these and the environment as being essential for development. “Nurture is important as a condition of normal development, and the degree of development often depends upon the amount of liberating stimuli provided by the environment.”¹ It may very well be, then, that peoples are backward, not because they are congenitally unfitted for social progress, but because they have lacked the suitable environment which is a vital condition of such progress. In confirmation of this view is the fact that, where favourable conditions for education have been forthcoming, individual negroes have made remarkable advance in all kinds of culture. What has been possible

¹ Ginsberg, “Problem of Colour” (*Journ. of Phil. Studies*, April 1926).

in single cases would seem to be possible on a wider scale, and to a whole people. It is not so very long ago that the advanced peoples of Europe were a wild and rude stock; but from that root have grown such flowers of genius as Goethe, Beethoven, and Wagner (though the racial ancestry of the last named may be somewhat debatable). What, then, may not be possible to a people who at present are inferior in every kind of culture?

If the point of view of this book is correct, there can be only one policy to be pursued with the peoples who are "backward." Their inequality in many respects with white peoples is not to be ignored. But it must be recognized that the inequality is accidental rather than essential, superficial rather than fundamental, temporary rather than permanent. Accordingly they must be treated as having an equality with others that is potential, in respect of political, economic, and cultural interests. Anything of the nature of exploitation is precluded. Hitherto it has been possible for the stronger nations and Empires selfishly to use these races, their territory and raw materials. Needless to say, any such national and imperial selfishness is quite inconsistent with the ideal of a World-Family.

In view of the fact that the development of backward races may require considerable time, some kind of tutelary system of control by advanced peoples seems necessary. There are vast populations which are at present unfit for the franchise, which cannot educate themselves, and whose labour, by reason of their low standard of life, is cheap. The task of shepherding them is not so peculiarly difficult where their more civilized neighbours are present with them in a merely governmental capacity. But where there is "mass contact"—where backward and advanced peoples live together

side by side—the problem of their inter-relation becomes acute, especially where the advanced population is in the minority. There is the fear that if equality of franchise be granted, and economic equality, with freedom of contract, allowed, the status of the advanced peoples will be lowered to the level of the more backward; that, for instance, in legislation the former will be at the mercy of the latter, and that in industry the competition of a greater and cheaper body of labour will be detrimental to the interests of the workers in the more civilized section.

It is of no use to deny the existence of these dangers. What it is important to do is to realize that they are not necessarily of a permanent character. Transitional difficulties require a policy of transition. But in framing such a policy it is necessary to do nothing which would be really inconsistent with the ideal of Equality as a regulative principle.

It may, for instance, be necessary to withhold full political, economic, and social rights for a time, though only to allow of adequate training and preparation for fullness of citizenship. Any policy without this aim is condemned. Whether the scheme of Segregation, for instance, is consistent with this aim may be doubted. To keep black and white apart rigidly in respect of spheres of residence, industry, conditions of government, is not only to remove the opportunities of co-education, but to bring about positive alienation. Restriction of intercourse is bad for all; for the one side it would mean deprivation of the responsibility of tutelage, with all the discipline and profit which that brings; and on the other hand, the peoples that are in the rear of the march of civilization, instead of advancing, however slowly, to the higher standard of life, would be left to blunder on as best they could. Moreover, such a policy

is one of despair; it surrenders the great ideal of a common good to which all races should contribute in their own way and to the best of their ability. Not Segregation, but Integration, should be the goal—the Integration of all peoples in mutual service. Into a World-Family the various nations of men would bring “their glory and honour”; the Western branch would bring its Shakespeare, its Beethoven, its Kant; the Eastern its saints, its seers, and its poets. Meanwhile, many in the Southern Hemisphere are preparing their contribution to the future of civilization under the tutelage of the “Mandatory” powers of European governments. It were much to be desired, however, that such “powers” should be used, not merely to “govern”—for government is but the body of administration without a soul—but also to teach and to upraise in every possible way. It is the opinion of some that this ideal of the Unification of all peoples can be accomplished only by the eventual mingling of races in certain parts of the earth, and the replacement of a white by another pigmentation.¹

So far, however, we have made no reference to problems which are only too common in the private family, and which have their counterpart in the World-Family. There is, for instance, the care of the sick members of the household. In the vast World-Family the volume of suffering is beyond any human estimate.

Most civilized peoples have come to make some provision, however slight, for relieving the physical ills of humanity. But while in some countries this is more or less adequate for its purpose, in other lands corporate efforts to combat sickness are either crude or non-

¹ E.g. W. Watkin Davies, art. “Empire and Colour” (*Hibbert Journal*, April 1927).

existent. And yet in the absence of checks disease will devastate a population. The problem of widespread disease is aggravated by its too frequent accompaniments of ignorance and poverty. Many countries have realized that even from the motive of self-interest corporate effort must be made to deal with the social evils of poverty, ignorance, sickness, and disease. And States in consequence have promoted systems of education, poor relief, sickness insurance, isolation hospitals. The problem of sickness has been solved to some extent along the lines of charity and philanthropy, but the solution is only partial, and to-day there are few Infirmaries which are not in debt.

As regards individual countries there is a growing realization that in place of Infirmaries inadequately supported by the haphazard method of private charity, and in place of the National provision of Social Insurance for a section of society against the evils of ill-health and unemployment, a system of Nationalized insurance of a contributory character should be made compulsory upon every citizen as a safeguard against disablement from accident or disease, old age and unemployment.¹ Such a scheme, being universal, would rule out the practice of profit-making in such a matter as Insurance. In such a case "we should not need the vast relief-services of the modern State. . . . We should not need to compel the hospital to rely upon the casual donation, to face, as it continually faces, the danger of inadequate equipment, or impossibility of experiment, when it has the right to call upon the medical insurance fund for the services that it offers; when, also, the citizen can go to the hospital as of right, in the knowledge that the

¹ Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, pp. 520 sq. (George Allen & Unwin, 1925.)

charge of his treatment is borne by the insurance he has paid.”¹

In the Wider Family—in the World-Household—there would be a correspondingly extended practice of such social Insurance. The poor, the sick, the disabled in every land, would find the provision of help for those evils which had befallen them and were unavoidable. Only, in such a world-wide society—a society become a family—the provision would be, not merely that of a prudent calculation, but rather that of fraternal care. And so international regard for those in any wise disabled through no fault of their own in the world-household would have lost all its compulsory character. It would not be a merely “official” solicitude. For, however naïve the view may seem to some, the world would, by hypothesis, be pulsing with love, and those in need of help would find home and love everywhere about them.

But in a world-society so constituted the love that would be operative would by its very nature tend to diminish the very evils which it was succouring. It is important to realize this in view of Nietzsche’s denunciation of Pity. Virtue as commonly conceived, he said, just turns the world into a hospital so that everybody may be everybody else’s nurse. But this is a total misconception of the real nature of ethical love. The impulse which moves through this world-family is energetically social; it would not be content with merely picking up the wounded from the battle of life, but would in the very nature of the case end the battle itself; by removing causes it would eventually remove the evil effects.

For sickness and sorrow are at present largely due to causes which, in the kind of society which we

¹ Laski, *op. cit.*, p. 523.

are sketching, viz. a world-family, simply could not operate. A society made up of persons who care for others as themselves would be a society without selfish excesses or injurious appetites; it would suffer neither from Alcoholism, Profligacy, nor Greed. And a society that worships neither Bacchus, Venus, Mammon, nor Mars would be on the way to eliminate much of the suffering of life. It is Alcohol, Sexual Vice, Economic Pressure, and Injustice which fill our Hospitals, Asylums, and Almshouses. It would be ultimately useless, even if we knew how to do it (which we don't), to try to produce a world, shall we say, of Socrateses in mind and Samsons in body, if such a super-race did not know how to love their neighbours as themselves; the present ills would supervene ere long. But among men who have learned to act for others as for themselves racial poisons would gradually be eliminated, the blood of the race would become cleaner and the minds and hearts of men more pure and serene. Such a change in the habits of mind and of body would eventually regenerate mankind and ensure in the great Household of the world lasting health and happiness.

CHAPTER V

LARGE-SCALE HOUSEKEEPING

IF we suppose ourselves to be spectators of our earth after its complete depopulation, we should behold it, not in its pristine condition before man's appearance on its surface, but with such changes as had been made by man in his ceaseless activities. We should, for instance, gaze on harbours without any sign of life; on ships that were motionless; on collieries that were inactive; factories that were silent; villages, towns, and cities with their innumerable streets, houses, and buildings—all tenantless and quiet. As far as the planet itself is concerned, all these creations would represent but a slight disturbance of its structure, for the rearrangements of matter effected by man would seem as naught in comparison with the stability of hills and valleys, the changeless course of its streams, the largely fixed distribution of flora, the inviolable seas. The works of man would, after all, have modified the earth but slightly. Such changes as we could discern would be superficial not only in the literal, but also in the figurative sense. Moreover, they would in themselves appear meaningless. Why the altered proportion of woodland to pasture? Why the acres of cultivated ground here and the miles of slums there? Why huge edifices in this congested area and tracts of desert or forest there? Changes, indeed, without influence on the ever-flowing rivers, the ceaseless tides, the diurnal course, the rotatory seasons, the solar system.

The only conclusion to which the spectator could

come would be that these changes discernible on the surface of the earth were changes meaningless and without significance in themselves, and intelligible only in relation to the life of the human creatures who once lived there. Man has to make these erections, to establish these works, construct these harbours, raise these factories, solely with a view to his own life as a man. With his departure from the planet all such works lose their meaning and purpose.

Clearly, then, there is no sense in the saying "Business is business," if the statement be taken in strict literalness. Industry has no inherent rationale. Its reason must be found in some purpose of man's life. What is that purpose?

It is not enough merely to say that the purpose of Industry is to furnish man with the material instruments for the continuance of his life in the world, as such a reply only raises the question of the nature of that "life," and this involves a discussion of human ideals. Human life has an ethical purpose. What it is we tried to indicate in Part I. We saw that biologically life is a perpetual take and give, and that its psychical aspect is of the same character—neither egoistic nor altruistic exclusively, but social in that it involves self and neighbour indifferently. This take and give process, of which the operation is noticeable in the more or less involuntary exercises of sex and friendship should, we urged, be given universal scope. Man should ever seek to bless and be blessed in his relation to his neighbour. The practice of mutual service which is characteristic of the intimate personal relationships of sex, of friendship, and especially of family life, should, we urged, be widely generalized. Humanity should live as a great family and establish a world-wide fraternity. All intercourse thereafter, not excluding that called "economic,"

will have as its aim the promotion of fraternity. The necessity for "economic" intercourse lies in the fact that the lives of the members of this great Household are physically conditioned and need at least food, shelter, clothing—to speak of no other requirements. Without such provision for the universal Family not only fraternity but life itself would fail. A physical basis is necessary even for the good life: goods are essential to good. All this "economic" activity will thus take on the character of "Housekeeping." It follows also that in a true Family this "economic" provision is not only for the sake of continuing the Household in its life of love, but is itself inspired and dictated by this very quality. Love, in short, supervises the provision for its own continuance.

It is interesting in this connection to remember that as a matter of historical fact property was the possession of the Family rather than of the individual: primitive ownership was communal. As it was of old, so, we suggest, will it be in the ideal Society. Commerce will literally be Housekeeping on a large scale.

Ironically enough, "Economy" in the modern world has little suggestion of that household management such as its etymology implies. Indeed, it is called "Political" to distinguish it from that which is technically called "Domestic." If, however, the argument of this book is sound, then even the "Economy" which is called "Political" should be Domestic, and what is described as the "Wealth of Nations" should be regarded as the livelihood of the Family of Man.

We have said that in the ordinary household Love dictates both the provision and the exchange of goods. Each member of the household takes what he needs from the common stock, which in turn is replenished

by all those who are able to work, generally and principally by the father of the family, or, in default of this, by such other members of the home as are competent. In short, the law of the household is no other than this: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

What we have just called the law of the household is easily open to misconception. In the first place, it is wrongly called a "gratis principle"; needs are met, not gratuitously, but only in relation to services: the individual gives as well as receives. Nor, again, are needs to be interpreted as mere "desires." Desires may be only whims or lusts, and their satisfaction, as and when they are felt, would eventually spell individual and social disaster. Only such desires have a legitimate claim to satisfaction as are compatible with social well-being. Moreover, what Society thus provides would not be wasted or spoiled but would be socially consecrate. Another common error is to interpret the law as implying equality, whether in respect of "satisfaction" or "reward." Even to say that "the more useful work a man supplies the more he should receive"¹ seems to involve not only the principle of Saint-Simon that reward should be determined by achievement, but the view that work is comparable in a quantitative sense. Now it is, of course, quite impossible nicely to graduate rewards in proportion to work done, especially if account be taken of all that is involved on the side of effort as well as on that of performance. Who can compare from this point of view the services of a crossing-sweeper, the skill of a navigator, the patience of an invalid, the invention of an engineer, the inspiration of a musician? Clearly the different kinds of work

¹ Cf. the acute article by Professor Laird on "The Ethics of Communism" in the *Journal of Philos. Studies*, April 1928.

that men do are really incommensurable. No two persons are equal in respect of either powers or needs. And the law of the household is compatible with—nay, indeed will necessitate—considerable differentiation as between the lot of one member and that of another. Obviously an engineer will for his fitness require at the hands of the community a training and provision differing vastly from that needed by a poet or a surgeon. Some vocations, indeed, will want larger supplies of leisure and possibly greater opportunities of intellectual and artistic diversion than others. Such inequalities will not prejudice the unity of the Household, which by hypothesis is moral in its nature; on the contrary, by such differentiation of conditions would this unity manifest its strength and scope.

For the true appreciation of the law of the household we need to remember that it is concerned primarily, not with a comparison between the satisfactions or services of different individuals, but with a problem of proportion: its task is to relate satisfactions to services in any *one* individual. What a man needs, in addition to those basic physical requirements which he shares in common with all men, must be conditioned, as Louis Blanc contended in his *Organisation du Travail*, by the nature of the capacities and faculties with which he is endowed. We may therefore assert that in relation to “services” “satisfactions” should at least be suitable and adequate. The needs of a scientist, an artist, or a statesman are, to an important extent, disparate. All require food, it is true; but their other needs vary in their nature and degree in accordance with the difference in their respective vocations. Expressed in biological language, this is but to insist that a due balance must be preserved between nutrition and reproduction. What, therefore, a man can do for his fellows, that he

ought: what his fellows can do for him, that they should, and in our ideal society, would do.

Now it requires very little observation or reflection to discover that modern industry is very far from exemplifying in its practice the law of the household just mentioned. On the contrary, in industry of to-day there is, as Eucken once expressed it, "a tragic isolation of the individual"; and this notwithstanding the fact that in commerce men work together in masses. The sociality that obtains in trade relations is for the most part superficial: there is no heart in it. Men work with, rather than for, one another. In a word, modern industry is soulless: a spirit of homelessness pervades it.

To say all this is not to imply that there is never any scope at present for kindness and consideration in business relations. But these qualities are incidental, and become conspicuous by being exceptional; they could be made regular and permanent without disaster only if they were practised universally. "We are not in business for philanthropic reasons," men say, who themselves outside their business are tender-heartedness itself. In commerce they are, or have to be, "hard"; in their homes they are affectionate husbands and fathers, and to the poor and needy they are beneficent. The curious thing is that such an anomaly has not arrested men as yet in any sufficiently powerful manner.

In the early days of the Guild system in this country the economic atmosphere was indeed more or less domestic. Regard was had to the varied interests of those engaged in production, and at the same time a real concern was felt for the good of those who purchased. The Guild system with the passing of time became degenerate, and trade lost its domestic atmosphere. Early ideals suffered eclipse through man's failure to sustain them.

When, however, a Science of Trade was essayed, the early Political Economists, in their anxiety to maintain the principle of the freedom of the individual, developed what turned out to be a theory of individualism in industry. Adam Smith in particular, who in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* (1759) stressed so much the attitude of impartiality as between self and neighbour in deciding what it was right to do, definitely in his *Wealth of Nations* (1776) made partiality to one's own taste in employment and one's own gain thereby the guide of personal action in Industry.¹ In spite of the qualifications with which this view was stated, self-interest became the orthodox motive in Commerce. Instead of resembling Housekeeping, the production and exchange of commodities became the occasion of a struggle to secure each man for himself as large a supply of wealth as possible. At least that is the logic of the competitive method. A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the unsocial nature of the modern way of dealing with wealth, whether regarded from the point of view of Production or Consumption. Sometimes our examples will relate rather to the one process than the other; sometimes they will concern both.

Instead, therefore, of the law of the Household by which services and needs attain an ideal correspondence, the actual practice of the world is to call forth the supply of "services" by the sheer strength of demand expressed merely by "price." That "price" can prove a common measure of the respective "sacrifices" of producer and

¹ Lest the contrast implied between Adam Smith's ethical and economic teaching might be exaggerated, it may be well to add that he never made this "attitude of impartiality" more than a means for avoiding bias in one's judgments about conduct, and did not pass on to the idea of impartiality of action, or regard virtue as essentially social. The whole question is considered at some length, I believe, in a recent German edition of Smith's "Theory" by Dr. Walter Eckstein (Meiner: Leipzig).

consumer is the fundamental fallacy of modern business, a fallacy in the sense not only that it is unideal in an ethical way, but also that it contains an inherent absurdity. "At first sight it might seem impossible to compare the values of such different things as a surgeon's skill, an ounce of tobacco, a preacher's eloquence, and a loaf of bread: yet, as a matter of fact, we do compare them. . . . Their qualitative differences are reduced to quantitative differences; our individual estimates, our motives, are measured by the price we are willing to give for each." ¹ Of course no real reduction of qualitative to quantitative difference is actually effected. Value in exchange and utility value are really incommensurable. The commodities which some people buy are of little use or satisfaction to them; other people to whom the "goods" would be invaluable cannot afford them. Price, being determined by the conditions of the market, by the reactions of supply and demand, affords no clue to the nature of the sacrifices of the producer on the one hand, or of the needs and appreciations of the consumer on the other. Franz Schubert, out of sheer hunger for food, sold more than one immortal song for tenpence, but the price represents neither the "sacrifice" of the genius who composed as effortlessly as the lark sings, nor the worth of the music in terms of human appreciation. The price of a railway journey through magnificent scenery is the same whether the passenger sleeps *en route*, or plays penny nap, or feasts his soul on the glory of the landscape; in the last case especially, the fare paid cannot represent the common measure of value between the services of the Railway Company and the various satisfactions of the passenger. Again, the life which is saved by a clever surgeon may be that

¹ Clay, *Economics for the General Reader*, p. 260. (Macmillan, 1916.)

of a ne'er-do-well, or the bread-winner of a large family, or a great statesman; but the price of the operation is incommensurable with the resultant satisfaction in each case.

On the other hand, it sometimes happens that things which have exceptional value in exchange represent but small utility. Diamonds are dear largely because they are scarce, but the satisfaction they afford to the purchaser cannot compare, psychologically or ethically, with that of the poet whose soul is waked to ecstasy by some simple wild flower which he freely plucks from the hedgerow.

The truth is that the attempt to relate services to needs by means of price must always be clumsy and indeed absurd. Both "services" and "needs" imply qualitative factors which can never be reduced to a common denominator. On the side of demand or want, what quantitative estimate can measure the agony of hunger or the pangs of thirst, the craving of the spirit for house-room, privacy, comfort, beauty or art, the influence of whim or fancy, the force of imitation, or envy, or crude appetite, all of which on occasion furnish "demand" with its dynamic? On the side of "supply" there are such imponderable qualities as a workman's patience, a craftsman's skill, a nurse's devotion, a miner's risk, a sailor's courage, a scientist's genius, a poet's rapture, a musician's soul.

Men sometimes speak of "units of capital" and "units of labour" and of the difficulty of effecting any equation between them. An "equation" is out of the question, for there are mental and spiritual factors involved in both "capital" and "labour." Consider "labour." Any work, after all, is the activity of a human being; being human, it is work of body, brain, and soul in varying proportions. Even the work that is called "manual"

is not entirely so, for it constantly implicates mental and moral qualities. Was it not Carlyle who said of a certain labourer that he broke the ten commandments with every stroke of his hammer? If, on the other hand, the worker carry through his task in spite of a feeble body or a heart that is heavy with chronic domestic anxiety, or a maimed soul, the reduction of "labour" to "units" under such circumstances is a kind of abstraction that is pathetically irrelevant. Labour is not a commodity; and it is vain to try to treat it as such. You cannot employ "labour" without employing the man who labours; and since the man is involved, mental and moral factors are as really present as they are in other types of workers. To pay "labour" by its results, or by time, is from our present point of view to separate the work from the worker, and to treat it as a commodity. Complete justice can never be done to work in abstraction from the worker; and ideal justice to the worker under ideal conditions would have regard to his capacities, limitations, and needs, not forgetting his needs as a husband and father.

If, then, the method by which the value of services in relation to wants is estimated through price is crude and even absurd, it is made cruder still by the way in which certain factors are allowed to operate on this "law" of supply and demand. Two or three of these factors only need be mentioned.

1. There is in the first place the factor of *Chance*.

The power to make a large and effective demand on the services of others under present-day conditions depends to an important extent upon the accident of one's birth. No one, however clever, can choose his own parents or relations. Yet those who happen to be the children of the rich or are legatees under a will possess, through no effort of their own, a great economic

advantage; they can stimulate production, guide its course, subordinate to their own desires the toil of many others solely in virtue of a mere hap. On the other hand, through the same accident of birth, inherited poverty restricts economic opportunity and the development of latent powers. Of hearts "once pregnant with celestial fire," it is true to say with Thomas Gray:—

Chill penury repress'd their noble rage,
And froze the genial current of the soul.

It may be that some economists like Taussig exaggerate the influence of inheritance on Wealth distribution. In a paper read at the meeting of the British Association on September 5, 1927, Mr. Joseph Wedgwood showed from an examination of the probate registry at Somerset House that in the case of 67 estates of £200,000 and upwards reviewed for death duty in 1925 there was a high degree of correspondence between the fortunes of the fathers and the fortunes of the sons, and that on the whole the largest fortunes belonged to those with the richest fathers. We are not concerned to arrive at any generalization from this somewhat narrow range of inquiry, or to try to secure any exact estimate of the degree to which inheritance affects the distribution of wealth. The fact that inheritance does cause economic inequality to some extent—some would say, to an important extent—and in consequence interferes with equity of opportunity, cannot be gainsaid.

Yet if the thesis of this book is correct, if it is the case that all men are fundamentally one; if the nature of Reality has bound them together in a spiritual unity; if, in a word, Humanity should be a Household; then it cannot be right that the accident of a particular physical relationship like birth should prejudice the General Housekeeping in favour of those who are so

related. To allow it so to do is to prefer the particular claim before the general which after all is, as we have tried to show, its rationale.

Birth, however, is more than a physical phenomenon: the newly born inherits from his parents more than his body. He derives from them a mental inheritance more or less fortunate from the point of view of capacity. Whether he finds himself endowed with ability, or handicapped by disability, whether he is quick or dull in mind by nature, is, of course, a matter over which he himself has no control whatever: he cannot choose his own parents. And yet this element of chance is at present allowed to govern very considerably the distribution of wealth. The brain of the slow-witted is not worth much in the market, and he accordingly tends to be economically penalized through no fault of his own. He cannot do as much or as good work in the same time as another, and instead of receiving special consideration and treatment, his pay is scanty and his stake in the world meagre. On the other hand, a natural genius, able to attain special distinction in such forms of service as Law or Medicine, can exact from society high "rents" of ability and obtain enormous fees. It is not suggested that in these cases of professional distinction severe study and long experience have not been necessary and should not have their appropriate recompense. But in so far as native endowment has played a part, that is a chance factor and should not receive economic recognition in a society ideally ordered. From this point of view the incomes of a great physician and a humble dispenser would not necessarily be extremely disparate, when the wherewithal for culture and service had become the basis of reward. There is some point in Mr. Bernard Shaw's observation that "if your only object is to

produce a captain and a cabin-boy for the purpose of transferring you from Liverpool to New York . . . then you need give no more than a shilling to the cabin-boy for every pound you give to the more expensively trained captain. But if, in addition to this, you desire to allow the two human souls which are inseparable from the captain and the cabin-boy and which alone differentiate them from the donkey-engine, to develop all their possibilities, then you may find the cabin-boy costing rather more than the captain, because cabin-boy's work does not do so much for the soul as captain's work."¹ Anyhow, we may conclude that the Housekeeping in the ideal family of Man would not care for the members solely in proportion to their degree of native ability.

There are other ways in which the element of Chance is allowed arbitrarily to affect the distribution of wealth. To some of them we will make brief references. I do not refer to those so-called "acts of God" such as fire and flood, earthquake and tempest, against the ravages of which men are able to protect themselves somewhat by means of insurance; but rather to those fluctuations in the supply of raw material due to variations in the fertility of the crop, whether it be wheat or cotton or some other product. Again, such contingencies can, in some cases, be insured against by the particular industry concerned. However, it is also true that these uncertainties of supply by Nature, coupled with the uncertainty of demand by Society, constitute a burden of risk upon the individual in business enterprise which no man should be called on to bear. Nor in an ideal community such as we are sketching should such fluctuations be made the occasion of a gamble. That loss is risked as well as gain does not

¹ Preface to *Androcles and the Lion*, p. lxix.

alter the situation from a moral point of view. The idle exploitation of such uncertainties is essentially unsocial. In the Great Household, at any rate, the burden of such risks would be taken off the shoulders of the individual, and the gains and losses due to the unexpected bounty or failure of Nature would be communal rather than private. Professor H. J. Laski points out that by the centralized purchase of Raw Materials the community would be fitted to ensure continuity of supply, as it would have the necessary statistical information which would enable it to even out the fluctuations of supply and demand.¹

To mention another element of risk and its economic incidence—it is possible for the individual to be made richer or poorer not so much through his own effort as through the political action of Society. The obvious illustration of this is the case of War. As a result of the Great European War some countries and some individuals prospered exceedingly while others suffered just as greatly. For this enhanced wealth the persons concerned did not necessarily put forth additional effort; on the contrary, such was the urgency of the demand for the commodity in which they happened to be interested, if only passively, that they grew richer and richer, even while they slept. No such rise and fall of fortunes through such a dread political event could take place in the Great Household if for no other reason than that the very nature of its constitution would preclude War. A perfect Society, however, would share all gains and losses of which the origin was in any way due to social action.

Another instance of gains of a chance nature which are due to social causes, but of which at present the individual largely reaps the benefit, is the often un-

¹ *A Grammar of Politics.*

foreseen increase in the value of land in places which become the sites of towns and great cities. The pressure of a growing population and the exigencies of business activity enhance vastly the value of ground in the midst of such localities. It is said, for instance, that the inhabitants of London pay £16,000,000 a year to their ground-landlords. The yearly unearned increment from land in Great Britain as a whole has been estimated to amount to £250,000,000. It is certain that many of the original purchasers of this land could not, and did not, anticipate the extent of the later increment in the value of their holding. Thus the luck of urban expansion and social prosperity has brought them fortune in many cases unexpected. Their descendants who inherit this fortune enjoy the additional luck of being the offspring of just those particular ancestors. Of course, the same kind of chance may bring losses, as where land depreciates in value through unexpected changes in the character of a neighbourhood. In this case the landholder is the unfortunate victim of the operation of public causes. But again, the inference is that where gain or loss is owing to social vicissitude the community should share the advantage or disadvantage, as the case may be.

Under the head of Chance Gains may be included those which come from the unexpected discovery of valuable raw materials on a particular property. This lucky circumstance may mean vast wealth either for the original proprietor or for those fortunate enough to be descended from him. This fortuitous disposition of raw materials on the surface of the earth has been exploited not merely by individuals for personal enrichment, but by nations for the sake of material and political advantage. A country that finds itself rich in the possession of raw materials tends to trade in them with a view to its own benefit rather than from a desire

to serve the needs of the world. Thus vital necessities like oil, cotton, and rubber, as well as other commodities like coffee, iodine, nitrates, potash, and mercury, are made the occasion of an economic war. "Nature has been very perverse. America, for instance, has coal and iron, but is lacking in other materials, such as manganese, chromium, nickel, tungsten, etc. . . . At present America and the British Empire control all leading raw materials, the most important exceptions being Franco-German potash and Chilian nitrates. . . . The whole world stands to gain by bringing together as cheaply as possible all the materials necessary to produce the products civilization needs." We may supplement this statement of Sir Josiah Stamp's by pointing out that "for half a century the British Empire has controlled politically more than half the world's production of tin, most of the gold, nearly half the wool, more than half the rubber, and a great proportion of the vegetable oils, and of all tropical produce."

Now if Britain got possession of large parts of her Empire in a fit of "absence of mind," as it has been said, that is scarcely a sound reason why she should have proprietary advantage over so great a portion of the raw materials of the earth. But even enterprise or conquest gives no title on high ethical grounds to a country to make an exclusive use of whatever valuable substances it happens to discover on or beneath its territory. If our thesis is correct, then it follows that the supreme good of life is common; which, again, would mean that men would act as brothers in a great household. In a world which has become a real Household these raw materials would be possessed and administered by the Household itself, and apportioned to different peoples in such a way as to subserve the prosperity of the world-market and the common gain

of all. After distribution of these raw materials their manufacture would be supervised so as to obviate wasteful competition, over-production, and malproduction.

2. But we must pass on to refer to a second factor which interferes with what we regard as Ideal House-keeping. This is due to man's attempt to imitate the operation of luck by so arranging the supply of capital or labour as to give him an advantage similar to that caused by natural scarcity. Since the price of a commodity is determined largely by its scarcity in relation to demand, attempts are made to increase the price by making the commodity in question artificially scarce. When, for instance, there is an excessive supply of "Labour," wages tend to be low. Thereupon "Labour" has combined to refuse work except under certain conditions of remuneration. By means of the "Strike," "Labour" withdraws itself from a particular industry in order to enforce its demands for higher pay. It is only fair to add that the attempts made by "Labour" thus to secure increase of wages have generally been dictated by sheer necessity. Trade Unionism arose merely as a defensive organization.

We cannot, however, say that it has generally been sheer necessity that has provoked "Capital" to attempt to make a commodity artificially scarce. The effort on the part of the capitalist to secure monopoly value in a product seems to be governed by anything but zeal for the comfort of the great Household and the interests of humanity. As I write, American speculators have bought up the cotton crop and have caused the price of raw cotton to mount to the sum of 1s. a pound, this being twice the price it was a few months previously, and without anything in "the supply position" to warrant it. The result of this move is that thousands of cotton operatives in Lancashire are having their

working hours cut down, and will, of course, suffer in consequence. Speaking to a party of American farmers in Manchester on September 12, 1927, and replying to a question as to whether the growers of raw cotton had shared in the great advance during the last nine months which had brought about the doubling of prices, Sir Charles Macara said it was his conviction that most of it had gone to the gamblers; and it was a terrible reflection that £300,000,000 had been added to the cost of the cotton crop of the world by such means.

The same method of exploitation by Capital could be illustrated in the case of other commodities. Sir Allen Smith, speaking at a conference of the Employers and Engineering Unions in February 1926, pointed out that Britain can purchase German and French pig-iron only at a price which is largely controlled by the American capital which finances this particular industry.

All this is not said with a view to creating prejudice against the people of any one nation; for indeed all peoples are guilty of the same kind of exploitation. It is, in fact, the tendency of all who are engaged in the production of wealth to aim at exclusive gains rather than at the general well-being. It is not, of course, denied that by our industrial system, even as it is worked, service is as a matter of fact rendered to the public; but such is the indirect rather than the direct purpose. Under present circumstances Production is for "profit" as its primary aim; and any form of organizing production that will augment "profit" is commercially justifiable. Consequently we see masses of Capital combining to own certain industries, and by ruthless competition suppressing all rivals with a view to attaining monopoly gains. We also see capital diverted to the production of what is financially rather than socially profitable; on this account alone there is

difficulty in abolishing war, reducing drinking facilities, lessening overcrowding, restricting gambling. By elaborate and expensive advertising the producer tries to stimulate a demand for what he has to sell, not so much that he may prove a boon and blessing to humanity, but rather that he may create a lucrative business.

We have now possibly said enough to show how man organizes the production of commodities for his fellows in anything but the spirit of fraternity. We will go on briefly to consider how by unsocial forms of Consumption man interferes with the well-being of the community.

In the first place, then, the resources of the Great Household are wasted by unhelpful or unproductive consumption. One form of this is expenditure on certain kinds of luxuries, especially those which are liable to great changes of fashion and tend to instability of employment. Of course, much depends on the definition of a luxury. Where a commodity is in no way helpful to life, but is merely the empty gratification of a whim, or of vanity, or of morbid appetite, then the supply of it is not only hurtful to the subject, but is an injury to society in that it diverts the agents of production from social to unsocial purposes, and thus prevents the more useful employment of the land, labour, and capital. Millions of pounds sterling are spent annually in many countries in ways which not only do not contribute to the general good but positively mar it. Men everywhere, as a matter of fact, are busy buying and selling "illth" in large quantities. War services, Drink, Debauchery and its ravages are costly forms of expenditure in more senses than one; and by these colossal items of waste the life of the Great Household of Man is straitened and made poor. Such a form of housekeeping is no credit to human reason, to say the least. So responsible is the

position of the consumer that it is he, as a member of the human family, who determines the character of the housekeeping and what sort of provision shall be made for his wants. To revert once again to our central thesis that, biologically, growth and reproduction are interconnected, that, psychologically, regard for self and others is a unitary interest, we would accordingly urge that economically any form of consumption that does not aid production is to be abjured, and further that with the satisfaction of wants there should be generated still greater abilities as well as needs. Life, indeed, should develop both in capacity and capability. Bread, clothing, and shelter are, of course, fundamental and indispensable. Wants of a cultural type must be superadded; and the satisfaction of these at once deepens the capacity for enjoyment and increases the power of service. Art, for instance, is not a mere "extra," but is a veritable enhancement of life. The truly "simple" life is not one in which the wants are few—such a life would be dull and ineffective—but it is one in which the wants, while growing in number, complexity, and refinement, contribute to a deeper social unity. For "simplicity" in relation to life is qualitative rather than quantitative in its associations; it is a social harmony of services and satisfactions, however elaborate these may be. No need would be pressed, and no effort to satisfy it made, which did not tend to promote this harmony of the household. That men should merely be busy is not enough; it is the kind of trade that matters. The traffic in white slaves, the provision of frivolous luxuries, the manufacture of noxious drugs, the forging of munitions of war—all such things may keep people busy, but they would not promote the unity of the Great Household, nor indeed would they help in the long run to increase merely

economic well-being. Business must be fruitful, not fatuous. Wealth is in order to life, and life is, or should be, love.

Further, if our philosophy of life is sound—that each life must both take and give—then he who takes and does not give, he who consumes without producing, is violating the fundamental principle of existence.

There is, however, in the present state of society a good deal of Idleness that is compulsory, due in some cases to sickness, in others to unemployment. On account of physical or mental weakness many consume who are able to produce little or nothing. Provision for all such would be made in the World-Household, as it is willingly made in the limited circle of the Family commonly so called. How sustenance would be maintained for the invalid, the cripple, the feeble-minded, the aged, need not here be discussed in detail. The community as a whole could make the necessary provision, as we have said, by a system of compulsory National and International Insurance. Such insurance, not being conducted on competitive principles, would eliminate those forms of financial waste which are incidental to present methods. In this way the objectionable features of private charity would be avoided, since by hypothesis the Great Household would be a spiritual fraternity in which mutual helpfulness would be organized on a comprehensive basis. Maternity benefit would not be given as a dole, but as a recognition that the production of healthy children is a valuable service to society. And indeed the very idea of “production” would receive a generous interpretation. Even the invalid, who, so to speak, can only “stand and wait,” would, as we have already said, by his manifestation of virtues like patience, resignation, and courage, be “producing” certain qualities of

character and exerting thereby a kind of influence which, if we are spiritual beings, would be among the greatest forms of service one soul can render to another.

As for idleness due to unemployment, that there is no work for some people to do, if put forward as an absolute truth, is in the light of our thesis unnatural and false. According to our interpretation, life has always the twin aspects of consumption and production, of which one is the complement of the other. There is a duality of process without a dualism. It follows, then, that on the economic plane consumption without production is a violation of nature which is to be avoided by all possible means. If we talk in terms of "rights," then there is a right to "work" as much as there is a right to "life," for, as we have said, life and work are counterparts.

That some people can find no work to do is at present unfortunately only too true; but it testifies, not to a natural, but to an artificial state of things due to human maladministration. There is both "vicious" production and "vicious" consumption; there is, in addition, faulty organization between these two factors. But there is also gross under-production, according to our Economists, who tell us that "all the wealth that we produce, even if equally divided, would provide a standard far less than the average social reformer thinks is already in existence." (Sir Josiah Stamp.) Professor Bowley, in his *Division of the Product of Industry*, similarly concludes that the wealth of this country is insufficient to support any general high standard of life, however it is divided, and insists that for such a purpose an increase of the national product is essential. Unemployment coexisting with serious Under-production, workless multitudes inhibited from doing work and creating wealth that is imperatively

necessary—this paradoxical state of things can be owing only to a grave malorganization of the industrial life of the world. Surely there would be no practical limit to the creatable wealth of the human community and to the value of its consumption, if the will to work and to share were universal. In such optimism we receive some support from the views of Sir Josiah Stamp, who, after pointing out that if all incomes in the United Kingdom above a certain modest level were pooled and then shared out the spendable resources of each family would not be improved by more than five shillings a week, nevertheless adds:—

“The standard of life to be obtained without elaborate contest, as a share of universal hard work and efficiency under stable conditions, far exceeds any standard that can be got out of the production that results in a world of suspicion and artificial restriction.”¹

We would add that in a world constituted as a household there would be not only an absence of “suspicion and artificial restriction,” but the positive qualities of mutual assistance and untiring and generous zeal, and that this would make possible the ideal of work for all.

It remains to say something about voluntary, as distinguished from compulsory, idleness. Strange to say, the attempt of the poor to live without work was regarded as vagabondage; a somewhat similar type of life in those who had access to wealth was thought at one time to have a peculiar dignity, and to be the appropriate life of a gentleman. In both cases the means of support are “invisible,” though in the former instance they are so casual and uncertain as to be almost unreal. Yet the arrangements of society are such that it is possible for a person to pass his days in sloth, existing the while on the labours of the community. In the case

¹ Stamp, *The Christian Ethic as an Economic Factor*, p. 106.

of the rich the ownership of wealth may be entirely passive. No doubt unearned income may be, indeed has often been, made a blessing by those who have been thereby enabled to carry through a special piece of work which society would not have financed. On the other hand, a person may come into the possession of investments on which he may live without toil of any kind; he can cause the community to work for him without its being necessary for him to make any specific return in the way of service. Of course, the mere loan of wealth is itself a kind of service, and may be so sagaciously directed by its owner as to make possible certain rare benefits. Do we not owe much of Wagner's *Ring of the Nibelungen* to a "dole" from Ludwig of Bavaria, and should we not have been deprived of the art of Tschaikowski had it not been for a subsidy of £600 a year sent by a wealthy lady with whom, however, he never exchanged a word throughout his life? Such patrons of the arts do a great work by proxy, so to speak; they make their money "talk" as far as mere money is able. Making all allowance for service of this sort, however, it remains to be said that each person is himself and herself, and not another, and should do something for the world in his or her own behalf. The contribution may be some unique work, or it may be as inconspicuous and indirect as the labours of a wife or mother. In the ideal society, at any rate, producers and consumers will not belong to different classes; for everyone will produce in some kind. No one will take from the common stock without adding to it. Each will feel the desire both to serve and be served. Those who sigh for a social state merely in order that they may possess more than they have at present misconceive the constitution of the Great Household. Such selfishness would, in fact, unfit them

for membership therein. The society we are sketching is composed of those who are as anxious to give as they are to receive.

In accordance with our view that humanity, ideally regarded, should form a Household, it follows that the Housekeeping should be on a universal scale and conducted in the interest of the world as a whole. No doubt such an aim seems hopelessly Utopian. But we are realizing that sectional housekeeping, especially on the nationalistic scale, produces chaos, inequality, and suffering; and we are beginning slowly to move to a more international, and perhaps in the far distance a unitary, economic administration. Hitherto we have considered the selfish use of the agents of Production within the confines of any one country, so far as such an abstract point of view is possible. But in concrete reality we have to take account of the alignment of the peoples of the world into nations and empires, inasmuch as political influences interfere with the free course of the world's trade. Not only is there international rivalry to gain possession of valuable raw materials, but, when in possession of these, nations tend to exploit their advantage to the disadvantage of the foreigner. Likewise, the foreigner will try to undercut the price of commodities in another country, which efforts that country seeks to meet in the interest of the "home" industries by means of tariffs. In these and other ways national protection and national enrichment come to be substituted for the service of humanity. World-trade in consequence suffers from dislocation; in some countries there may be over-production contemporaneously with under-production in others; some countries may relatively be busy and others unemployed; in some countries one of the agents of production—it may be labour or capital—manages to secure

a greater share of the "reward" of industry than in others, with corresponding effects on the price of the "product" and its ability to compete in a foreign market. America has, relatively speaking, too much oil and Britain too much rubber, while other countries are in these respects very necessitous; yet as industry is at present conducted, the problem of distributing these commodities where they are most needed or where they can do the most "good" is made difficult by reason of the vested interest involved. Then again, the backward state of Labour legislation in some countries, particularly Eastern, enables sweated labour to compete with "success" in the world-market against other countries where labour enjoys a higher standard of life. All such facts—exploited raw materials, preferential tariffs, unequal conditions of labour—as well as other phenomena, cry aloud for International co-ordination, for some World-Institution which can prevent aggressive nationalism from interfering with world-trade; which can, by accumulating the necessary information, adjust supply and demand for humanity's benefit, and thereby prevent alike over- and under-production; which can also superintend the conditions of production in different lands so as to do away with hardship and suffering and eliminate unfair competition.

Of course we do not mean by this International organization of Industry anything like international Cartelization. Of such schemes as international Cartels we may say that so far from being a remedy for the kind of chaos to which we have referred they might easily, to quote the words of Mr. W. T. Layton, "be a public nuisance if they endeavoured to maintain unduly high prices. Any such proceeding would have precisely the opposite effect to that desired, for it would stimulate consuming countries to put up tariffs in order

to create their own industries as a measure of self-protection." Besides, under the system of Cartelization it might easily happen that one of the agents of production, e.g. capital, might, in competition with labour, enjoy a position of unusual strength. As a matter of fact this is a source of great anxiety to Labour at the present time.

The conclusion to which we are led is that Geneva appears to be the hope of the world alike in an economic as in a political sense. Indeed, it is impossible to separate the two aspects, as will, we venture to think, be found more and more to be the case. Nations often go to war for economic ends; and on the other hand, and in view of what we have just said, industrial chaos in the world is traceable partly to political causes. Two developments in the work of the League of Nations are full of promise for the future, viz. the International Labour Organization, and the recent World Economic Conference.

The aim of the International Labour Organization is to secure that, subject to local circumstances, climate, and custom, labour conditions shall be uniform throughout the world. In this way, not only will competition by the sweated labour of backward countries be prevented, but the status of labour in these lands will be raised. Although at present only recommendations to such an end can be made to the Nations or States concerned, yet already a good deal has been accomplished, especially in India and Japan, where hours of work have been reduced and the minimum age of employment raised.

But even more promising, because more radical and fundamental in its influence when fully exercised, is the institution of the World Economic Conference. It is true that at its first meeting in May 1927 somewhat

humble results accrued, such as the resolutions which were arrived at condemning excessive nationalism in Industry, as shown by the increase of tariff barriers, sudden changes in Customs Duties, Governmental interference with Imports and Exports, and Subsidies. But the great significance of the Conference lies in its realization that Trade cannot be properly conducted till it is International, not merely in its scope (for it is that already), but especially in its control.

What this "Control" may involve only time and experience will reveal. The President (M. Theunis) in his survey said:—

"The Conference, as an International Conference, has felt bound to assume . . . that the exchange of products between persons of the same country or different countries is normally to the advantage of both parties: that the greater the range of exchange of different products between those who by their resources and capacities are best fitted to produce them, the greater is the general economic advantage."

It is claimed by some that International Cartelization will realize "the general economic advantage." Already it affects at least twenty-two branches of industry. It is claimed that it can effect economies in salesmanship and in the allocation of markets. Certain expenses of transport can be overcome. Labour conditions can be standardized. But as against such hopes is the fact that the International Cartel is, after all, a combination primarily of Producers and especially of Capital; we cannot, therefore, feel the same security that the interests either of Labour or of the Consumer will be safeguarded; and if they are not, then the economic advantages secured will not be really "general."

Ideally the control of World-Trade should be in the

hands, not of Producers only, much less of Producers of specific commodities ; nor of Consumers merely ; but of a community who are alike producers and consumers. At present political control is the control of consumers who may not all be producers ; but however far such control falls short of the ideal Household management which we have sketched in this book, yet it is the consumer who determines the nature of production and influences the prosperity or adversity of different producers, and therefore occupies a key position. The consumer, in short, as distinguished from the producer, "represents the whole of society."

International control, therefore, must be political in the sense that it is the control of the citizens of the respective Nations or States over the economic life of the world. We have said that it does not yet appear how much such control will involve. Some things are obviously and urgently necessary. First of all, we may say, comes the education of the world as a consumer that it may demand, not armaments, noxious drugs, excessive supplies of intoxicants, useless and wasteful luxuries, provision for sexual vice, but commodities, institutions, and cultural facilities such as will strengthen and enhance the life of humanity. Then will be necessary the collection of information and statistics as to the natural and human resources in the world for meeting world-demand. The actual task of relating world-services to world-needs will then engage the "Parliament of Man," and in the execution of this colossal work the chief aim will be to exclude exploitation by nations, by any of the "agents" of production, whether land, labour, or capital, and by the consumer who may put forward false or selfish claims. Our system of finance has already become international in one sense ; that is to say, in its scope and range. But it is not international

in the sense that it is controlled in the international interest. On the contrary, it is often in the power of one particular nation, or even of individuals, to influence international Credit and Currency. An urgent need is that the world as a whole should some day regulate its financial system. Connected with this is the problem of what may be called "Directional Saving." Mr. J. M. Keynes has already pleaded for more communal control over the amount and direction of the savings of the people. It is questionable, even from the standpoint of the nation, "whether the present organization of the investment market distributes savings along the most nationally productive channels." In an ideal organization of the economic life of the world saving on the broadest possible scale would be necessary, and the disposal of these savings and the diversion of the capital accumulated would be not the least difficult of the problems of large-scale Housekeeping. Of course, some of the items in the foregoing programme are more Utopian than others; but others are not so immediately difficult as that they cannot be regarded as future practicable aims of the economic efforts of the League of Nations.

But will the House of the World be too crowded to allow of the provision of adequate sustenance? Some say that population will outgrow the resources of the world's food-supply and that Nature will be unable to feed her children. As to this we would reply that in an ideal World-Household certain factors would come into play which would greatly husband Nature's resources. In the first place, in such a community, marriage and procreation would not be as irresponsible as they often are. Those who bring a child into the world would take care, as far as foresight could ensure it, to recruit the population with children sound in mind and body, so

that they would be destined not merely to consume but also to produce and add to the resources of life. The population, who by hypothesis are supposed entirely ethically minded, would by that very reason, as we have already partly shown, effect economies in the use of Nature's provision. The raw materials of the earth would not be wasted in War, or frittered away on useless and even hurtful lusts. There is, for instance, a large food waste in the utilization of grain for the manufacture of alcohol. Humanity, thoroughly disciplined in its tastes, would abjure what is hurtful and even extravagant in food and drink; and without suggesting that men would radically alter their diet, they probably would not require the same amount or kind of food.

But something can be added in regard to the resources that are really available. At the British Association meeting in 1926 Lord Bledisloe stated that the wheat yield of the world might, in his opinion, be raised 50 per cent. above its present level by the application of fertilizers; and further, that 15 to 20 per cent. of the food crops of the world were now lost through insect and fungoid attacks. In the discussion, Professor D. H. Macgregor agreed that chemistry might augment the earth's food supply 25 per cent. by defeating the ravages of the insect plague. Moreover, a world really organized for co-operative housekeeping could open up new areas of cultivation which under present conditions are too costly or risky for private enterprise. The soil, the forests, seas and rivers, are far from having yielded up their utmost to man in the way of food.

Those who prophesy that in the future Nature's supplies will be barely sufficient, fail to take into account the fact that so far the world has never been organized for "Housekeeping." Nature has hitherto

been exploited for private gain rather than used for the good of men regarded as composing a great Family. For example, it sometimes happens, as in the case of fish and fruit, that there are abundant supplies, as there are abundant needy consumers, but man is so clumsy and selfish—perhaps clumsy because he is selfish—that the supplies cannot be brought to the hungry on account of the fact that the process would not “pay.” When it is said that it would not “pay,” what is meant is that it would not return a profit that is private. And just as this consideration governs the transport, so it governs also the production, of food. Capital does not flow always where it is socially necessary, but is directed to that form of production which happens to “pay.” So, in the words of a present-day writer,¹ “We do not know of what our industrial system is capable until we organize it for use and not for profit.” Our conclusion, therefore, would be that in a world where perfect brotherhood reigns life would be easier, not more difficult, to support.

Finally, the view of the Industrial life which we have just sketched is not eccentric or novel; it goes back to the earlier centuries of our era. The Fathers of the Christian Church maintained that all property was really common and should be owned in common—on the ground that such was both the will of God and also the Law of Nature, “Nature” being interpreted according to the Stoic conception as presenting a norm for human activity. Private property, they said, was a concession to human weakness, and tolerable only if it was accompanied by almsgiving to the needy. In the Middle Ages economic transactions were regarded as rigidly subject to ethical principle. Opinion was definitely formulated on the matter by Aquinas.

¹ H. J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 108.

"A transaction," he says, "designed for the common advantage of two people should not bear heavier upon one than upon the other, and the contract between them should proceed upon the principle of equality."¹ With Aquinas we associate the idea of the "Just Price"; by which is meant, not the price which is settled by the higgling of the market, but that which reconciles the true interests of both parties to a transaction.

But notwithstanding such teaching and the attempt of the Christian Church in Mediæval times to control economic life, industry developed, as we have seen, in independence of any controlling ethical ideal. In scale industry has at times been domestic; but in motive and spirit it soon divested itself of any family feeling that may have once impelled it. Even when in scale it was domestic, whether in the ancient household or in more recent history, the conditions involved either slavery, or otherwise labour which was free only in a nominal, or at least partial sense. Industry as Housekeeping is an ideal which is in the future; but it is one after which humanity must ceaselessly strive.

¹ *Summa Theol.*, 2a, 2ac, 77, Art. I.

CHAPTER VI

THE HOME TEMPER

WE have perhaps sufficiently indicated already the ethical nature of the life of the Great Household. Using technical terms, we should characterize it as a life neither of egoism nor of altruism, but of community. It would be a state of existence in which the individual lives neither for himself nor for others exclusively, but for both himself and others. In the present chapter we propose to describe briefly the life of this Household more particularly on its psychological side, to make a short study of the Home temper. "To feel at home" is an expression which has a well-defined meaning; it describes the sense of harmony and peace which results from a perfect adjustment between persons through love. In that little circle of kindred lives which we know as the "family" it is happily a common experience, and being unique in its charm as well as common, it has set a standard for intercourse outside the narrow bounds of the family strictly so called. As we conceive the ideal of human life man should have everywhere and with everyone this feeling of being "at home."

In the first place, he should have something like this feeling in relation to the universe as a whole. To regard the universe as hostile, or even strange and mysterious, is to have a sense of disquiet. And, of course, from the earliest times man by metaphysical thought has done his best to rid the universe of its sinister or mysterious aspect. His struggle to understand, and by understanding to gain peace, has indeed been pathetic but grand.

When at last he found in the world without that which corresponded in some way with the Reason within him, then did he begin to feel less strange in the vast world.

"Then I (Socrates) heard someone reading, as he told us, out of a book of Anaxagoras, and saying that Mind was the disposer and cause of all: and I was delighted with this notion of the (first) cause . . . indeed, it gave me a sort of comfort to think that Mind was the cause of all things, and I said to myself, 'If this be so—if Mind is the orderer, it will have all in order, and put everything in the place that is best for it.' " ¹

It is this hunger to feel at home in the universe that has driven the great philosophers to their speculations if so be that they might find the world amenable. Spinoza, because he could not rest in any conception of Reality short of Infinite Substance, was called a "God-intoxicated" man. Hegel and his later followers found a comfort not solely intellectual in their view that the Real is Rational. Others who conceived the nature of Reality to be ultimately Personal and Good must, we think, have felt the world to be friendlier still. In view of such examples it would not be fair to say that the philosopher aims merely at a *mental* synthesis of the Universe. That may be his essential and characteristic task. But much depends on the nature of the philosopher and his philosophy. A metaphysician who interprets Reality as a Rational Whole of which he is a constituent part may speak of that Whole as indifferently Thought or Will and merge Logic and Life; such a one will attempt as far as may be to live up to his creed and in all he does to have a sense of, and regard to, the Whole. Many such Idealist thinkers have been strenuously social in their life and conduct.

¹ Plato, *Phædo*.

Otherwise, it is one thing to formulate a social philosophy in thought; it is another thing to be social in conduct. The will to understand may be active while the will to do may be comparatively passive.

However, though the passion of the thinker is to find an intellectual synthesis of things, the fact is that man in action, man on the field of history, has proved to be a disintegrating as well as, some would say rather than, a socially binding influence. Social life of a sort has always existed on the earth; on the other hand, man's inhumanity to man is just as real and just as ancient a fact. It is unnecessary to recount in support the long record of war, strife, discord, and hatred. In view of centuries of bloodshed, slavery, racial animosity, misery, and poverty, millions of mortals must have felt the world to have been a homeless place. It must have often meant life without security, without peace, without happiness; or, to use Hobbes' description, life must often have been "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

In his Gifford Lectures Dr. Bosanquet suggested that it was "things" which set the problem of life for persons—such "negative" things as pain, conflict, and sacrifice. But the problems set by "things" are few in comparison with those set by persons. Birth, Disease, and Death, it is true, present problems. But we venture to say that a large proportion of human suffering proceeds from persons rather than things; that it is the result, directly and indirectly, of personal action in its avoidable hate, selfishness, ignorance, negligence, and imprudence. Think only of the multifarious evils wrought by politics, national and international; of the cruel antagonisms of race; of the hopelessness caused by the soullessness of industry; of the havoc made by such widespread poisons as alcohol and syphilis; of the cost

to human content incurred by the lust of pleasure, the love of indulgence and sloth. When we call the seas "cruel," and the desert "unfriendly," we are but using anthropomorphic language; the real author of cruelty is man himself. In proof, it is surely unnecessary to marshal the evidence of history; otherwise we should have to speak of the age-long struggle of man to obtain freedom of body and of mind, of the protracted effort to secure political and economic security, and of the prodigious cost of it all in blood and tears. Even thus far on its journey of progress Humanity has come "out of great tribulation."

This secular struggle has not been without a certain unfortunate influence on the spirit of man. Every age has had its gaiety, though often there has been no development in the quality of its happiness. Much human gaiety is of merely negative value; it is indulged in as a counteractive. There never was a time like the present when it was possible to be amused so frequently, so variously, and so cheaply. But modern pleasure seems rather to act as a palliative than to assist in improving the relations of men.

Some clue to the state of the mind of modern man is afforded by recent Psychology, which devotes much attention to the study of the Abnormal. Indeed, the teaching of the Freudian School is that "conflict" is such a common phenomenon in human experience that we may almost say that it is normal to be abnormal. Of course, there are stages and degrees of abnormality. But it would seem that so far humanity has failed to attain absolute normality of mind, inasmuch as "conflict" is as yet far from being eliminated from human experience. Professor William McDougall thus explains the nature of this "conflict":—

"The constitution of the human being reflects this

perennial conflict between the interests of the individual and those of the species. Man's nature is such that his conduct is prompted and sustained by tendencies or purposes of two great classes that are not easily harmonized, the tendencies to secure the welfare of the self, and the tendencies to secure the welfare of the species and of the social community. It is only under peculiarly favourable social conditions that any individual can approximate to entire harmonization of these two groups of tendencies. Their opposition, their liability to conflict with one another, remains the principal ground of functional disorder. . . . But this opposition of primary biological functions is not the only source of conflict in the individual. Each of the instinctive tendencies of human nature seems to struggle for its own maximal development. . . . When any one tendency . . . becomes so strong that it is not easily kept within due bounds, the process of reciprocal checking is exaggerated in intensity and becomes what we call inner conflict. Thus there is no sharp line to be drawn between morbid or pathogenic conflict and the normal processes of reciprocal inhibition by which alone all harmonious life and development are maintained." †

From our point of view, which is ethical, we should draw no sharp line between the "inner" and "outer" conflicts. If the struggle within the soul be analysed, it will be seen that it is a struggle, after all, between the social and the selfish principle, and is thus homologous with the "outer" conflict. The difference between the two kinds of conflict, as we see it, depends upon whether a man struggles to impose his selfishness on others or resents and fights against others' selfishness, the effects of which they would impose upon him.

† Wm. McDougall, *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, p. 50.

In either case life is filled with stress and strain. Professor McDougall himself draws a brief but lurid picture of the conflict of present-day life ¹:—

“Crime and divorce increase alarmingly, children grow scarce, the family disintegrates, and young men ask, ‘Is life worth living?’ Add to all this that a large proportion of adults are engaged in occupations which yield little satisfaction other than the pay envelope, and it is easy to understand that serious moral conflicts are frequent and neurotic disorders a common scourge.”

Now it is the repression of such conflicts that produces neurotic disorder. But McDougall confesses that “conflict” is in itself painful and wasteful of energy, and, by consuming within the organism the energy that should be sustaining fruitful work of mind and body, may reduce and weaken the organism and prepare the way for disorder.

It is only now that we are waking up to the fact that to live our lives in a state of conflict—fighting either to overcome others, or against being overcome by them—has a most serious repercussion both on mind and body. Many of our physical diseases arise out of a disturbance of the secretions and an interference with the chemical balance of the organism. The source of these pathological conditions is frequently mental and arises out of anxiety which is the reflection of what we call “the strain of modern life.” We are told that there is a close connection, for instance, between Fear and Graves’ Disease. Disorders of the mind again are now largely attributed to “conflict” as their origin, whatever may be the proximate cause of cerebral degeneration.² Thus the disharmony of social life tends to induce physical ill-health, sometimes brain-failure, and often abbreviates the time-span of human life. Hospitals, Asylums,

¹ *Op cit.*, p. 217.

² *Op cit.*, p. 42.

and Almshouses are filled by the overborne, the weary, or the weak of will, for whom the inner or outer conflict has proved too much. The very expression which we use concerning those who fail in life has a sinister significance; for we say that they cannot "fight" the world.

In view, then, of the foregoing facts, the life of man is anything but domestic in its temper and spirit. On the contrary, a feeling of homelessness pervades the industrial and political relations of men. But a Society made up of persons who cared for others as for themselves would be a community without hostile aims, selfish excesses, and injurious appetites; it would be a co-operative commonwealth such as we see on a small scale in the life of the Household. What its characteristic features would be we will now try briefly to indicate.

Firstly, the temper of the Great Household would be one of Peace and Harmony. Most prophets of a perfect Age look forward to it as an Era of unalloyed gladness and joy. Boys and girls will be found playing in the streets of the ideal City, and on the heads of all its inhabitants everlasting joy will rest; in such a way, indeed, did the ancient Jews express their optimism. But prophets of other climes and other days have conceived their social ideal in terms similarly felicitous. What we ourselves have to realize is the close dependence of universal joy upon a state of complete ethical harmony—a harmony of human wills; selfishness having vanished from human life, men are at peace with each other. Consequent, again, upon this ethical harmony would be a hygienic state of the emotions; life would have lost the element of strain, and general confidence and trust would have supervened. Also a community whose emotional life was thus perfect would tend to have perfect bodily health,

But it might be objected that such a state of social perfection would issue in idle Complacency and lack of Enterprise, and that the members of the ideal household would be constrained to sing in the Gilbertian manner:—

Oh, don't the days seem lank and long
 When all goes right and nothing goes wrong,
 And isn't your life extremely flat
 When you've nothing whatever to grumble at?

Professor McDougall tells us that in Burma, where there is "undisputed sway of universal ethics" (*sic*), the people are "mild-mannered and gentle, mutually tolerant and forbearing, and singularly free from the more violent vices and crimes," but adds that they are so indolent that they have remained in a condition of stagnation and rudimentary civilization.¹

As to this we should, of course, contest the view that such a people are living in a state that is completely ethical; certainly we should doubt that they are practising the ethical life as we conceive it in the present work. For, by our hypothesis, in the Great Household the members are mutually helpful; therefore they are busy. In what would they be busy? In the first place they would be active in rendering to one another every possible form of service, material, intellectual, artistic, spiritual. And we can scarcely imagine a state of things in which it would be impossible to improve or develop such services. There would seem to be practically limitless scope for invention in such matters as processes of manufacture, means of transport, facility of marketing. As regards development in Art, neither the poet nor the dramatist, neither the painter nor the musician, is within measurable distance of

¹ McDougall, *Ethics and some Modern World Problems*, p. 44. (Methuen, 1924.)

having exhausted the resources of his medium. The possibilities of discovery in Science appear to be endless; it may be that at present we are only at the stage of the alphabet in the task of trying to read the Book of Nature. And the fact that all this progress, material, artistic, intellectual, was going to be dedicated to the highest human uses by a perfect people would stimulate active interest in life to the point of enthusiasm. Then, besides, there are the ultimate problems, those of a metaphysical type, which have already fascinated the intellect of man for thousands of years, and which have by no means yet received a final solution—these problems would never be beyond the stage of discussion. On the contrary, if our interpretation of Reality is valid only as far as it goes, then what is now only a tentative explanation of the World in terms of Value may be expected to receive rare reinforcement from a society of people whose whole intercourse subordinates every interest to the realization of Love.

For in the second place the supreme value of life, which we call Love, is, above all else, itself capable of infinite development. The mutual reactions of personalities under the varying conditions of life are never-ceasing and ever-changing. Individuals who love are constantly exploring each other's nobility, each other's helpfulness amid the vicissitudes of existence. Instead, therefore, of growing tired of love, they find the span of life all too short, and feel the flight of the years to be, as it were, the passing of days. So in the same way a society enjoying the perfect concord of a household would cherish a perennial interest in its members and would be continually engaged on the task of creating, not so much a common mind as a unity of soul, a unity which varieties of work and circumstance would only enhance.

In the next place we must observe that the harmony in the Household, of which we have been speaking, is a unity which does not exclude or despise human differences, but rather by transcending them seeks to subordinate them. Many social idealists, impressed by the existence of differences between men that are purely arbitrary and conventional in origin, such as, for instance, partiality in the incidence of the laws of a country as between rich and poor, plebeian and nobleman, or partiality in the administration of law, have adopted in protest against these inequalities the ideal of Equality as the standard for social life. And truly, as we have already observed, the idea of Equality has had in history explosive power, shattering dynasties and changing the very course of social development. Rousseau's famous treatise in which he enunciated this doctrine of the Equality of man was indeed referred to as the "Bible" of the French Revolution. And this idea of Equality, influential as it has been already, may still have to be used in our imperfect world for many a long day. Men are demanding political and economic equality and, speaking generally, "equality of opportunity."

Nevertheless, for two reasons at least, the ideal of Equality is unsuitable as a social standard for a perfect community. For one thing, to repeat a former statement, it is negative in its import; it is a protest against inequality. To secure "equality of opportunity" is good as far as it goes. But if and when you have made the opportunities of all men "equal," the individuals concerned may remain apart, or may become actually hostile. The ideal of Equality does not carry any guarantee that the equalized opportunities will not be selfishly used. For after all, we repeat, there are various motives which may inspire the movement for equality;

among one section of society it may be resentment against unfairness, among another section it may be the prompting of a far-sighted prudence as a measure of self-defence. Rights may be selfishly demanded; they may be also selfishly yielded so as to safeguard the stability of the community and thereby personal security. But where such motives operate the promotion of equality will do nothing in itself to cement society. Indeed, just because progress is so often merely a response to agitation, a redress of grievances, its dynamic is not completely satisfying from the point of view of high ethics. Justice is not enough.

Besides, Equality as a conception is too quantitative. The features of human life which are susceptible of measurement are after all comparatively superficial. If you equalize men, it is mostly with reference to matters of external administration and treatment in matters of law, of government, of regimentation. Qualitatively men are all different, no two individuals being alike in respect of physical and mental capacity—differences, indeed, which are native and ineradicable. It is therefore useless to proceed as though these differences did not exist. These differences are of many kinds. Some are limitations of physical and mental capacity. But some consist of temperamental peculiarities which, so far from being regrettable, make possible contributions of unique value to the material, artistic, intellectual, and spiritual wealth of mankind. For instance, the speculations of the East complement those of the West; the literature of the Orient adds its treasures to those of the Occident; without the compositions of Slav, Teuton, and Anglo-Saxon the world of Music would lose its Elgar, its Brahms, its Wagner, its Tschaikowski, and suffer grave impoverishment. Fortunately, the "Universal" is, to use Hegelian

language, a "concrete one"; it does not exclude, but includes, differences. In view, therefore, of the variegated nature of Reality, we must choose as our architectonic conception not that of Equality, but that of Unity.

But this all-comprehending Unity, while it does not suppress differences, must subordinate them and reconcile them. This will not be easy where there are any that appear recalcitrant. In the ordinary family it often happens that there is considerable disparity between the members of the household in respect of physical stamina, attractiveness of disposition, intellectual acumen; there may even be the more serious situation which is created by the presence of congenital disease of body or of mind in one or more of the inmates of the home. But usually the challenge thus made to the harmony of the household is not too severe for love to meet; on the contrary, the affectionate care of the household rallies to meet the needs of the weakest members of the family. What of similar problems in the Great Household? The sons of men are far from being equally endowed; the varieties, indeed, in respect of strength of body, alertness of mind, artistic tastes, and spiritual aspiration, are at first bewildering and almost confounding. The differences in question are, in fact, so great that we have come to speak of "Forward" and "Backward" races.

Now in some quarters it is thought that there are races which are so "backward" in intellectual and social culture that even the hope of a uniform ethical status which is irrespective of race must be given up as a universal ideal. Not merely so, but these "backward" peoples are by some regarded even as a menace to the greater well-being of humanity. It is alleged that, since the coloured races are multiplying faster than the white,

they will gradually invade the civilized lands, compete with their cheaper labour to the economic disadvantage of those workers who are accustomed to a higher rate of reward, that their production of offspring will be irresponsible and dysgenic, and that in consequence the more cultured portion of the community will suffer political and financial hardship and will be dissuaded from themselves perpetuating the stock. It is said that even within the same civilized nation the bad stocks are multiplying irresponsibly at the expense of the better, and placing ever greater burdens and presenting ever larger demands upon the latter for relief and support.

These are undoubtedly grave problems, and in this work we do not pretend to offer any suggestions of a strictly practical kind for their immediate treatment. Our concern is confessedly with the ideal to which we must try to approximate, however slowly.

Now, of course, in the Great Household there is no place for those, of whatever colour, who are "backward" in the sense that they are persistently irresponsible and selfish, for by hypothesis all the members are devoted to the service of each other: exploitation by any section of society is out of the question. Qualification for membership in such a household is ethical and at first may demand stern discipline. And those who are "forward" in the sense that they are already inspired with the spirit of service have it as a prime duty to try to instil the same spirit in the "backward." Even Professor McDougall, in spite of his recommendation that society should be organized into classes according to their fitness for citizenship, thinks we might look forward to a time when the whole population of the world would consist of the highest class.¹

¹ McDougall, *Ethics and some Modern World Problems*, p. 170 n.

If, however, the supreme test of "forwardness" should be ethical, as we think, then many that are considered first should be placed last, and many who are deemed last should be given higher rank. The positions of peoples cannot be decided by their colour; the events of 1914 are a tragic comment on the "superiority" of the white. On the other hand, take the following testimony by an Englishman to an African:—

"There hangs before me in the place of honour in my study the enlarged photograph of Mungalo—one of my friends. . . . He was an old chief of the Ba-ila at Kasenga. We spent long hours together, whether in his hut, or in my study, or out in the open. He was a rare companion. . . . I have rarely known a man of finer reverence. . . . Anyone who has enjoyed the intimate friendship of one African can never think meanly of the race. They have a genius for friendship; they excel in loyalty. No people perhaps are more capable of a deep and constant fidelity to those whom they love—for their sake they will go through fire and water and brave a thousand deaths."¹

We do not wish to enter into a comparative estimate of the moral capabilities of white and black respectively, but merely to use the illustration in order to remark that the ethical achievement which is possible to one African is virtually possible to all, and for our argument it is sufficient to admit merely the potentiality of goodness. We would add, however, that to be "forward" in the sense explained is to be truly so. If one had to choose between the alternatives, one would rather live with a devoted though somewhat ignorant black than with a brilliant but treacherous white.

Nevertheless, though goodness may be better than

¹ E. W. Smith, *The Golden Stool*, p. 325.

cleverness, ideally the two should accompany one another. The presence of a large number of the ignorant in the Great Household, even granting that they are ethically "forward," would detract from the perfection of the life of the Family of Man. While they remain ignorant, they are unfit for fully enjoying and contributing to the common good. There are those who declare that the members of some of the coloured races of the world are by nature unfit to attain the intellectual level of the more civilized portions of mankind. There seems to be insufficient warrant for such a view. However degraded the savage may appear, yet for aught we know he might, given the full opportunity of culture and environment, rise to great heights of civilization. This is acknowledged even by McDougall when he says: "It must be conceded that, so far as our knowledge goes, any existing people may be capable of producing individuals of the highest capacities of all kinds."¹

If, then, the "backward" have it within their power to go forward, then all those who are already "forward" must in the spirit of household service render all possible assistance to the weaker and less advanced brethren. Differences in health, in wealth, in culture, in civilization, afford no ground for the spirit of complacency or pride in those who have the advantage, but, on the contrary, present an opportunity of help by the fortunate to the unfortunate. The temper of the Great Household is one of mutual helpfulness: to make the best of each other is the dominant aim of its members.

Of course it will be only gradually and in judicious stages that a "backward" people can be brought forward. For instance, the full commingling of black with white may not be immediately practicable. This is so particularly with reference to the question of inter-

¹ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

racial marriage, which is at present generally thought inadvisable owing partly to the indignities which the offspring would have to suffer from the prejudice of the "superior" race. But with the growth of culture among the people of colour, and with the increasing moralization of "white" civilization, it is not inherently impossible that some day inter-racial marriage may not only be tolerated but even thought desirable. And looking still farther ahead to the establishment of the Great Household and a world-wide fraternity as cultured as it is kind, and as gracious as it is capable, we may even think of complete miscegenation as the ideal with the result that the perfect race may in colour be neither white, brown, yellow, nor black, but a mixture of all.

At present, however, the world is, as we have said, far from having the home-temper. It is, indeed, a somewhat lonesome place in spite of all its sociality. We have already said that men feel this solitude in industry; it is a case of each man for himself. Men work *with* rather than *for* one another. All the segregation of classes and peoples, every kind and manner of exclusiveness, helps to increase the sense of homelessness. This world-loneliness is not a loneliness of places; it is not the "stillness of the central sea," nor the silence of the moorland, nor "the sleep that is among the lonely hills." It is not Nature-made at all. Paradox though it may seem, it is a loneliness felt only in society, because it is man-made. As man has made it, so man can unmake it. He can set up, if he will, not merely a Great State, or a Great Society, but a Great Household, where in association with his fellows he will find life's supreme value—the love of a kindred spirit.

CHAPTER VII

HOME-MAKING

THE Great Household has never yet been established in the world: it is but in the making. Men have never yet lived as a vast fraternity. It is true that man is social in instinct and that human life and activity have a social setting. His institutions are social: he lives his life as a member of a family, tribe, or State. His activities in the realms of trade, science, and art have become even international in their range. Yet in will and motive he tends to be obstinately insular. The world, therefore, instead of being organized into a great Household, as we contend that it should, is actually a homeless place. For consider once again the different relationships in which the individual stands, as a member of a family, a citizen, a worker; in all these respects he can, and often does, realize the sense of isolation.

As a member of a family—as a son or father—he can generally count on the affection of his own parents and brothers and sisters, or children, as the case may be. But outside his own domestic circle of three or four he cannot rely on affection; the attitude of other families, of other parents or other children, is often exclusive. It results that family life often presents the picture of little islands of affection in the sea of human life. Enjoyment of the intimate love of more than a few homes is exceptional. Family exclusiveness is a special hardship to those who, owing to special circumstances, are deprived of home-life, and to none more than to

those who are exposed to merited or unmerited ostracism, as Thomas Hood reminds us :—

Alas! for the rarity
Of Christian Charity
Under the sun!
Oh! it was pitiful!
Near a whole city full,
Home she had none.

And indeed the way in which families practise a kind of parsimony in their affectional life can on occasion lead to tragedy. There is a solemn truth underlying the saying of Bernard Shaw that most children have too few parents. The fact is that, though the family as a social institution has existed for thousands of years, it has not yet learnt to function socially in the sense of being a self-conscious and active member of the great Family of Mankind.

We have already pointed out that, while modern Industry involves large aggregations of workers, yet all this association fails to create a really moral bond. Trade is now conducted on a world-wide scale, and a certain degree of co-operation is necessary between people of different nations as it is within the same nation; but in this co-operation there is little soul or union of heart. For "profit" nation competes with nation and man with man. The individual worker of whatever grade or class, instead of having the sublime feeling that he is engaged in "keeping house" for mankind, soon realizes that on the contrary he has to engage in a general fight with mankind if so be that he can secure enough of the world's produce for the support of his little family group, where alone he can escape the homelessness of life. Thus Industry becomes cheerless and desperate; or if it is exciting, it is with the excitement of battle.

Other forms of Associational life are no more home-like than Industry. In the smaller associations devoted to such interests as Science, Art, or Sport the concern of the members is primarily, if not entirely, in the objects of the association rather than in one another. It is only secondarily and incidentally that those who belong to a Golf Club or a Musical or Literary Society develop a personal interest and a social relationship of the ethical type. Indeed, sectional associations are apt sometimes to manifest a corporate egoism and a selfish autonomy which are hostile to the well-being of the wider community: in other words, the type of fellowship cultivated within them fails to rise to the lofty level of regard for all men as the supreme purpose of all activity.

The State itself is an Association; indeed, it has a unique function as providing a basis of social order and peace which permit other associations to flourish. What, however, shall we say of the quality of the Will which maintains the State? Rousseau appeared at times to think it possessed an august character, especially when he referred to it as a "General Will" and declared it to be a "single" will.¹ At other times, however inconsistently, he warns us that "the particular will tends, by its very nature, to partiality," and that "all peoples have a kind of centrifugal force that makes them continually act one against another, and tend to aggrandize themselves at their neighbours' expense, like the vortices of Descartes."² Many idealists also have an optimistic view of the high character of the will that is expressed in the very existence of the State as an Institution. For them it is objective Reason.

It will already have become clear that in our view the "will" of which the State is the expression is not as

¹ *Social Contract*, Bk. IV, ch. ii.

² *Op. cit.*, Bk. II, ch. ix.

a matter of fact social in such a way and to such a degree as to deserve to be described as "general" or "rational." It is a social instinct which brings and keeps men together in communities ; but the sociality on which the State is based may remain without high ethical quality and lack that universal reference which is the mark of the rational will. The social life which is so conspicuous in the municipality and the nation is social in its setting rather than in its motive. Men herd themselves together in cities and countries ; but the common government on which they agree is largely a matter of mutual convenience. A feeling of solidarity is generated which, at any rate, appears like a real unity of heart. A section of the community may certainly feel that unity ; but when it is analysed it consists partly of the sense of insecurity that arises from division, partly from the advantages to each that are obtainable merely from outward union. "The common good is explicitly willed by a minority of thinking and public-spirited individuals. What is general is more undefined and perhaps indefinable, a participation in the variegated mass of psychological forces out of which the actions and development of the community emerge." ¹

It is no wonder, then, that with so inferior a quality of sociality as the basis of States the world's political life should fail to bind mankind together, and instead cause men to feel in relation to one another "strangers and foreigners." Indeed, this problem of the stranger and the foreigner is the inveterate problem of politics ; it was the problem of ancient peoples, the Hebrews in relation to the Canaanites, the Jews in relation to the Gentiles, the Greeks to the Barbarians. And lest anyone should think that the modern world is far in advance of the ancient in the ultimate quality of its political life

¹ Hobhouse, *Metaphysical Theory of the State*, p. 126.

lest anyone should imagine that the world is fast developing in international friendliness and becoming a thoroughly homely place, one fact alone should be borne in mind for the sake of its significance, and that is that at the present time (1927) out of every £1 which the British taxpayer gives to his government no less than 14s. goes towards the payment for wars that are past and the preparation for wars to come! Truly world-unity is prevented by competitive armies and navies and tariffs, and nations dignify their selfish independence by the august term "sovereignty."

The root cause of the loneliness running through society lies in the fact that man tries to live by instinct rather than by reason. As we have all along contended, man is social by instinct; but instinct, while it is inevitable in its operation, is at the same time specific. Through his instincts man reacts towards others in certain definite ways: he woos and weds the opposite sex, he begets and cherishes his family, he seeks the company of his neighbours, and forms communities. Now all this instinctive love does not exceed in its scope and range the specific objects by which it is naturally satisfied: it possesses no principle of universality. Love of family, of class, of native land, should quite rightly quicken one's loyalty. But, after all, the sphere of our life, especially in regard to the place of our nativity, is as far as we are concerned a matter of accident, and there are lands other than that of our birth to which we must take up some attitude. Instinct is certainly in one sense the basis of our life, but instinct must be taken up into the will, and reason must supervene.

Insects and animals cannot rise to general conceptions; birds know their nests; beasts, their dens. "The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib." Man, however, though a creature of instinct also, is

not so merely. Not only can he "look before and after," he can do a greater thing—he can think things together and regard the world in its unity. But he can do more than philosophize; there is a practical unity, a unity of human wills—in short, a social unity—which he can do much to create and express. It is the actual work of creating this world-wide fraternity which forms the subject of the remaining part of this chapter. How, indeed, can a state of world-wide love be promoted?

From what has already been said it will be gathered that we do not regard as sufficient for this purpose that largely instinctive type of sociality which is expressed in the State: the Political method is inadequate. Of course, the effect of any sort of government is to bring about some degree of socialization of service; the citizens of a State share, for instance, in a common administration of justice, in the possession of the same defensive Forces, and often in other institutions. On the smaller scale of municipalization we see examples of ownership by the people of such conveniences as lighting, power, and transport. Municipal ownership has indeed developed amazingly since the time when private purveyors of water in a city laid down competing water-pipes. Now the citizens of a town own in common water, gas, electricity, trams, buses, and other services. However, the motive behind all these developments seems to be as much that of convenience as anything else, perhaps more than anything else. It is a question whether joint-ownership has done much to create or increase public affection. Do we feel a special thrill of affection towards our fellow-passengers in a tram-car such as we should never feel if we met them in an express run by a Railway Company? Are the precincts of a General Post Office a specially hallowed place? And are the Rate Collector and the

Tax-gatherer welcomed as *personæ gratæ*? The truth, of course, is that in a community there may be a dynamic which is sufficient to socialize services but which is of itself unequal to the greater and essential task of socializing the wills of men. However far it is possible to proceed by equalizing legislation, the individuals whose chances have been made equal will not necessarily be drawn together. For the movement towards equality may have been inspired by more or less selfish motives, or at least not entirely uninfluenced by them. In one section it may be due to resentment against unfairness and partiality of treatment; in another section it may be supported for reasons of self-defence. In other words, the crude demand for "rights" may be yielded to by those in power from a motive just as crude, viz. from a desire to safeguard the stability of the State and thereby the preservation of their own safety and comfort. So far as such motives operate, merely to promote equality will in itself fail to cement society. Indeed, just because social progress has contented itself with a mere redress of grievances as a result of agitation, the ethical level reached has been somewhat low. Justice even is not enough. What is more, the very associations of the idea of Equality are sinister; they speak of an attempt to apply a quantitative measurement to that which is not patient of it. Human nature is in so many respects unequal that the very conception of equality is inapplicable to it. To equalize opportunities where capacities are unequal and diverse is, to say the least, inept. So it is suggested that the idea of *equity* of opportunity be substituted.

Now Equity of opportunity is an intelligible and appropriate ideal, but it can result only from an impartial regard for the needs and capacities of all

men. And indeed such regard is the critical and vital requisite. Impartial and discriminating treatment of the needs of all in the community has its analogue in the care of the members of a family. And indeed it is only in a Brotherhood that the equity that is desiderated can be realized. Thus so far are the historic ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity from being co-ordinate in rank that Liberty is found to involve Equality, and Equality, Fraternity. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—these three; but the greatest of these is Fraternity. If, however, the lesser and narrower ideal presupposes the greater and wider, it follows that the latter will be inclusive of the former. A world which realizes fraternity will realize also equity, and liberty too; for the greater includes the less. Where Love is, there also is Justice, and there too is Liberty. This Aristotle long ago realized when he said:—

“Where people are in Friendship, Justice is not required: on the other hand, though they be just, they need Friendship in addition, and that principle which is most truly just is thought to partake of the nature of Friendship.”[†]

There is, however, in the world to-day among certain peoples a strong belief in the all-sufficiency of legislation. It is thought that all that is required is a change in the character of the Government, a transference of the seat of power from the few to the many, from the control of kings and rulers to the control of the people, a control exercised by that section of the people who “work,” especially with their hands. In history these changes to Democracy and Ergatocracy have been more or less of a Revolutionary character. Nor are we prepared to deny that Revolution is sometimes neces-

[†] *Nicom. Ethics*, Bk. VIII, ch. i,

sary, especially when it is prompted by high moral principle, and no other alternative is open. We hold, indeed, that the constitution of a perfect Society will be democratic and ergatocratic in the sense that the administration of its affairs will be in the hands of its own members, all of whom will work for all, each according to his ability. But what we do emphatically deny is that such a society can be created by a mere political revolution. All that a change in the political constitution of a country can do is at best to alter the character of its institutions; it does not necessarily impart to the people a different nature. Proof of this lies in the fact that the use of force is found to be as indispensable afterwards as before; indeed, in some cases it seems to be more necessary. The restraints of law are certainly educative; but out of a regime of restraint there can never issue a regime that far transcends the need for law, having love as the principle of its life. Attention has been drawn by others to the amazing Communist paradox which seeks the goal of Fraternity along the path of violence; there is, as it has been said, no compatibility between end and means. The sword and the bomb are indeed strange methods for the purpose of ushering in the age of Brotherhood. Violence provokes, not Love, but Violence; and only a mind ignorant of human nature and its psychology, ignorant, that is to say, of human nature's natural reaction (which from the point of view of Part I is unnatural), can adhere to a creed so vain. The Great Household is a vast Community animated by Love; it is a mighty spiritual fellowship; force neither creates nor maintains it.

William Blake, in his desire to build "Jerusalem" in England's green and pleasant land, became militarist at least in language as he cried:—

Bring me my bow of burning gold!
Bring me my arrows of desire!
Bring me my spear! O clouds, unfold!
Bring me my chariot of fire!

But then he describes his fight as "mental"; which also reminds us that it is only through the labour of men's minds that the Great Household itself can be set up. Fraternity is a creation of the spirit of man, and it is through spiritual persuasion only that men will elect to live as brothers.

The main vehicles of this persuasion are the social institutions of the Family, the School, and the Church. They are, however, not co-ordinate in rank of importance. Having contended in the closing chapter of Part I that the conception of humanity as forming a Household rests in the last resort on a metaphysical view of the world, we hold that it is only as such a view is maintained that there can be any hope of the actual creation of such a Household. In order that such a view may be maintained it is not necessary that everyone should become a philosopher in the technical sense of the term. What is essential is that the view of the world which we have outlined—the view that the ultimate Reality is personal and moral—should be more than a theoretic construction, but rather a practical attitude of the whole personality—in a word, a religion. The Great Household is a Household of "Faith" in the sense that Faith expressed in a Religious approach to life is its essential basis. Now this realization of the Divine unity of all things and all men expressed in Worship is the great "persuasive" to fraternal action in the world; whatever "persuasive" influences are exercised by the Home and the School are auxiliary to this and effective for the supreme end only as they are based on it. The brotherhood of man depends on the Fatherhood of God.

Reverence, then, for the Divine unity in which all participate would be the primary attitude of the ideal community. Unlike the *θεωρία* of Aristotle it would be the practice, not of a few, but of all. Indeed, the chief occupation of the members of the World-Household would be, not so much ways of living as a constant realization of the ultimate significance of life itself. The Divine background of human existence would never be forgotten.

Auguste Comte realized the vital connection between humanism and religion. The service of humanity, according to this view, must have its source and inspiration in Worship—the Worship of the Grand-Etre. Comte, we think, made a mistake in ascribing divine attributes to humanity itself. Humanity is not self-existent or self-sufficient; it has no personality except in a metaphorical sense; it cannot be said even to be eternal—part of it is yet to be, and its perpetual existence can be no more than an assumption; moreover, it is confessedly imperfect and needs help. Nevertheless, as Comte realized, there can be no service of Humanity which can be safely divorced from Worship, a Worship, however, which must have an adequate object, an object, indeed, which can be no other than the great Whole on which all things and creatures depend, and of which they are in different ways the expression.

And yet it would seem that apart from the inspiration of Religion mere Humanism can do much, and indeed has done much, for the Race. In view of the psychology of human nature adopted in Part I, this is only what we should expect. Man is endowed with the social instinct as his fundamental possession. And the strength of that instinct merely as instinct carries men and women far. It impels doctors and nurses to won-

drous acts of sacrifice ; it leads thousands to lay down their lives in war in defence of their fellow-countrymen ; it urges others to agitate and work for the disinherited and downtrodden. Of course, human nature is a whole, and it is therefore difficult to assign the parts due respectively to the operation of mere instinct and the play of the idealizing reason upon instinct. Moreover, in the case of reformatory passion we cannot be sure how far the social impulse is overlaid by resentment against oppression and an anger tainted with selfishness. Such anger, indeed, is often effective for the removal of abuses and the redressing of grievances, as we have already recognized. But it is unfitted for the purpose of creating constructive social life. It can pull down, but cannot build up. That, once more, is why Revolutions are usually but a partial success. There is a sufficient spirit of revolt to destroy an outworn or unjust regime ; but scarcely enough disinterested altruism to replace it by a regime of larger liberty and more generous institutions.

However, mere Humanitarianism—the expression of mere kindly instinct towards our neighbours—useful though it is as far as it goes, is ultimately inadequate. For one thing, it is too specific in its operation ; it succours the poor, the aged, the sick, the distressed as such, and relieves them as and when it finds them. But after picking up those who fall wounded in the battle of life it is not sufficiently idealistic to abolish the social war or to determine the nature of conduct in a perfectly peaceful and healthy world. If all the sick were healed, and the poor made affluent, and the aged and infirm sustained, what then ? The question of questions which is prior to all others, and which indeed contains, as we think, the solution to all others, is as to the general attitude of man to man as man. Such a

question involves much more than the rendering of material help; it is a question which is concerned rather with the interaction of human souls. The nature of that interaction is critical because it is formative in its influence on every kind of human relationship; out of the heart are the issues of life. Mere Humanitarianism is too specific in its expression to deal with this problem of problems, for we are concerned with nothing else than the universal relation of men to one another. To determine that relation aright and to make it actual, the help of Religion appears to us indispensable. How otherwise can we feel that unity with all men which transcends differences of colour, of race, of nation, of wealth and ability?

Of course, much depends on the character of the religion. The actual history of religion in the world has too often been a history of the exploitation of deities in the service of the individual, the tribe, or the nation. The God of the Hebrews was at one time conceived as a local god. Greece, too, localized her gods and goddesses. In Zoroastrianism we have an approach to a universal conception of deity. Stoicism through its founder, Zeno, attained to the idea of a complete harmony (*ὁμολογία*) as between God, the universe and man—a point of view still more conspicuous later in Marcus Aurelius, to whom the world was a perfectly co-ordinated unity—"one order made of all things, one God through all, one being, one law, one reason common to all things intelligent and living."

A Monistic system, however—and such was Stoicism—is scarcely an adequate exposition of Reality as we have conceived it, for it logically excludes diversity, in particular such diversity as is implied by the existence of separate and independent selves. Certainly whatever reality Stoic Monism allowed to such selves should

preclude anything like egoism. And yet in its actual working Stoicism did not bridge the chasm between self and others but, on the contrary, accentuated the feeling of independence and isolation. No doubt it is difficult to reconcile the two attitudes in Stoicism of identification with God and independence or self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*) as far as other men were concerned. "The autarkia of the Stoics is rightly viewed, at bottom, as nothing but a constant 'sucking of one's own paw.'"¹

Hence it was impossible for Stoicism to create a Household of Man. It never got beyond the ideal of equal citizenship for all in the World-City of Zeus. And as we have seen, there is nothing in the idea of Equality to bind men to one another, but rather the implication of an essential separateness. No doubt the Stoic conception of the nature of the World-Unity was largely responsible for this. The Reason which was the nature of the World was not personalized; it was materialistic in its associations, being regarded as a fiery substance, particles of which abode in men as separate individuals.

The great value of Stoicism, however, was its quasi-religious setting of human life. Its ethics were based on a metaphysic. We ourselves hold that the relations of men cannot be properly adjusted unless by reference to ultimate Reality. Man's unity with his neighbour is impossible apart from a fundamental Unity in which both share. But if the world is to become domestic, it will not find an adequate foundation in the Panlogism of the Stoics. Assuming the truth of our contention that Reality is in the last resort Personal, the adequate religious expression of this would be the Christian doctrine of the universal Fatherhood of God. Such a

¹ Martensen, *Christian Ethics*.

doctrine at last contains the sufficient reason and motive of human Brotherhood. As yet, however, there does not appear to be, even among Christians, any vivid realization of the import and dynamic power of the two first words of the prayer given by Jesus Christ: "When ye pray, say, Our Father." What is required is the earnest exploration by all of the practical import of the Paternoster. Unfortunately the Churches, whose special work it is to inculcate the love of God and the service of men, lose persuasive power through too great a preoccupation with what we cannot help regarding as comparatively minor matters, such as niceties of creed, and rite, and polity. The World Conference at Geneva on Faith and Order, encouraging as it was, was at the same time a revelation of the existence of divisive and disrupting influences which weaken the witness of Christianity in the world.

The Middle Ages cherished the ideal of the unification by religion of all men and their interests and concerns. It was the aim of the Holy Roman Empire to bring under one spiritual dominion the people of the various countries composing the Empire with all their affairs. One visible universal State was to be controlled by one visible and universal Church. "Religion thus came into everything and everything came into religion." The Church supervised civil law, and scrutinized commercial dealings. So far as this ideal aimed at the unification of Society, it was good and valuable. It was the method that was at fault. The "unification" was imposed from without and from "above," and as such, was unmoral. For a moral unity is, of course, achieved only as men personally of their own choice administer all their affairs in accordance with the principle of brotherhood. Moral unity sits self-enthroned in the hearts of men, and otherwise does not exist. Individuals

themselves must give effect to the truth of the oneness of all men in the Family of the Divine Father. Worship must express itself in service. However indispensable prayers and sacraments may be, they are no substitute for the love of man which should be their expression. In the Aristotelian ethic meditation and practice appear to be disconnected: some only are qualified to reflect on ultimate reality, while others, not so qualified, must be content with virtue of a more practical type. It is, however, a debated point whether Aristotle intended to divide those who follow respectively the meditative and the practical life into two distinct classes of men, or whether, while all must cultivate practical excellence, some in addition must become seers of truth. From our standpoint neither view is satisfactory. The ideal surely is that of a practical mysticism; worship and work must be conjoined in their degree in every life. The brotherhood of man must find its constant ground and inspiration in the worship of the All-Father.

It is only thus that instinctive love will find its safeguard and fulfilment. The inveterate tendency of our instincts is to function within a Sentiment of which the nucleus is the self-idea. Though our fundamental impulse is to take and give, the will is prone to exert a bias in the individual interest, with the result that the possession of individuality is perverted to a merely individualistic end. An almost insuperable inertia hinders the will from adopting the social aspect of impulse as an essential part of its rational aim. What is required, therefore, is a point of view which shall give the will at least breadth of aim. Such a viewpoint is furnished by the faith that the individual and his neighbour are not ultimately separate in their interests but, on the contrary, are united in a common relationship to God.

We have said that the Home and the School both supply in their different ways a social education. But the education given by these institutions can be of the highest type only as it is informed by the religious principle already mentioned. There can be no proper preparation for human brotherhood by either Home or School except on a religious foundation. Consider first the case of the Home. Of itself its influence is strongly psychological without being fully ethical in our sense. Psycho-analysts are never tired of telling us what these characteristics usually are; they describe the respective "complexes" which are formed in sons and daughters. Father and daughter have each a "fixation" in regard to the other, as have mother and son. We are told, for instance, that the son may have such a "mother" complex as to cherish a certain animosity against the father for his rivalry; that the daughter idealizes her father as the image of what her future husband will be like. Sometimes also the father is taken by the son as a pattern of strength and independence. However we describe these various complexes, there is no doubt that by reason of the very intimacy of the family life marked psychological influences are exerted. The question that immediately concerns us is as to the ethical character of these influences. As to this, the family tends to a corporate egoism, so to speak. It lays itself open to the charge of "stuffiness"; the home becomes like a castle with its keep, shut off from the world. The only attitude of many homes seems to fight, and even try to exploit, the world rather than to serve it. For instance, the amount of money spent on personal and domestic pleasure is often disproportionately large as compared with the amount given to beneficent institutions like Hospitals and Orphan Homes; further, there is an indisposition to pay for the support of other

people's education who are unable to educate themselves, and to relieve the poverty of those who are unrelated to us by blood. There is, in short, in family life a strong tendency to "keep things within the family," whether they are material possessions or spiritual commodities like sympathy and kindness. No wonder that the institution of the family has drawn down upon itself a certain amount of criticism. Indeed, Mr. Bernard Shaw bids us:

"Get rid of your family entanglements. Every mother you meet is as much your mother as the mother who bore you. Every man you meet is as much your brother as the man she bore after you."

Now we suggest that the true escape from this family egoism lies through religion. Children should be brought up to love their parents, but not merely as an end in itself; and parents themselves should not selfishly crave for their children's affection as if it were the sole consideration in family nurture. Harm is done both to parents and children when their mutual devotion gains intensity at the expense of breadth; for the parents will grudge their children to the service of the world, and the children, deprived sooner or later of parental affection by the circumstances of life, will suffer the loss of their idol and not easily learn how to replace it. Family life can "spoil" both children and parents. Certainly there is no institution which can vie with or replace the family as a training ground for community life. It is, indeed, admirably fitted to rehearse the "give and take" of human life. But it will actually fulfil this function only as the love of the home is from the first placed in a wider setting, and definitely related to the love of God and the service of man. There is no such wider setting for the homes of birds and beasts; they care for their own young with little

or no appreciation of the significance of their acts, for they are creatures of instinct rather than reason. If, then, the human home lives simply to eat, drink, and beget, what do its inmates more than the birds and the beasts? It is surely man's vocation not simply to live, but to understand the significance of life, to take up an attitude to the homes of others, and especially to that vast host of his fellows who have scarcely been able in this unfriendly world to attain anything that can in any worthy sense be called a home. Precious is the love of kindred and sweet are the affections of parents and children; but that is all the greater reason for sharing the feast and trying to "brother all the souls of men."

Besides the Home, the School exerts on the community an enormous influence. It is therefore a matter of great moment that we should have a clear understanding of the chief aim of Education. Roughly speaking, there are two main traditions on this subject, of which the one maintains that the primary purpose of Education is to culture the intellect, and the other, to develop character. We unhesitatingly adopt the latter view, on the ground that there can be no adequate preparation for the work of life unless there is also some comprehension of the ultimate purpose and significance of that work. What is the ultimate use of developing the mind, or of acquiring technological science, if such culture be divorced from an understanding of the meaning of life? The scholar and student will be left to himself to supply his own view of life's meaning, which often enough will be from our standpoint no worthy meaning at all. Indeed, it is only too likely that his philosophy of life will be of a hedonistic or utilitarian type—a mere philosophy of "getting on," a doctrine of conduct which is quite incompatible at least with the theory maintained in this book. Holding,

as we do, that work is in order to life, and that life is for the sake of love, no system of education can be adequate which does not impart above all a sound conception of the supreme purpose of all learning and skill. It is sometimes claimed that the older type of education given in the ancient Universities and in the great Public Schools is "corporate in its influence, spiritual in its appeal," while the more modern type given in the new urban Universities and Secondary Schools tends to be "individual and intellectual." We are not concerned to discuss how far this comparison is true, but only to contend that all Schools and Colleges should generate a spirit and develop a tradition of what is called "public service," by which expression we mean not only service to town, city, nation, or empire, but service which is essentially human in its final aim and motive. Education in unselfishness does not consist merely in learning "to play the game" in the team-spirit, though that helps; but it may also involve such a culture of unselfishness as makes a man willing to recast the "rules" of the game altogether, even to his own disadvantage. In other words, a sound education will teach a man always to relate the Justice which is Legal and Conventional to that which is Ideal.

In these days of wonderful scientific invention we are quickly developing by means of increased facilities of communication, by post, train, ship, air, and by wireless telephony, a culture that is international. These additional means of intercourse between the peoples of the world bring responsibilities as well as facilities. For through literature and wireless conversation the beginnings of a World University for all the races of the earth are being laid down. Can we moralize and spiritualize these modern means of communication as fast as science can supply us with them? Or must we

be content to send through the ether over countries and continents only futilities and banalities? The ear of all the world is fast becoming able to hear. What shall it be told? A rare opportunity is opening up to speak unto all peoples messages of peace and good will.

Sharing in the culture of all peoples, we can also share in the varied aspects of their lives, their work, their hopes and fears, sorrows and misfortunes. The Parliament of Man, the Federation of the World, is certainly not so impossible as at one time it seemed. Is the ideal of this book—Humanity as a Household of Faith, which goes beyond a World Parliament—also less impossible? At least we suggest that as an ideal it possesses truth.

Some will ask whether after all it is possible to feel a love for universal man. Of course, in the nature of the case, there cannot be the emotional intimacy of the love which we experience on the small scale of the ordinary family. But the sense of membership in a universal Family, even a Family of God, has inspired hosts of men and women to go to the service of peoples of alien race and colour whom previously they did not know, and for their sakes to endure hardship, encounter danger, and even sacrifice life itself. What is possible to the ordinary man is not any intimate acquaintance with people of other lands (he cannot have even personal and intimate acquaintance with the people of his own land), but an association of another kind. He can express a universal love in the first place by loving his own family, village, town, or nation from the universal point of view. As for those who are not so nearly related to him, who, indeed, may be distant peoples of strange language and customs, these he can love in the sense that he can support all movements, societies, and legislative acts that have for their object universal justice and friendship. He can substitute for

the parochial spirit the International Mind, and then go on to aspire after a Domestic World.

It will be at once understood that the making of a Domestic World can be a matter only of spiritual growth. Those who indulge in such wild cries as "Socialism in our Time" scarcely know what they are saying. Certainly it might be possible quickly to change certain social institutions; but the problem is not so simple as that. The socialization of services and institutions can be a stable and enduring success only as it is accompanied by the creation of the social mind. To get a perfect society you need far more than nationalization; you need, in fact, a community in which each loves other as himself, and that is not so easy. What is more, you need the spirit of community made general over the world. The creation of such a spirit, it may be said, will require centuries, possibly ages of time. But even many centuries spent on the supreme task of humanity may not be long if the history of man is but beginning, and especially if millions of years remain for development. Besides, it is not impossible that the spirit of mankind should scorn the years and speed faster than time itself in its ethical progress.

CHAPTER VIII

HOME-SICKNESS

NOSTALGIA, in its literal sense, is usually an experience which visits merely young persons, and which in due course they generally outgrow. There are, however, instances of its occurrence in adult and comparatively aged people. In Tschaikowski it attained a strength that was wellnigh pathological. He could never leave his native Russia without undergoing a very agony of longing to return. Though he was fifty-one years of age at the time, he often broke down during his tour in America from home-sickness. As his ship drew near to New York he collapsed. Referring to an interview with a Russian lady in the course of his tour, he wrote:—

“This was the first time I had the pleasure of talking to a Russian lady; consequently I made a fool of myself. Suddenly the tears came into my eyes, my voice broke, and I could not suppress my sobs. I fled into the next room and could not show myself again for a long time. I blush with shame to think of this unexpected episode.”

So uncontrollable can longing for one's native land become!

But there is another type of home-sickness which is not pathological, which is not even temperamental, but rather ethical. It takes the form of wistfulness for the Ideal, a longing not so much for an actual country as for ideal conditions of life. In the case of the Pilgrim Fathers, for instance, we see how the strong love of fatherland may be subordinated to a love still stronger, to a passionate yearning after a form of community

life whose laws they could fashion more nearly to their hearts' desire. And so to the new world of Columbus and Cabot sailed in September 1620 a shipload of pioneers, to be followed in the subsequent twenty years by upwards of 22,000 Puritan emigrants.

Pontius in his *Vita Cypriani* (A.D. 259), referring to the pagan authorities who banished Cyprian, observes:—

“Their country is too dear to them . . . to live outside their own state is a severe punishment for them; to the Christian the whole of the world is a single home.”¹

“A single home” it is, of course, to the Christian, who regards himself as a child in his Father's world. But in the ethical sense “the single home” is not so much an actuality as an ideal to be striven for. To whatever country a man belongs, his aim, we maintain, should be so to moralize human life, so to create the family spirit among men, as to set up in every land the Great Household. The longing for a Domestic World which should inspire every effort to establish it is a kind of home-sickness—in fact, a spiritual nostalgia.

Since the world began man has from time to time indulged in dreams of what a perfect society would be like. It is true the Golden Age was sometimes thought of as in the remote past; but that it was thought of at all indicates a certain feeling after the ideal, and is an expression of the home-sickness of the soul. But as civilization advanced men turned from the past and fixed their hopes on the future. As an example of this mass optimism nothing is more impressive than the history of Jewish Apocalyptic. Amid the direst calamity the Jew was encouraged to look forward to the establishment of an ideal community in which there would

¹ Quoted by Dr. C. J. Cadoux, *The Early Church and the World* (T. & T. Clark).

be neither moral nor physical evil. The views as to the time, duration, and locality of this perfect society varied considerably: some believed that it would be set up on earth before the final Judgment and have but a limited duration, others held that it would be established after the final Judgment and have its locale on the earth. The manner of the coming of this Kingdom was by some conceived as gradual, by others as catastrophic. Among other peoples spiritual idealism has not taken the form of a mass-dream so much as a desire for social betterment cherished in the heart of an individual, or by a few enlightened souls, and afterwards shared by the rest in greater or lesser degree. From Plato to H. G. Wells individual thinkers have sketched Utopias which have stimulated the soul of society.

It is an interesting inquiry to seek out the causes of these Apocalyptic and Utopian dreams and the respect paid to them by men. Obviously the general cause lies in a discontent with things as they are. How does this discontent arise? The answer is not easy. Is it due to economic and political suffering? Persons are not homesick unless they are conscious of being absent from home and of being deprived of what is dear to them. And that consciousness, it is said, does not readily come to those who are immersed in miserable conditions. The attitude which is begotten in such is largely that of listlessness rather than wistfulness; often enough it is an attitude of sheer despair. Custom is so deadening in its effect that it is only with great difficulty that an oppressed people rouse themselves from their own inertia. They may sigh under their burden, but they scarcely know what they sigh for. Some sociologists¹

¹ E.g. L. P. Edwards in *Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago Univ. Press).

think that revolutions come only while repression is lessening, and accordingly distinguish the state of "Repression" under which the victims can struggle and think from the state of "Oppression" under which they merely feel. And it would, indeed, seem that there may exist a dull discontent which is merely "felt" and which remains passive. Not until Imagination begins to play upon the discontent does social movement begin. Often enough, however, this Imagination is not spontaneously kindled by the people themselves; its fire is frequently borrowed. Great as were the sufferings of the French people prior to the Revolution, it is doubtful whether those sufferings would ever have focused themselves into definite action had it not been for the stimulus derived from external suggestion, so to speak; from such a book, in fact, as the *Social Contract* of Rousseau, which has been called the "Bible" of the Revolution. Of course, the Imagination which rouses a country to action must be informed, not wild and uninstructed. And Rousseau's conception of an ideal State had enough truth in it to reveal by contrast the evil of the existing regime. It is a vision of a better order of society which stirs a people; but that vision is often enough seen only by individuals of rare perception and instructed sympathy. And the more such a vision is shared, the more will discontent grow, even though economic and social conditions may themselves be in a comparatively improved state. This, indeed, has been spoken of as the paradox of progress. With the amelioration of circumstances discontent grows. It grows because the imagination of the multitude has been roused and instructed by leaders of thought and the spread of education.

All this, of course, places a great burden of responsibility on those who can direct the mind of a community

whether as thinkers, preachers, or teachers. Two main qualifications at least seem necessary for the discharge of such a function : Knowledge and Sympathy.

Only those can direct wisely and well the aspirations of a people who have adequate knowledge both of the evils to be left behind and of the goal to be striven for. Unfortunately, owing to the physical and social separation of classes in the world, one class scarcely knows how the other lives. The backward and the oppressed may know each other and each other's conditions ; likewise the fortunate and culturally advanced may be familiar with each other and their common lot. And the result of this restricted experience is inertia. The one class hardly know of how much they are deprived, and the other scarcely realize of how much they are possessed. Comparisons and contrasts are therefore not easily made : a member of one class does not know what it feels like to live as a member of a higher or lower. And so the *status quo* tends to be maintained, and there is little social nostalgia. It would, however, seem a more feasible thing for those of a higher to acquaint themselves with the life of those at a lower social stratum than *vice versa*. A forward race or class can more truly estimate the cultural distance that exists between themselves and those who are backward than can the members of the backward themselves. Nevertheless, mere knowledge of this superiority will minister merely to idle curiosity or complacency apart from active sympathy. Social reformers have usually this twin endowment of knowledge and sympathy. They know both human misery on the one hand and human possibility on the other ; and withal they possess the sympathy that leads them to seek to raise their fellows from their low estate to the height of human attainment. It is significant that many of the leaders of

social reform have had unique knowledge and sympathy. In many cases they have agitated for reform even though the application of the principles which they advocated would involve them in personal loss. For instance, Sir Thomas More about the time when he projected his Utopia had a large practice as a barrister, and was employed in the Royal service on a mission to Flanders. The founders of German Socialism—Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx—by birth both belonged to the upper classes, and both were University students with the usual ambitions of the scholar.¹ Saint-Simon, one of the pioneers of French Socialism, was of noble descent and traced his lineage back to Charlemagne.² In more recent times, Jean Leon Jaurès was an “intellectual,” not a “working-man,” and became a professor of philosophy. Bakunin was born a Russian aristocrat, the son of a diplomatist, but nevertheless described his Socialism as “instinctive.” Kropotkin was a Prince, descended from an ancient Russian family that was said to have a better claim to the throne of Russia than the Romanoffs. Tolstoi, it is unnecessary to add, was a Count and the possessor of large landed estates. The leaders of reform in England were themselves not poor men. It is true that Robert Owen was born poor, but it was when he had become a successful manufacturer that he advocated his schemes for the reorganization of society. Thomas Carlyle’s enthusiasm for social justice was not gained by experience as a manual labourer, but begotten largely by sympathy. Southey, who was called by Dicey “the prophetic precursor of modern collectivism,” was a poet.³ William Morris was an artist as well as a poet. F. D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley were distinguished

¹ Cf. Vedder, *Socialism and the Ethics of Jesus*, p. 75.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

³ C. E. Raven, *Christian Socialism*, p. 48.

preachers and writers. Ludlow, who has, however, been regarded as the real founder of Christian Socialism in England,¹ was the son of a Colonel in the Indian army, and received a first-class education in Paris. John Ruskin was both rich and clever—a great art critic and a man of wealth. Living writers like G. B. Shaw, H. G. Wells, and the Webbs can scarcely be said to maintain their ardour for social reform by a life lived under dreary industrial conditions.

But though so many pioneers have, generally speaking, lived outside the conditions they seek to ameliorate, they have obtained the requisite knowledge of these conditions, sometimes by temporary experience of them, but always by an observation and an imagination made keen at least by sympathy.

But of course social sympathy must be enlightened, not merely in regard to the conditions which it is desirable to escape, but especially as to the ideal to which it is desirable to advance. In what direction lies the haven of men's dreams? To avoid all possible misunderstanding we will try to make clear what our own view is.

Many idealists desire for the whole community merely better material conditions. Now no one who sees the squalor, disease, and suffering of life will be inclined to scoff at such idealism even though we regard it as limited in its outlook. It is, however, inadequate because it deals with conditions rather than with human nature. Indeed, the hope that is placed in Parliaments and Soviets as remedial agencies is pathetic. Such agencies, after all, depend upon force, and force is no remedy for what is surely a spiritual ailment. The "dictatorship" whether of the proletariat or any other group is, in so far as it is a dictatorship, a con-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

fession of failure finally to solve the great problem of society. The complete idealist must be thorough in his idealism and strive to better men as well as conditions; otherwise all his efforts will break down sooner or later through the failure of human nature. It is, however, easy to get the problem out of focus. Whereas those who stress the importance of conditions are apt to forget the spiritual basis upon which conditions ultimately depend, on the other hand those who emphasize the importance of a spiritual foundation for social reconstruction fail sometimes to see that it is wanting unless there actually is in evidence a superstructure. It is not enough to say that "the soul of all improvement is the improvement of the soul" and to forget that an "improved" soul which does not function in a new body has not really experienced the improvement attributed to it. The alleged "failure" of Christianity, for instance, to meet social needs really means that Christianity has not been tried. No doubt the Church has, at certain epochs particularly, been ambiguous in its witness and supine in action; and this fact may have led some idealists to seek a merely secular basis for human brotherhood. Nevertheless, the apathy of the Church at certain eras discredits, not Christianity itself, but merely its imperfect representatives. As a matter of fact, society can find a powerful dynamic for social construction merely in two words uttered by Jesus, who said, "When ye pray, say, *Our Father.*"

The evidence of the history of Revolutions is ambiguous in respect of the quality both of the results achieved and of the motives that inspired them. As to the effects, it may be sufficient to quote the opinion of a modern sociologist who says: "The wounds of such internal conflicts as the French Revolution and the American Civil War have perhaps healed . . . but the good

which they accomplished was bought at such a price . . . that if the changes which they effected could have been secured in any other way, it would have been socially preferable.”¹

As to the quality of motive present in Revolution, we think that these violent crises, instead of revealing the deeper trend of the human spirit, rather bring out what we call the worst. When a regime is felt to be unjust, and when an opportunity for radical action presents itself, men see “red.” The first feeling is one of anger issuing in a desire violently to destroy the old regime and all associated with it. Such an attitude is backward-looking, and is apt to generate a permanent attitude of hate. Now such an attitude of hate, however widely it is shared, and however confident of success, is ultimately useless as the means of establishing a stable and harmonious society. For, in the first place, it meets all opposition by violence, and by continually meeting force with force creates a vicious circle from which there is no escape, and which makes impossible that spirit of community by which alone man can effectually live with man. According to Trotsky, “there is in history no other way of breaking the class-will of the enemy except by the systematic and energetic use of violence.” Such a mistake is pathetic if it were not so serious. The truth is, of course, that violence never broke a “class-will” nor any other will. Violence has broken very much in history, but it never broke a human will. Human wills need to be broken in the sense that they need to be changed; indeed, the setting up of an ideal society is the problem of changing men rather than conditions. But of that problem force affords no solution. No Revolution in history (and “historically, force has always been the essence of Revolution”)

¹ Ellwood, *Psychology of Human Society*, p. 267.

has ever created Fraternity or anything approaching it, nor is ever likely to.

"Violence on the grand scale . . . so far from proving an avenue to communism, would be the one kind of existence in which the impulses demanded by a communist society would have no hope of emergence. For the condition of communism is the restraint of exactly those appetites which violence releases; and the communist has nowhere shown how this difficulty can be met except by affirming that dictatorship will destroy them."¹

Besides, there is in a common Hate, however widely it is shared, no power to weld into a social unity the members who experience it together; and this, because hatred is so rarely free from the taint of self, and because this element of selfishness eventually proves a divisive influence, even though its presence may for a long time lurk unnoticed. Hence it has often happened that those who have united in a campaign for Fraternity have been disillusioned by the discovery of its absence from their own ranks. Nor is there any guarantee that those who would coerce others into brotherhood will be eminent examples themselves of the unselfish spirit.

If, however, we condemn the use of violence as an auxiliary to the effecting of a radical change in Society, if we recognize the tragic blunder in psychology thereby implied, nevertheless we must not fail to detect the element of wistfulness even in Communism. Bolshevism itself is a nostalgia, very different, of course, from the heart-sickness of the distinguished Russian to whom we referred at the beginning of this chapter, and which probably in his day he never expected. But behind all the blood and terror, behind all the crass muddle-

¹ H. J. Laski, *Communism*, p. 174. (Home University Library, 1927.)

headedness of Revolution, there is a discontent and a yearning whose significance it is easy to miss. The aim cannot be purely selfish, inasmuch as so many will lay down their own lives for its realization. Clearly there is evidence of genuine social passion acting as a dynamic. The social enthusiasm of leaders rouses similar passion in others—which, indeed, is what we should expect if our psychology of human nature in Part I is sound. Man, we said, in spite of all his aberrations, in spite of the inertia of his will, is fundamentally social. This basic sociality is revealed in his love of family and kindred, in the love of comrades, even in the phenomena of class-consciousness, and in racial attraction. And in the view that he takes of an emancipated humanity he looks forward to what he thinks will be a superior type of social existence. This hope is traceable even in Lenin's *Utopia*, for he envisages the day when, as he puts it, the State will have "withered" and government will be shorn of its coercive character. In such a day universal consent and harmonious co-operation will have displaced every kind of dictatorship.

Our own view of the perfect society is not dissimilar in some respects, though we profoundly disagree, as will have been gathered, with all methods of violence as means of attaining the goal. We, too, think that an ideal Community would be anarchical, if such a word can be divested of its associations. For in such a "Beloved Community," however complex the administration of life would be, there could by hypothesis be no coercion; everyone would love his neighbour as himself. In a word, the world of men would have become a Family, even a Great Household in which love is law and law is love.

This we believe to be the Christian conception of the perfect Community. It may at first sight seem strange

that the New Testament represents such a society as forming a "Kingdom" with its latent suggestion of a coercive system. "Kingdom" was indeed the term used by Jesus himself, as in the oft-repeated phrase "Kingdom of Heaven." Jesus, however, could scarcely speak to the people in any other phrase, for it was an inheritance from the Jewish past, and was the current form of expression at the time. Indeed, in his worship in the synagogue Jesus would hear most frequently as the title of God "Sovereign of the Universe."¹ It was this idea which was the regulative conception in Jewish prayer and ritual. But when you find what, according to Jesus, God's "Kingdom" is like, that it is the sphere of the humble, the pure-hearted, the merciful, the gentle, the devout, you realize at once that, while the old terminology is still being used, its meaning is so different from that aforetime that the significance of the idea of kingdom has changed. And apart from the Gospel of Matthew—written more especially for Jews—there is a tendency for the regal aspect of God's relation to man to recede into the background. Jesus, indeed, in his own teaching and life revealed the nature of God as Love, a Love which he finally expressed by his Cross. The idea of God as a Father, which was of a somewhat secondary rank in the synagogue worship, was in Jesus' teaching given the supreme position. Even in Matthew's account of the Sermon on the Mount the term "Father" occurs seventeen times. We must therefore interpret the Kingdom of God in terms of the Fatherhood. And accordingly we must regard it as the aim of Christianity to establish among men a Household rather than a Kingdom, at least in the old sense of mere theocratic rule. No doubt in relation to man God is Creator and Lord, and because of our human

¹ Walker, *What Jesus Read*, p. 23. (George Allen & Unwin, 1925.)

tendency to revolt his Will is felt to be more or less repressive. Yet in proportion as man grows in the love of God and of his neighbour the Divine Will loses its repressive or coercive character and becomes, as the Psalmist found, a matter of "delight." The relationship of created and Creator is in the nature of the case unchangeable; but the relationship of Father and child can become so harmonious as to be adequately expressed by the idea of life in a Home rather than in a Kingdom.

The view of morality which we have sought to express in the present book may be called an "Evolutionary Ethic" in the sense that it is based on the fundamental trend of the developing life-process; and our ethical ideal may be described as that of a "perfected humanity." Some writers, however, hold that the effect of Evolution is to subordinate the individual to the general good. "The individual," it is said, "exists only for the sake of new generations of individuals";¹ "individuals are a means, not an end, of evolution";² and the ideal is a "perfected humanity."³

We do not demur to the statement that individuals are a means to other individuals, present and future. In many respects, particularly in regard to material acquisition, scientific and artistic culture, this is quite obvious. In such matters any generation is the heir of preceding generations, and the last generation, if there is ever a last, will be the most fortunate legatee of all. It is, indeed, because other generations have thought and worked that we, for instance, know that the earth moves round the sun, that we are able to navigate the seas, that we can derive motive power from steam and

¹ Wildon Carr, *Changing Backgrounds in Religion and Ethics*, p. 63. (Macmillan & Co.)

² *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 222.

electricity, that we can travel through the air and speak through space. Perhaps the generations to come will advance in discovery and attainment as far beyond ourselves as we have progressed beyond the culture of Abraham. But we must not confuse mental and material progress with moral. Because we can send our voice through the ether of space we are not on that account more "perfect" in an ethical sense than the inhabitants of Ur of the Chaldees, who could not vocally communicate beyond the ordinary range of speech.

Now a "perfected humanity" in the moral sense can after all consist only of individuals. So when it is said, as above, that the individual exists only for the sake of new generations of individuals, the fallacy is in the "only." To say that any individual exists merely as a means to another begs a great and critical question. To grant this position would be to imply that true ethical life is impossible except to those people who happen to be alive at the time when the perfect community has come into being.

Is the ethical life, however, of such a nature that it must necessarily be restricted as to time and date? In accordance with the argument in Part I, we can form no other idea of what ethical life is than that it is life that is "natural" in the sense there explained, viz. the world-process adopted by the human will and given rational expression. Briefly stated, morality is the will to love humanity both in one's own person and in that of others. And such a will is practicable by any man at any stage of society's evolution. Indeed, it may and ought to be practised even though it meets with little or no reciprocation, though as yet "the perfected humanity" or the Great Household is but an ideal, even as Plato taught that the citizen of an imperfect

State will organize his own life according to the pattern of the ideal Republic. "The question of its (i.e. the ideal city's) present or future existence on earth is quite unimportant. For in any case he (the good citizen) will adopt the practices of such a city to the exclusion of those of every other."¹

In conclusion we may refer again to a question briefly mentioned in our Introduction. We there stated that in our view there is no inherent impossibility of establishing the Great Household in the world that now is. Others have thought that the hope of a perfect Society must be relegated to a transcendental sphere. Such seemed to be the opinion of Plato. Centuries later, at the time of the decay and dissolution of the Roman Empire, Augustine opposed to the vicissitudes of earthly kingdoms and human governments his ideal of a "City of God," a spiritual and eternal realm, of which all of whatever race or nation, whether they were living or dead, who acknowledged one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, are members. Earthly kingdoms are imperfect, transient in duration, coercive in method, vitiated by human folly and sin. But in so far as men become citizens of the Heavenly City they have a unity which neither governments, nor sin, nor death can dissolve. Such a conception, however inspiring in its day, and however true in itself, is too transcendental a view of human unity, and not quite relevant to the relations of men in this world. The social Ideal must be "World-Affirming," and not merely "World-Renouncing."

Nevertheless, while we hold that our social Ideal is applicable to the world that now is, we do not imply that it is restricted to this world, or even that its full realization does not also necessitate a transcendental

¹ Plato, *Republic*, Bk. IX, end, tr. Davies and Vaughan.

sphere free from the limitations imposed by physical and material conditions. Indeed, there are considerations that severely challenge the "Perfection" of any Society if it be regarded as living its life under the limitations of time and space. To these we will make only a very brief reference.

In the first place, then, there is the problem created by cases of extreme self-sacrifice. We have said that the fundamental trend of life is social, in which regard to self and others is a unitary interest. Situations, however, arise—they arose in wholesale fashion during the Great War—in which the individual apparently had to surrender all regard for self and give up all for others. In such cases life could not function as a process of "take and give"; it was absorbed in giving. Some contend that it is a quite satisfactory thing that we exist merely to transmit excellence to posterity. But this seems an elusive ideal. It eludes us for the simple reason that the well-being which we seek to promote in our neighbours turns out, when you arrive at the neighbours in question, to be the duty which *they* have to promote well-being in *their* neighbours or successors. Now these successors in turn must live for *their* successors, and so on; and thus you never come to rest. Well-being, so explained, is like a football which is passed from player to player and is never held for long. It may be said that a martyr or a soldier lives on in the continued effects of his martyrdom or sacrifice, and that in this way he survives and continues his vocation as a lover of his kind. But what actually are these effects? They are, of course, effects on the lives of survivors and successors in the form either of increased happiness or goodness. But why should one man shed his blood and cease to be, merely that another man—for logically it amounts to this—should be a lover of his

kind instead of himself? Both self and neighbour seem called to an equally high vocation. What, then, of the vocation of him who dies? According to our view, self-sacrifice and self-realization should go together. This condition seems to be met only on the understanding that a man must survive his sacrifice, living on, if not in this world, yet in some other.

But in the second place, even if it be granted that self-sacrifice finds a rationale in the idea that the way is being slowly prepared for a Super-race, this conception, again, on analysis seems unsatisfactory. Such a noble Race cannot have in such a world of mortality as ours stability or permanence. The personnel of such a race must be constantly changing and its identity thus becomes problematic. Those who cannot believe in the permanence and eternity of Value apart from the subjects in whom Value inheres, look for another sphere where Love shall be more than a fleeting experience that can never stay, even Immortal and Eternal because the subjects of Love are preserved for evermore. But here we arrive on the threshold of the doctrine of Immortality of which any further discussion would take us beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it for us to conclude by remarking that the home-sickness of mankind has in its yearning continually passed beyond the bounds of this life; it has, in fact, sought for itself a more enduring dwelling-place than earth, even for a house "not made with hands, a building of God, eternal in the heavens."



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